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ABSTRACT 
A review of the literature indicated that a reappraisal of 
the conceptual and methodological approach to the study of 
deafness was necessary if research is to explain why deaf 
children fail to achieve the scholastic potential predicted 
by I. Q. tests. 
This study aims to test the utility and validity of an 
approach, in whic 
,h 
the psychological 'consequences of 
deafness are viewed as an alternative perspective on 
normal human information processing; the result of 
functional adaptation to the environment. Qualitative and 
quantitative methods of data analysis, are used to examine 
process and structure underlying outcome. 
The approach- is tested by examining control of attention 
and visuo-spatial processing and the relationship of these 
to language in severely and profoundly prelingually deaf 
children between the ages of 2 and 6 years, whose primary 
means of communication is British Sign language (BSL). 
These were examined using tests of problems solving, 
memory, intelligence and observational studies of play. 
The results emphasise the importance of visual information 
gathering and processing for deaf children. Control of 
attention is seen to vary as a function of the visual 
complexity of the environment and of stimuli, ease of 
environmental monitoring, and social factors. An 
observational study indicated that the deaf child uses 
language to direct his/her behaviour and as an adjunct to 
play. It was also observed that the ch ildren spent time 
exploring and using mirror images, and that this activity 
was related to BSL structures and functions. 
The use of these same mirror image like structures was 
also evident in visuo-spatial problem solving. In general 
visuo-spatial abilities were found to vary as a function of 
task and information characteristics, attentional demands 
of the stimuli and social factors; the presence of a deaf 
experimenter improved problem solving performance for 
concrete problems. The results were discussed with 
reference to Sign language, and its ability to represent 
information, and also interference, both positive and 
negative, consequent on tasks requiring the processing of 
both a visuo-spatial language and visuo-spatial information. 
It was concluded that the approach offered the potential 
to generate data which would lead*to a richer, and 
ecologically more useful, description of the cognitive 
abilities of deaf children. 
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3. 
CHAPTER 1: General Introduction and Definitions 
scope and Nature of the Thesis 
The psychology of deafness is, by and large, a by product. 
Deafness does not merely entail a loss of hearing, but also, 
limited access to oral language and all which is consequent. 
Thus the deaf have been seen as a natural experimental 
population with which to test theories concerning the 
relationship between language and thought. The processes 
which have led to a psychology of deafness could be 
schematised thus; 
Observation of hearing 
populations 
Theory/Model building to 
describe data 
Formulation of Testing of predictions 
hypotheses using deaf populations 
as comparators 
Conformation of thelý 
ý/rnodel 
on basis of comparative data 
Evaluation of deaf data- . psychology ofdeafness 
qua original theory/model 
Two things are immediately obvious from this scheme; 1) it is 
tautologous and 2) there are no direct observations of the 
deaf- This has led to a deficit model of, deafness, which 
emphasises what the deaf cannot do compared to the hearing 
and which claims that similarities in performance are explained 
by the theory which the deficit was used to test. 
Whilst this approach may have told us something about the 
hearing, it has told us little which is of practical use to the 
deaf and educators of the deaf. Despite nearly a hundred 
years of research, we are no nearer to answering the central 
question which the research has posed; 
"Why do deaf children fail to achieve the scholastic potential 
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predicted by I. Q tests". 
Where earlier research had addressed this question indirectly, 
by comparing the deaf to the theoretical yardsticks upon which 
successful hearing education was founded, more recent research 
has addressed the problem directly. This has been done by 
posing the same kinds of fundamental questions as were asked 
of hearing populations, directly to deaf populations. A second 
factor has also had to be taken into consideration; Sign 
language has been recoqnised as an independent and fully 
functional natural language. Social changes have also taken 
place with the deaf community demanding their right to have 
Sign language recognised as their preferred first language. 
These taken together have_ led to increasing acceptance of sign 
language, in research, if not in educational practice. 
To summarise, there has been a recognition of the inadequacy, 
from the point of view of a useful psychology of deafness, of 
data derived from studies where the deaf are an experimental 
population with which to te-ýt theories about hearing 
populations. This has led to research where the deaf per se 
are the focus. The linguistic status of sign language, and of 
the deaf thdmselves, has changed, giving rise to a research 
climate which is different from that in which the earlier 
research was conducted. This then raises the question, what 
implications do these changes have for evaluating the previous 
research and for formulating future research? 
This study raises and explores some of these implications. 
Previous research is examined with two questions in mind 1) 
what are the underlying assumptions, both explicit and implicit, 
and 2) how would different assumptions, derived from an 
alternative perspective, affect the interpretation of results 
or choice of study. This train of thought is carried through 
to the empirical work, by the choice of test materials and 
methods of data analysis. 
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It was felt that earlier cognitive research did not provide a 
secure empirical base on which construct testable hypotheses. 
Neither was it felt that a purely theoretically derived 
alternative could provide such a base without it first being 
demonstrated that an approach based on such a system was 
empirically viable and would lead to data which was ecologically 
valid and practically useful. As this project, by its nature, is 
of limited scope; its aim is to construct and test the 
feasibility of, an alternative approach to the psychology of 
deafness, within a limited domain. Two key constructs are 
common to all the studies; visuo-spatial processing and control 
of attention. These are the two areas, which an examination o'f 
past and present research, and my own observations, suggest as 
being of central importance. 
The project takes as its focus the relationship between Sign 
language and thought and, therefore, children whose primary 
means of communication is Sign language. The extent to which 
any conclusions drawn apply to orally educated children is an 
empirical question which is not addressed here. Bohm (1984) 
said "... science has been affected by a point of view which 
tries to be value free. This is of course mere prejudice. ". 
Anyone beginning to research into issues surrounding deafness 
and language, immediately finds themselves in a political 
maelstrom, where polemic tends to be the main currency. 
In such a situation it is virtually impossible to hold an 
unbiased view. I do not claim any privileged exemption from 
this, nor do I claim to be "nothing but an unbiased observer". 
I have endeavoured to specify my bias in the form of explicitly 
stated assumptions. 
Definitions 
The following is not intended to be an exhaustive set of 
definitions for all terms used, rather they represent the 
minimum necessary to set the tone and context of what will 
f ollow. For this reason, any justifications for the choice of 
definition are kept to a minimum, as these will emerge during 
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the course of the discussions to follow. Some terms are only 
defined in the course of the discussion. For example, in 
Chapter 3 the term verbal is discussed and defined. 
Deafness 
Deafness is a complex term, referring to loss of the sense of 
hearing, which is applied to a heterogeneous group of people, 
The implications of deafness extend beyond hearing loss to 
include linguistic and cultural considerations. Webster (1986) 
suggested that deafness be more accurately characterised as a 
lack of language. In fact these tend to be related, but 
already we have acceded to an assumption about what 
constitutes language. In his definition Webster means spoken 
language. I will'say more about this latter 
Objectively, deafness is defined in terms of hearing loss in 
decibels (dB), which is a logarithmic scale. Hearing loss is 
measured by comparing the intensity of sound required for 
detection by the subject with a baseline. The difference 
between the two is expressed in decibels. Conductive and 
sensori-neural hearing measurements are taken for five 
frequencies between 250 and 4000 Hertz. Hearing loss is then 
categorised according to the range in which it falls. Losses 
up to 40 decibels are Slight; between 40 and 70 decibels, 
Moderate; between 70 and 100 decibels, Severe; losses in excess 
of this Profound (British Association of Teachers of the Deaf, 
1981). 
Quoted hearing loss measurements are averages of loss over 
the range of frequencies measured, for the better ear. The 
mid range, 500 to 2000 hertz, are the most important for 
understanding speech. Figure 1.1 shows audiograms for two 
people with better ear losses of 80 dB. From the diagrams it 
can be seen that two people with the same quoted hearing loss 
can have differential access to sound, which in the case 
/ 
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Figure 1.1 
0 
Audiograms Showing a Severe Bilateral Hearing Loss of 
80 Decibels in the Better Ear 
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r- 
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of a child will determine to some extent the probability of 
acquiring spoken language. 
Deafness need not be continuous i. e. it may be intermittent. 
Also hearing loss may not be due to damage to the sensory 
mechanism (sensori-neural loss) but can be due to masking of 
the signal by, for exaMple, tinnitus or glue ear (Otitis media) 
(conductive loss).,, T. innitus. may also be present with sensory 
loss. Finally, the etiology of deafness can vary from genetic 
to the capricious. Non-genetic causes of deafness include 
maternal rubella, birth trauma and meningitis. Some etiologies, 
e. g. maternal rubella, have an associated risk of C. N. S. damage 
over and above the hearing loss. 
Speech Acquisition 
The above criteria for deafness -are purely mechanical. One of 
the most obvious consequences of deafness is its effect on 
speech, sometimes to the point where a person has no 
intelligible speech. Unsurprisingly, therefore, definitions. of 
deafness are intimately bound with linguistic considerations. 
Webster (1986) suggested that deafness, may be better described 
as the deprivation of language. The audiograms in figure 1.1, 
both show a. yerage hearing losses of 8OdB. However the 
relative distributions of loss across the frequencies 
demonstrates that even in the case of an identical quoted 
hearing loss, access to speech may be differentially affected. 
Speech information, particularly the nuance, is predominantly 
carried by the high frequencies. Mere access to sounds is not 
of itself enough to predict the development of speech, and 
hence ascribe deafness, as evidenced by those who are 
categorised as severely deaf who do not acquire speech and 
those who are categorised as profoundly deaf who do acquire 
speech. 
When considering the speech implications of deafness an 
important factor is age of opset. Deafný-ss occurring after 
speech development has begun has less serious affects on 
I 
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speech than deafness which is prelingual. The seriousness of 
the affect of post-lingual deafness decreases as the age of 
onset of deafness increases. A consensus view is that the age 
of two represents the dividing line between pre- and 
post-lingual deafness. 
Whilst the hearing world defines deafness in terms of objective 
, measurements and speech acquisition 
the deaf have their own 
criteria. These are usually based on practical and cultural 
considerations such as can a person use a telephone, and where 
and wit h whom a person chooses to spend their time. 
Definition of Deafness Used here 
The term deaf, without qualification, will be used here to 
denote those who are severely or profoundly prelingually deaf. 
-This will also include those who, with respect to speech 
acquisition, behave as if they fell into these categories. This 
latter is necessary as the age of the subjects drawn from the 
nursery meant that reliability of their audiograms was 
uncertain. The term deaf will be qualified where necessary to 
avoid confusion. The slight and moderate categories will be 
referred to as partial hearing. 
Language 
Defining language is a difficult undertaking, for many reasons. 
Any person defining language, is a competent language user and 
brings intuitive knowledge of what language is to the task. 
Where language is to be the subject of empirical investigation, 
operational definitions are required, which must, of necessity, 
state precise boundary conditions for what is being studied. 
These two tend to lead to differing kinds of definition, 
functional, in the case of the former, and structural, in the 
case of the latter. A complete definition of Janguage would 
seem to require both structural and functional components if it 
is to be intuitively acceptable and empirically useful. Finally, 
any definition, should be such that it clearly 'exemplifi es-, which 
objects or events fall into the class and which do not- In the 
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case of language in relation to deafness, this is especially 
important as what is defined as language has profound 
implications for the alleged linguistic status of deaf 
experimental populations. 
Psychology, like- all science, is heavily dependant on language. 
Psychology differs, in the extent to which language is 
necessary to access its raw data, unlike those disciplines 
which use language to explicate physically given raw data. In 
the final analysis, however, all science depends on some form 
of language, be it natural language, such as English or a formal 
language such as mathematics. The purpose of these languages 
is, to use Pask's (ý980) term, to 'exteriorise' thought 
processes, such- that they may be shared, pointed to, commented 
on, and reached agreement on. This view encompasses more than 
communication; it also includes representation. Science, and 
indeed, any form of culture, can only arise because homo sapiens 
has the ability to create and use generative, representational 
and communicative systems. This then forms my definition of 
language. 
Definition of Language used Here 
The term Language.. is used here to mean any open, rule 
governed, generative system of symbols, which is capable of 
representation and communication in space and/or in time. A 
language can represent objects in the world, thought, or both. 
This definition has much in common with a symbolic 
interactionist view of language. Many kinds of symbol systems, 
such as mathematics, music and natural language, with diverse 
properties, attain the same status on functional grounds, 
without prejudice to structure. The essential point is that 
there is a set of rules or Grammar, which prescribes the ways 
individual symbols may be combined, and which in turn, allows 
decomposition of the string to recover the intended meaning. 
In other words the grammar is shared between users of the 
symbol system. Language Acquisition is the acquisition of both 
the symbols and gr: ammar of a system which is shared by other 
r 
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members of a language community- 
Languages may vary along a number of dimensions, as a function 
of the adaptive purposes and pragmatic uses of the language. 
For example, understanding natural language requires the use of 
presupposition, whereas mathematics is constructed to reduce 
presupposition to a minimum, and then to axiomatic cases. This 
allows mathematics to function in a more descriptively precise 
arid unambiguous manner than is possible in. natural language. 
This difference does not imply a deviancy of either language 
from some predetermined norm; it merely reflects their 
functional adaptation to a particular realm of discourse, each 
being adept at representing and communicating the intent 
(thought) of users in that domain. 
Symbols: Oral Language, Sign Language and Sign Systems 
The definition of language above, does not dictate the form the 
symbols must take, nor the medium in which they are 
transmitted. The word language, to the majority of people, 
means the language they speak, such as English or French. In 
these languages the symbols are words (morphemes) and the 
primary transmission medium is oral (speech). This is what I 
mean when I use th. e term oral language. Orsýl language may 
also be transmitted visually, i. e. in written form, and received 
visually by reading. A second way of receiving an oral 
message visually is by lip reading (speech reading) where the 
message is decoded from the lip patterns of the speaker. 
Manual languages are those in which the hands and body are 
used to transmit the symbols. In British Sign Language (BSL) 
the symbols are signs, which are formed by the hands, face 
and body. The primary means of transmission is gestural 
(manual). There is no secondary medium, in that there is no 
written form of BSL. Not only are the symbols of BSL 
different from those oE English, but also the grammar. Hence 
it is a distinct and autonomous language, denoted by the term 
Sign Language or Sign. 
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There are a number of other manual methods of communication, 
such as Sign Supported English (SSE), Signed Essential English 
(SEE), Makaton and Paget-Gorman (PG). These are not included in 
the term Sign language, although they fall within the definition 
of language. These sign systems may be thought of as pidgins, 
where the grammatical structure of one language (oral) is 
imposed on the symbol system of another (sign). This involves 
more than just making sign order follow, say English word order, 
but includes the creation of new symbols to represent 
grammatical markers not used in Sign language. 
Thought, Cognition and Cognitive Processes 
As with language, a precise definition of thought is complicated 
by a persons intuitions and common sense notions of what 
constitutes thought. In any event it is a term which carries a 
multitude of meanings. The debate. concerning the relationship 
between language and thought implies that they are distinct 
entities, or can be contrasted (thought about! ), at a 
theoretical level. In the next chapter, I specify my views on 
the relationship between language and thought and will, 
therefore, leave the definition until then. Suffice it to say 
here, that I use thought as a general and non-specific term to 
cover any "psychological process which cannot be directly 
observed. 
The terms cognition and cognitive processes, are used in a 
more specific way. These refer to subsets of thought, such as 
visuo-spatial processing, for which definit ions, either 
theoretical or operational, are advanced and which imply a 
definite structure and/or function. For example, I would use 
the term cognition to refer to Piaget's schema. 
t 
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CHAPTER 2: Area of Interest; Language, Thought and Psychology. 
Some Reflections on Constructivism and Innatism. The History 
of Deafness. 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I stated that I would endeavour to 
make my bias as clear as possible. Jahoda (1980) cautions 
psychologists against confusing the ontological with the 
conceptual. By this she meant that underlying any scientific 
enterprise, there is a set of beliefs, about how the world is, 
which are not necessarily articulated or specified in the 
conceptual framework of the enterprise. Whilst this is true 
for all science, Jahoda believes that the nature of the subject 
matter of psychology and the potential consequences of its 
findings, place a special responsibility on psychologists to be 
clear about their (philosophical and untested) beliefs. The 
first part of this chapter is a statement of those beliefs I 
hold, which are of direct relevance to the thesis. The second 
part gives a brief history of issues surrounding deafness and 
gives the context in which previous research was carried out. 
Language, Thought and Humanity 
The relationship between language and thought has been the 
subject of philosophical controversy for centuries. People,. -have 
two attributes which are generally considered to set them-. 
from the rest of the animal kingdom; language and the 
possession of a self concept. In classical times, language was 
considered to be an innate (e. g. Herodotus) and necessary 
condition, for a person to be considered human. It was 
believed that without language the kind of thought which 
''enables unique aspects of human intelligence, such as reasoning 
and foresight, are impossible. People who could not speak, such 
as the deaf, could not think and were, therefore, considered 
sub-human. This view was incorporated into Roman law and in 
turn passed into European law, so that as late as the 17th 
century the ability to speak was a legal necessity for 
inheritance etc. Indeed, it is this aspect of law which provided 
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the impetus for the development of methods of teaching the 
deaf to speak. 
The Relationship between Language and Thought 
Until the advent of psychology, formal specification of the 
relationship between language and thought had been an esoteric 
undertaking and the province of philosophers. Language and 
thought, along with behaviour are the raw data of psychology 
and therefore, the construction of predictive theories required 
empirical, as well as logical substantiation, of any alleged 
relationship. In this context, the relationship between language 
and thought, takes on a new significance. 
Another persons. thoughts are never directly accessible. We 
can only 'see' into the mind of another, by observing their. 
behaviour or their language and understanding the 
relationships between thought and language and behaviour. To 
achieve this understanding is the task. which confronts all of 
us, in our everyday lives, from the time we are born. . It is, of 
course, also the task of psychology. Psychology deals with the 
problem in two ways. The first, is to treat language and 
thought as distinct entities, defined in structural terms, and 
test explicit hypothetical relationships empirically. The 
arguments concerning the cognitive dominant hypothesis (e. g. 
Piaget, 1980), the linguistic relativity hypothesis (Whorf, 1956) 
arid its variants (Miller & McNeill, 1969) and t. he behaviourist 
view of direct correspondence between language and thought 
20) are well rehearsed, and will not be (e. g. Watson, 19Z 
reiterated here. Dealt with in this way, the question is a 
direct descendant of philosophical considerations and remains 
esoteric, although not totally bereft of practical significance. 
The second, and more general, way is to tacitly assume a 
functional relationship. This relationship is purely operational 
and implicit in the conceptual fraITLework which generates the 
theoretical constructs and empirical practices. In other words, 
this takes the common sense view that in practice language and 
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thought cannot be separated; that humans are thinking- speaking 
beings who have to be dealt with as a whole, rather than a 
thinking being and a speaking being who can be dealt with as a 
dichotomy. In many practical situations, such as in school, in 
the clinical psychologists consulting room, or in many 
psychological experiments, this is the reality. In such a 
situation whether cognition is dominant or relative to language, 
is largely irrelevant, as thought can only be inferred from 
language or other overt behaviour. Put another way Personal 
Constructs (Kelly, 1955) or Attribution Theory do not assume 
either language or thought to be dominant for their existence. 
They assume a cognitive structure, which can be observed 
through some form of languagel. It is here where language is 
used to access raw data; where language is used as a metric, 
or in its mathetic function (Halliday, 1973). The minimum 
relationship required is that language can represent thought, 
and theoretical arguments are about what is represented and 
how. 
From these considerations I would argue that the relationship 
between language and thought is fundamental to psychology. It 
is not merely an academic debate about which dominates which; 
without both, the debate would not possible. ' The relationship 
between language and thought is a structure-f unction dynamic 
which is at the very core of the practice of psychology. 
Language is the means by which we share our human experience, 
whether we are experimenter or subject, teacher or pupil. It 
is here were my interest lies. I believe that debates about 
dominance are as futile, in practical terms, as debates about 
the chicken and the egg. Like the ancients, I believe that 
language and humanity are inseparable, but unlike them, I do not 
believe, that spoken language is the only manifestation of 
whatever it is which underlies language. The questions which 
1. Personal Constructs are usually elicited by means of a 
repetory grid. Kelly (1955) argued that this was a form 
of conversation albeit a formal one. Personal Constructs 
can be elicited by purely linguistic means; either in 
in conversation or by the technique of laddering. 
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concern me are how does a person come to know and represent 
their world and what, does their language and behaviour tell me 
about their experience of the world. Underlying these 
questions are some philosophical beliefs about innatism and 
constructivism. Before I discuss these I will first outline my 
position with regard to the theoretical relationship between 
language and thought. 
Language and Thought as a Dialectic 
The title to this section signals that my views on the 
relationship of language and thought owe more to Vygotsky 
(1962) than Piaget (e. g. 1980). They also take into 
consideration, Fodor's (1972; 1978) arguments concerning the 
logical constraints on what can be acquired during development. 
I do not propose to give a 'full justification for these views 
as such an undertaking would require a thesis in itself. 
Those justifications 'that are given are those which have a 
material bearing on the work to be reported here. 
We have only one way of making contact with and knowing the 
world; through our senses. Fodor (1978) has argued that 
language should be accorded the same status as the Other 
senses. His prgument is that a sense allows the brain access 
to information from the environment, and that each sense deals 
with information which is unique to it; for example, visual 
information is different from auditory information. Language 
conveys information which is culturally abstracted and 
independent of space and time and which cannot be gained 
directly by any other sense. By this token language can be 
thought of as a sense which is parasitic on another sense. 
From the-- point of view of an observer, language and thought 
are both manifestations of information processing, as data 
(input) and as product (output). Language and thought may 
represent one another, but the relationship is not necessarily 
reciprocal and neither is capable of a full description of the 
other. Language is capable of direct communication, but 
15 
thought can only communicate indirectly. Thought is capable of 
direct representation, but language is only capable of 
representation indirectly, via thought. Thought can be shared 
with others, indirectly by language; language is shared. Both 
language and thought allow functional adaptation to the 
environment. 
Whatever the relationship between language and thought, at the 
level of brain processes information can only take the form of 
neural impulses. The sense organs are transducers, changing 
mechanical energy to electro-chemical energy. Theories such as 
that of Neisser (1976) postulate that information is pýocessed 
into schemata, which are multi-modal in origin. These two taken 
together suggest that there is some- underlying code. which is 
common to all sense data irrespective of its origin. 
This is the essence of Fodor's (1972) argument. Using a 
computational metaphor, he argues that there is a language of 
thought, a central computing language, into which all 
information is coded; 
"In such a language are performed the calculations 
involved in evaluating the auditory implications of 
visual inputs, the gustatory implications of olfaction, 
etc. " (p85). 
Given that language can be considered as a sense input (see 
above), then; 
"the problem of thought and language is primarily the 
problem of characterising these information exchanges 
between natural languages and the central computing 
language. " (p85). 
With this part of Fodor's argument I agree, and it is this kind 
of relationship with which the empirical work is concerned. 
Constructivism, Innatism. and Language 
Piaqet and Chomsky were the main protagonists in a debate 
concerning the extent to which cognition, including language is 
innate or constructed from experience (Piatelli-Palmarini, 1980). 
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The record of the debate is long and complex, involving 
contributions from, amongst many others, Fodor. His 
contributions to the debate, were concerned With the logical 
necessity of accepting an innatist position, such as Chomsky's 
if the arguments concerning the relationship between language 
and thought, sketched out above, are accepted. He argues that 
contructivist theories of cognitive development, such as 
Piaget's and Vygotsky's characterise development as the 
acquisition, by hypothesis testing, of a series of logics, each 
more powerful than and containing the preceding one, where 
contains is an asymmetric relation. The transition from the 
weaker logic to the more powerful, has to made with only the 
computational power of the weaker logic, which is weaker just 
because it cannot formulate the kind of hypotheses needed. 
Hence cognit ive development is the extension of computational 
powers to wider areas. For example, the young child's problem 
solving skills are not informed by the same kind oil 
computational power as underlies syntax, but as the child 
matures, such power becomes available for problem solving. 
Putman (1980) points out that a logical consequence of Fodors 
model is that all concepts must be innate, in principle at least. 
Piaget disputes Fodors position, just because he believes that 
the human mind can and does acquire new structures or 
concepts, and that this can be observed, for example, in the 
phylogenesis of mathematics, which ontogeny mirrors. I disagree 
with Fodor's views on the impossibility of acquiring more 
powerful structures and with Piaget to the extent that I do 
not believe philosophy's conception of logic is necessarily a 
correct model of the mind. There are other models which would 
allow for both a progression of more powerful stages and their 
genesis. Petitot (1980) and Thom (1980) both discuss a 
Catastrophe model of the genesis of representational space, as 
a re-interpretation of the localist hypothesis. Pask (1980) 
has noted that models of non-reversable, non-linear self 
organising structures, such as Prigogine's (e. g. Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1984) dissipative structures, can be seen as 
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descriptive of many problems in language and cognition. 
The main outcome of the debate, was that extreme conceptions 
of either innatism or constructivism are individually unable to 
give complete accounts of development and cognition and that 
some intermediary position is probably the source of a more 
accurate account. Within this framework, innatism and 
constructivism are opposite sides of the same coin. This is 
not altogether surprising as some form of interactionism is 
appealed to in most areas of psychology. I do riot view 
interactionism as being some kind of 'soft option', which excuses 
one from rigour in either thought or practice. Rather, I see it 
as being the consequence of theory having to recognise 
practical reality; we have a genetic complement and we do 
interact with an environment. Biology has long had to 
recognise that genotype and phenotype may not have a one to 
one correspondence, just because genetic information c an only 
be expressed as the result of environmental conditions. This 
is of course the basis of adaptation. By the same token, I 
believe that language and thought are the expressions of 
gene-tic predispositions, consequent on the environment in which 
that expression is made. This is part of what I mean when I 
use the term functional adaptation, in so faiý as the analogy 
holds. Language and thought become a part of the environment, 
for example, as culture, and thereby become available as 
resources with which to adapt. Therefore, functional 
adaptation describes the dialectic in which language and thought 
are both the enabling device of adaptation and the product. 
Language, Thought and Deafness 
The history of the deaf, mirrors the debate concerning the 
relationship between language and thought and the nature of 
language. Thinking about deafness, language (both sign and 
oral) and thought throws the issues just discussed into sharp 
relief, and also raises questions of a more fundamental nature. 
Some of these other issues will be discussed in Chapter 4, 
after a brief history of the deaf, and a review of the 
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literature. 
Scientific research is not conducted in a vacuum, it is set in 
the context of the prevailing social and cultural climate. 
Whilst this is true for all science, it is perhaps, especially so 
for psychology, due to the social and cultural nature of its 
subject matter. The study of deafness is no exception. We 
have already seen how definitions of deafness are intimately 
connected in non trivial ways with language, i. e. spoken 
language. A deaf actress recently won an Oscar for her 
part in "Children of a Lesser God". She used spoken language 
only once in the film and that was unintelligible. For the rest 
of the time she used American Sign Language (ASL). It has been 
known for at least 400 years that the deaf communicate 
amongst themselves in a visual gestural language - Sign 
language. However, this knowledge has been the basis for one 
of the longest running and most bitter disputes in special 
education; the oral - manual controversy. 
The Oral-Manual Debate 
The oral-manual debate concerns the correct medium for 
communication with and instruction of deaf children, i. e. oral or 
manual langliage. The debate is premised on assumptions about 
the quality of language possible in the two media and its 
suitability as a vehicle of thought, both intra- and 
inter-personally. I want to outline the historical origins of 
this debate because its impact has, I believe, influenced the 
kind of studies which have been conducted with the deaf and 
the assumptions underlying them. These in turn have 
implications for the interpretations placed on the resultant 
data. 
Historical Context 
Under Roman law the deaf were excused the rights and duties of 
a citizen. A person who could not speak lacked the defining 
human characteristic, i. e. lahguage, and was, therefore, 
sub-human with respect to intelligence, having a soul etc. 
19 
Being excused the rights and duties of a citizen meant, amongst 
other things, lack of the right to inherit property and wealth. 
The legal status of the deaf persisted into 16th century 
Europe- Lack of succession rights had important political and 
economic consequences, such that a high ranking Spanish 
nobleman, offered a large sum of money to anyone who could 
teach his deaf heir to speak. This was accomplished and is the 
first reported suggestion that the deaf were educable and 
marks the beginning of the oral tradition. Oral teaching of the 
deaf began to be practiced throughout Europe. 
Up until the mid eighteenth century, the emphasis in deaf * 
education was on speech and manual alphabets were seen as aid 
to teaching oral language. The beginning of the manual method, 
the use of Sign language, is marked by the work of a French 
priest, De I'Eppe and his student Sicard. De I'Eppe believed 
that the "language of signs' was the natural language of the 
deaf, but even so did not consider Sign language as adequate 
as French for expressing abstract thoughts. However, his 
contribution that Sign language was both useful and natural for 
the deaf and could be used as a medium of instruction was an 
important one. 
We now move to the 19th century. The fact that the deaf were 
educable was by now firmly established, as were schools for the 
deaf in Europe, England and America. Both manual and oral 
methods were in use, however, which method was best and should 
be universally adopted was fiercely debated. The argument was 
not so much about which method produced the best results in 
terms of achievements by the deaf but was, and still is to 
some extent, fundamentally premised on the nature and role of 
language. There are several strands to the argument; 1) the 
deaf have to function in a hearing world, where commerce is in 
oral language. 2) If the deaf are allowed to sign the 
motivation and/or ability to learn oral language will be reduced. 
3) Sign language is not a real language, but rather a loose coll 
ection of iconic and mimetic gestures and pantomime. 
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4) Sign language does not have a syntax (grammar) and is not 
capable of expressing the same subtlety of thought as oral 
language. 
, The conference of Milan 
in 1880 was convened to settle the 
question and passed the following resolution; 
Considering the incontestable superiority of speech 
over signs in restoring the deaf-mute to society, and 
in giving him a more perfect knowledge of language ..... 
The oral method ought to be preferred to that of 
signs for the education of the deaf and dumb" (cited 
in Savage et al, 1981). 
As a result of this conference the vast majority of children in 
this country were, and still are to a large extent, educated 
by exclusively oral methods. The empha sis on oralism was such 
that any use of the hands for communication, including natural 
gestures such as any hearing person might make, were 
prohibited and their use punished. Despite the conference 
manual methods continued to be usýd in some quarters as the 
main method, and in oral regimes when it became obvious that 
oral methods were failing individual children (around the age of 
11 or 12 years). The debate continues to the present day. 
This then is the context within which the earlier research was 
set. It is clear that much of the thinking revolved around 
beliefs relating to language; language is necessary for 
intelligence, language is necessary for thought, language is 
oral language, Sign is not a language. These beliefs are 
reflected in the issues addressed by the research which will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: A Conceptual and Methodological Review of the. 
Literature. 
Introduction 
Deafness has an impact, or a potential impact, on just about 
every aspect of a persons psychology. This is reflected in the 
wide ranging nature of the ektant literature. This review will 
be confined to the literature which comments on the 
relationship between language and thought from a cognitive 
perspective, and which has a potential to elucidate why the 
deaf child fails to achieve his/her ý-academic, -potential, as"]ýredicted 
by I. Q. tests. Hence, the work relating to psycho-social 
adjustment and that dealing with educational problems, including 
the teaching of oral language skills, such as reading and 
writing, will only be mentioned where it has a direct -relevance. 
A Review of Reviews 
A second point is. that the review takes as its focus the 
conceptual and methodological issues raised. by the previous 
work, rather than a detailed description of individual studies. 
Such reviews are given by Myklebust (1966), Furth (1964 & 1971), 
Ottem (1980), Rosenstein (1961), Vernon (1967) and Meadow (1980). 
With the exception of Ottem, these reviews are concerned with 
establishing the necessity and influence, or otherwise, of 
language for and on the development of cognition. Emerging 
from all these reviews is that the data is equivocal, if not 
contradictory. The taxonomies used by different reviewers for 
grouping studies are not always consistent. Rosenstein (1961) 
comments; 
"Investigators have used labels for perceptual. -and., 
conceptual functions that do not necessarily mean the 
same things. For example, the same label abstract 
ability has been used to refer to a visual memory 
task, a test of nonverbal reasoning by analogy, and 
an arithmetic reasoning task. In other contexts, the 
same tasks have been assigned different labels.. " 
(p276). 
The purpose of these taxonomies, is to elucidate underlying 
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regularities in the cognitive data, which can be related to 
language and or deafness. However, such attempts are often 
frustrated by the fact that different results can be recorded 
for the same task by different workers. For example, Furth 
Youniss (1965) and Kates (1969), both report equivalent 
performances in the use of logical symbols by the deaf and 
hearing, but in a discovery task, involving logical symbols, 
Kates reports equivalent performance by the deaf and hearing, 
Furth and Youniss an inferior performance by the deaf. 
Ottem's (1980) review was also concerned with discovering a 
classification system which could consistently separate the 
deaf and hearing with respect to performance- His system was 
based on the number of minimum data, which an observer outside 
the experimental situation would need to know, to decide if an 
experimental subject had understood the solution to a problem. 
His analysis of the above example, was that in the case of the 
Furth & Youniss discovery task two minimum data were required, 
whereas only one was required in the case of the Kates task. 
This review of reviews and a first reading of the literature, 
suggested that nothing new would be added to the debate by 
mere. ly reiterating the range of studies conducted during the 
past 90 years and creating yet another taxonomy- Ottem's 
analysis, indicates that the pattern of results may be as much 
a function of methodology, as deafness. It was also 
noticeable that Myklebust (1966) and Furth (1964) come to 
different conclusions using very much the same data. In other 
words, disagreements about the psychological consequences of 
deafness are disagreements about interpretation of the data 
overall, rather than the interpretation of specific aspects of 
the data. In all the reviews, except that of Ottem (1980), it is 
the extent to which data is able to comment on the relationship 
between language and thought which has been examined rather 
than -the ability of the conceptual frameworks and methodologies 
to produce data which is a comment on the psychological 
consequences of deafness. 
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summary of Findings 
Despite nearly a hundred years of research the educational 
prospects of the deaf are depressingly low- It has provided 
little in the way of data which is useful for formulating 
effective curricula for the deaf. A review of the research 
shows that the potential of the deaf child, in terms of I. Q. 
scores, is within the normal range. This would predict that the 
deaf child should have no problems in ýchool, yet academic 
achievement scores do not reflect this. This then raises the 
question of what factor or factors are instrumental in 
preventing the deaf from achieving their potential. Does 
deafness affect the way intelligence is structured or used? 
The most obvious concomitant of deafness is failure to develop 
oral language- The question then asked is can' this lack of 
oral language account for the discrepancy between potential and 
performance? This is a reformulation of the classical language 
and thought debate, i. e. is language crucially related to 
thought or independent of it. With respect to the deaf the 
question can be asked in two ways, by examining cognitive 
development and structure, or by examining language development 
and structure. 
In terms of cognitive development and structure, the Most 
widely held view, that of Furth, is that the deaf do not differ 
significantly from their hearing peers, and any differences are 
developmental delays due to restricted exper ience, rather than 
lack of language. Language has no direct effect on cognition, 
but rather lack of language leads to an experiential deficit, 
which may delay development, but these delays are not 
permanent or real differences in cognition. 
In terms of language development the deaf are found to develop 
oral language slowly, if at all, whether the medium is speech, 
reading or writing. Furthermore, that oral language which is 
acquired is characterised as deviant even in the earliest 
stages (e. g- Gregory & Mogford, 1981). Also the deaf make 
characteristic mistakes, which are never made by hearing 
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language learners, be they first or second language learners 
(e. g. Ivimey, 1976). 
If, as Piaget argues, it is cognition which underpins language, 
and language is deviant, then the underlying cognition must be 
deviant. However, according to Furth, cognition is not deviant. 
If these arguments are accepted then we are left with an 
apparent paradox, and it follows that research carried out 
within the existing conceptual frameworks can never provide an 
internally consistent psychology of deafness which would 
provide answers to the problems of deaf school children and 
their teachers. 
If this is the case, then how is it that this state of affairs 
was arrived at and what needs to be done, such that research 
can provide the empirical base on which to devise effective 
curricula for the deaf? In order to answer these questions I 
will examine the assumptions, both implicit and explicit, which 
underlie previous work with the deaf. 
Deafness, Intelligence and Scholastic Achievement 
once it became clear that the deaf could be educated, whether 
by oral or manual methods (see Chapter 2), it followed that 
they possessed human intelligence. The beginning of the century 
saw the beginning of intelligence testing, with the aim of 
predicting the academic potential of children. Pintner is 
credited with being the first worker to examine the intellectual 
potential of the deaf using intelligence tests. The studies 
reviewed in this section take no account of the possible 
influence of Sign language. 
The most extensive study from this period is that of Pintner 
and Reamer (1920). Based on data from 2,172 children from 26 
schools for the deaf in the United States, they concluded that 
the deaf had, on average, a mental age which was two years 
below chronological and an educational retardation of five 
years. They attributed the educational under achievement to a 
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combination of the 2 years mental retardation, and the 
remaining three years to the language handicap consequent on 
prelingual deafness. Implicit in Pintner's conclusion is the idea 
that deafness could have effects over and above the 
concomitant language handicap. 
If deafness has an effect on intelligence independent of any 
effects which may be due to language handicap, then it is 
necessary to develop methods of testing intelligence which do 
not have recourse to language. It was partly in response to 
the necessity of developing appropriate tests for deaf children 
that non-verbal performance scales were devised. These 
included Pintner and Paterson (1923), Drever and Collins (1936) 
and Arthur (1947). A number of studies were carried out using 
these and similar tests, through the 20's and 30's. A review 
by Myklebust (1964) concludes that on the basis of these early 
studies the deaf were of below average intelligence. This 
deficit was alleged to be due to a reciprocal effect of 
deafness itself, exacerbated by language limitations. 
The data on which the above conclusion was based was collected 
from studies using group administered tests. From the mid 
1940's individual testing, using for exafhple the W. I. S. C., became 
more widespread, and it is this type of testing which remains 
the norm. Reviews by Vernon (1967), Myklebust (1964) and Meadow 
(1980) all come to the same general conclusion; that the deaf 
fall within the normal range of I. Q. scores, although with a 
slightly lower mean than hearing groups, when nonverbal tests 
or performance scales are used. Scores become depressed when 
verbal items are included. The major problem to be overcome in 
administering test scales, is that of communication. This is 
currently the accepted position and appears to be one of the 
few uncontentious conclusions in the area of deafness. 
one obvious feature of the research reviewed above is the 
change in the reported level of deaf children's intelligence 
over time. One possible reason for this has already been 
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mentioned, Le. the change from group administered to individual 
testing. A second point to note is the increased use of 
performance or non-verbal scales. A third possible reason is 
changes in the deaf population, especially with respect to 
etiology of deafness. Liben (1978) has noted how advances in 
medicine and public hygiene has altered the distribution of 
causes of deafness, with a decrease in etiologies which have an 
associated risk of C-N. S. damage over and above deafness and a 
consequent decrease in mental retardation. 
The aim of intelligence testing is to predict academic 
achievement. If deaf children fall within the normal range of 
intelligence then their academic potential does not differ 
markedly from that of the hearing- However, this is not 
reflected in their aý: ademic achievements. For example in a 
longitudinal study reported- by Fielder (1969) involving 20 deaf 
students, although their I. Q. scores on the WISC performance 
scale were in the range 90 - 142 only 3 were not considered 
educationally retarded at age 16. Their mean grade level was 
4.9 being 5 to 5.5 years behind- 
Given the importance of reading in education, there has been 
much jýssessment in this area. A second point about reading 
assessment is that it often used to assess the language level 
(oral) of the child. Conrad (1979) conducted a survey of all the 
deaf students aged 15 to 16.5 years, in special education in 
England and Wales. He found 40% to be totally illiterate for 
prose comprehension. 509z with hearing loss in excess of 85 dB 
had no reading comprehension at all, as did 25% of those with 
less severe hearing loss. On average reading age is 8/9 
years, and shows little improvement in adulthood; reading 
achievement plateaus at the level where reading for meaning 
becomes important (Brooks, 1978). 
There is some evidence to suggest that the reading scores just 
cited may in fact be overestimating the reading capability of 
many deaf children. Wood et al, (1986) present evidence which 
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indicates that deaf children's test taking strategies differ 
from those of hearing children. Error analysis indicates that 
the deaf child understands less of the text than the scores 
indicate. These strategies appear to be specific to language 
tests as the same strategies are not found in tests of 
mathematical ability. Whilst mathematical abilities ar e also 
delayed, it is not to such a great extent as reading (Wood et 
al, 1983). 
Unlike the results from I. Q. studies, there has been no increase 
in the reported level of the deaf child's academic achievements 
over time. The I. Q. data on which claims of normal potential 
are made is almost invariabley performance or non-verbal data. 
It is well established that- verbal tests of intelligence are the 
most highly correlated with academic achievement, and hence, 
predictive of it. Hence, it could be that the academic 
potential of deaf children is overestimated, and their academic 
achievement scores merely reflect this. 
However, it will be recalled that non-verbal testing was 
introduced just because the deaf had limited oral language 
skills, to allow an assessment of potential which was not 
confounded by lack of competence in oral language. Many tests 
of academic achievement do require competence in oral language. 
Hence, the criteria for assessing potential and performance are 
based upon different skills, which makes interpretation of any 
discrepancy problematic. In the area of mathematics, which is 
not so dependant on linguistic skills (Suppes, 1974) we find the 
discrepancy between potential and performance is much less. 
Furthermore, non-verbal or performance tests are the best 
methods available for assessing potential in deaf children, and 
although verbal tests have higher correlations with academic 
performance than non-verbal tests, it still remains that these 
tests are predictive. On the basis of this it would be 
predicted that deaf children's academic performance would be 
higher than that which is reported. 
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Cognitive Development 
Given the discrepancy between potential and performance, it 
seems natural to ask what underpins this discrepancy. There 
are two obvious candidates; 1) Linguistic influences, e. g. 
communication problems, difficulties in learning language per 
se., the-influence of language on cognition. 2) Cognitive 
processes, i. e. deafness has an effect on cognitive processes 
and/or their development. These are the two factors which 
Pintner cited as being causal in the underachievement of the 
deaf. 
Four general characteristics of deaf thinking are often 
referred tq in the literature (e. g. Wood et al, 1986). In 
comparison with the hearing the deaf are said to be; 
1) more rigid or less flexible in their thinking. This summarises 
studies which have looked at concept transfer or reversal 
shifts (e. g. Oleron, 1951; Furth, 1963; Furth & Youniss, 1964; 
Andre, 1969) or colour form preferences (e. g. Doehring, 1960; 
Suchmann, 1966). In the case of reversal shifts or concept 
transfer, the general finding is that the deaf are less likely 
to transfer or shift spontaneously than the hearing, although 
the deaf will accomplish the task after suggestion. These 
studies also indicate that on problems which are more likely to 
be mediated linguistically, the deaf do less well than the 
hearing. 
2) The deaf are more concrete or less abstract. This is a 
generalisation from studies which examine concept attainment, 
including Piaget type tasks, and sorting behaviour (e. g. Templin, 
1950; Oleron, 1962; Furth, 1964; Furth & Milgram, 1965; Watts, 
1979). These studies show that concepts are attained and 
classification is successful when these rely on concrete, i. e. 
perceptually given attributes of the stimulus material. 
Attainment of concepts and sorting is less successful when 
these depend on more s. uperordinate, or less perceptually 
obvious, aspects of the stimulus, such as a knowledge of 
classes or the discovery of a principle. Again, these are 
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instances where linguistic knowledge or mediation, may be 
helpful. For Piaget type tasks, concepts such as conservation 
are acquired by deaf children, but with a developmental delay, 
on average, of five years. 
3) The deaf are more egocentric or less aware of the 
perspective of others, and 4) more impulsive or less likely to 
take thought or consider alternative courses of action. These 
generalisations are derived from a range of studies, involving 
psycho-social development (e. g. Lewis, 1968 on personality ) as 
well as observations of behaviour during some specifically 
cognitive task (e. g. Chulliat & Oleron, 1955). In other words, 
these are claimed to be general behavioural characteristics, 
often advanced as explanations of deaf children's inferior 
performance. There are some studies which examine these 
constructs directly; for example, egocentricity in communication 
Hoemann (1972) and impulsivity Harris (1978). 
It will be noted that, of the specifically cognitive studies, the 
latest date mentioned is -that of Watt's (1978). A 'DIALOGUE 
database search of psychological abstracts, indicates that 
emphasis has now shifted away from basic cognitive issues, to 
concerns with test administration, leducational issues, and sign 
language studies (see below). 
These characteristics are fairly robust observations, and 
indeed, were observed in the studies I will report, for example, 
behaviour which could be described as impulsive (4 above) is 
reported in Chapter 5. The arguments which surrounds these 
findings is whether they are indicative of deafness affecting 
the development and structure of cognition (e. g. Myklebust, 1966) 
or whether they merely reflect the consequences of limited 
language, and are examples of delayed but otherwise normal (in 
hearing terms) development (e. g. Furth, 1966; 1973). 
At a functional level, it seems impossible to separate language 
and cognition in any meaningful way, yet just such a separation 
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is necessary if we wish to examine the relationship between 
language and thought or the consequences of deafness for both 
or either of these is to be elucidated. This is reflected in 
the literature on cognitive development in the deaf by the 
nature of the assumptions, especially with respect to language, 
which inform the collection of data and its interpretation. 
Within this area two distinct traditions can be discerned, 
typified by Myklbust and Furth. Both of these were 
investigators as well as ma3or reviewers and they, more than 
anyone else, have given accounts of the psychology of 
deafness, which have attempted to integrate the empirical 
findings into a coherent conceptual framework. Myklebust (1964), 
saw the need to create a 'special' psychology of deafness (Wood 
et al, 1986). Furth (1966) argued; 
"... there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as a 
"psychology of- the deaf" and we wished to avoid any 
such implication in our research" (p7l) 
and that the data from deaf populations could be explained 
within Piagetian fheory. The positions of Furth and Myklebust 
are often portrayed in the literature as representing opposing 
views with respect to deafness and its psychological 
c6nsequences. A close examination reveals similarities as well 
as differences. The ensuing discussion will take the form of a 
comparison of these two workers, as this best highlights the a 
priori assumptions, both implicit and explicit, which are brought 
to the study of deafness. 
The Deaf Are Just Like The Hearing Except They Cannot Hear? 
Myklebust (1964) works- within the tradition implied by Pintner 
and argues 'that when studying the effects of deafness one 
should take care to distinguish between the effects due to 
deafness per se and those due to lack of language. His 
theoretical position is reminiscent of say Neisser (1976), in 
that he views experience as being intersensory, through the 
processes of synesthesia- In other words, our knowledge of the 
world is a product of information gained from all the senses, 
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which is integrated by our psychological processes. His central 
tenet is that the deaf person, by virtue of his loss of hearing 
has a different sensory experience and hence comes to organise 
his psychological processes in a different way to those with 
intact senses, in order to maintain the necessary contact with 
the environment. He argues that; 
"The point of view that a person with deafness is 
just like everyone else, except that he has impaired 
hearing, is unsatisfactory as a frame of reference 
from which to progress in the study of the psychology 
of deafness-" (p54). 
However, he did not wish to imply that the total experience of 
the deaf was different from that of the hearing, but. rather 
that deafness would exert an influence in those areas of 
psychological functioning, where dea fness most compromised 
functional adaptation. He expressed this by saying that the 
task of a psychology of deafness "is to ascertain the ways in 
which such sensory deprivation alters modes oil growth and 
manners of adjustment. " (p45). Implicit in this line of reasoning 
are the predictions that the deaf and hearing will show 
equivalent performance in some areas of functioning and 
differential performances in others. It is worth noting that 
differential performance can include superior as well as 
inferior performances by the deaf when compared to hearing 
norms. I make the point because in many instances differential 
performance is taken as-synonymous with inferior (e. g. Furth, 
1964). 
In order to understand the effects of deafness, on cognitive 
processes, Myklebust argued that quantitative comparisons of 
deaf and hearing alone are insufficient. Whilst a deaf person 
may achieve an identical score to a hearing person, that score 
may reflect differential cognitive strategies, either in part or 
whole, due to the task being perceived differently or the 
knowledge/skills required for successful completion being 
structured differently. Hence, he argues, there is a need for 
qualitative data. His (implicit) definition of qualitative data, 
appears to be a consideration of test battery profiles. For 
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example, Myklebust (1964) presents data concerning memory 
abilities in the deaf (see Chapter 11) which shows that in some 
areas of memory functioning, (e. g. memory for design) the deaf 
achieve higher scores than the hearing, whilst in other areas 
I achieve lower scores than the hearing. (e. tj- digit span) the deaL 
Therefore, one cannot make general statements about the 
effects of deafness on memory, only statements about effects 
on specific areas of functioning. 
Furth (1964; 1966; 1971; 1973) starts from quite a dift ferent 
perspective- Furth's position requires the assumption that 
deafness itself has no impact on cognition. Indeed, he says 
"the discovery that the deaf were educable - that they were in 
fact normal apart from their deafness... " (1966, p-S). This is 
also implicit in his experimental design, where the dependant 
variable is cognition and the independent variable is linguistic 
status and not hearing status. On first reading this last 
statement may seem at least c. ontentious, if not wrong. Furth's 
research was carried out within a Piagetian framework. This 
theory predicts that lack of language will not-, affect cognitive 
development. To test this prediction an alinguistic population 
is required, and also one which differs only in this respect, if 
the requirements of experimental methodology ar-e to be 
satisfied. 
Most of Furth's work with the deaf, in contrast to Myklebust, 
is comparative and quantitative, i. e. a group of hearing children 
and a group of deaf children are asked to complete the same 
task and their scores are compared. If the scores are the 
same then it is argued that no differences in cognition exists 
between the groups. such direct quantitative comparisons are 
only possible if it is assumed that the groups differ only in 
terms of the independent variable, such that any differences in 
the dependant variable can be ascribed to the independent 
variable and no other uncontrolled for variable. For Furth to 
be able to make his claims it is necessary for him to assume 
that deafness per se is not a significant variable otherwise it 
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would be necessary for him to first quantify and then partial 
out statistically the effects of deafness. As he does not do 
this we must conclude that, unlike Myklebust, Furth assumes 
that a deaf person is just like a hearing except he cannot 
hear. 
In any experiment, designed to generate quantitive data, it is 
possible for two results, acceptance or rejection of the null 
hypothesis. Where the hypothesis being tested is that lack of 
language has no effect on cognitive development, accepting the 
null hypothesis, would give support for Piagetian theory, 
whereas rejecting it would not. Considering first accepting the 
null hypothesis, two interpretations are in fact possible. The 
first is that there is indeed no difference between the groups. 
The second is that the groups may differ qualitatiVely but not 
quantitatively. Considering rejecting the null hypothesis we 
have to conclude that there is a quantitative difference 
between the gro. ups, but this does not preclude the possibility 
of qualitative similarity. Quantative data alone cannot decide 
between these alternatives. This is, in fact, a reformulation 
of Myklebusts position, which is not inconsistent with a, 
Piagetian perspective. With respect to cognitive behaviour 
Piaget said; I 
"our real problem is to discover the actual 
operational mechanisms which govern such behaviour 
and not simply to measure it" (1954). 
In this respect Myklebusts approach seems more in the spirit of 
Piaget that of Furth, who expressly set out to examine the 
impact of deafness with respect to Piagetian theory. 
The vast majority of studies involving the deaf, including those 
reported in later chapters, are comparative. Any cognitive 
developmental theory is initially constructed on observations 
of a (hearing) population. Before say, Piaget, his 'norms' for 
children were not possible. Piaget's method was to observe 
children and mark regularities in their behaviour, i. e. the 
theory was constructed on the basis of within group 
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regularities. After empirical substantiation these regularities 
accrued the status of norms. To then measure deaf children 
against these norms, implies that they have a psychological 
(cognitive) structure to which these norms apply. or to put it 
another way, observations of deaf children's behaviour, and 
elucidation of their within group regularities could lead to the 
construction of an identical theory to Piaget's. In this way 
theory testing becomes an attempt to reconstruct the theory in 
another group. This holds true for any -theory which the deaf 
might be used to test. 
That hearing norms do apply to deaf children is again implicit 
in -Furth's paradigm. By contrast the converse is implied by 
Myklebust's position. Reviews by Furth (1964; 1971) and Ottem 
(1980) cover 97 studies involving 124 non verbal tasks. 
Compared to the hearing the deaf showed inferior perf ormance 
on 53 tasks, but on- 71 tasks they were not inferior. Included 
in the not inferior performances are some superior 
performances by the deaf. The logic of hypothesis testing 
dictates that the. null hypothesis is never directly tested or 
confirmed, a point which Furth (1966, p144) admits. Considering 
the performance of the deaf against hearing norms, with a 
Pijýgetian hypothesis is, in effect, a test of a unidirectional 
hypothesis; that lack of language will result in inferior 
performances by the deaf. A finding of superior performance is 
contra-hypthesi but cannot be recognised as anything but 
grounds for rejecting the experimental hypothesis and accepting 
the null hypothesis. The point is a theoretical one, but the 
implications are of practical significance. Devising effective 
curricula and educational strategies for deaf children surely 
depends on a complete knowledge of what deaf children can and 
cannot do. This would require a knowledge of superior as well 
as inferior abilities. 
Linguistic Status 
The above discussion was concerned with the consequences 
attendant on the assumptions made concerning the status of 
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deafness per se as a relevant variable in the development and 
structure of cognition. We have already seen how definitions 
of deafness are intimately connected in non trivial ways with 
language, i. e. oral language. The discussion which surrounds 
language and deafness is perhaps some of the most confused in 
psychology. This arises from a combination of the wide 
ranging and compley nature of the subject, lack of precise and 
consistent definitions of terms used to speak about language, 
sign language and deafness and the assumptions held concerning 
the nature and functions of language, and the capacity of sign 
language to fulfil these functions. 
Myklebust's (1964) description of the relationship between 
language and thought embraces ideas from both Piaget (cognitive 
dominance) and Vygotsky (language as a tool). He describes that 
relationship, and the impact of deafness thus; 
...... experience constitutes the basis of all behaviour, 
including language behaviour. Language is the 
instrument, the tool, the means whereby experience is 
symbolised and communicated. If experience itself is 
altered, if it is constituted differently, then meaning 
is changed. " (p224). 
He sets the place and role of language within a hierarchy of 
experience which varies along the concrete abstract dimension 
from sensation to conceptualisation (see Fig. 3.1) which he 
argues can be shown empirically, to apply equally to the deaf 
and hearing. 
ABSTRACTION 
E Conceptualization's H 
x I 
P Symbolisation E 
E R 
R Imagery A 
I R 
E Perception C 
N H 
C Sensation Y 
E 
CONCRETENESS 
Fig 3.1 Heirarchy of Experience (After Myklebust, 1964) 
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Within this hierarchy changes at one level will affect the 
levels above it. Therefore, in the case of deafness, which 
affects the level of sensation all levels above, from perception 
to conceptualisation will be affected. He suggests that the 
deaf person; 
"is highly dependant on imagery, especially visual 
imagery, which may be a predominant factor in the 
restriction imposed on his psychological development 
as well as the concreteness which results. " (p229). 
Language operates at the level of symbolisation, which, to use 
Myklebusts terms, can be both verbal and non-verbal. Here 
language is equated with verbal symbolisation, which is, in turn, 
considered necessary for the attainment of certain types of 
abstract functioning. He does not-argue that the deaf lack 
symbols and concepts, but rather that their nature is altered 
as a function of a differential experience. 
Myklebust uses the term verbal, as do many writers, to 
describe oral language and the term non-verbal as a contrast 
for other types of symbolism such as art and music. The use 
of the term verbal becomes problematic when both oral and sign 
language are being considered, as often it is not clear whether 
verbal is being used as a description, i. e. as_a synonym for 
oral language or as a theoretical construct which refers to 
the patterning of arbitrary symbols in any linguistic system. 
Used in the first sense, verbal never applies to sign language; 
used in the second sense verbal may or may not apply to sign 
language depending on whether or not oral and sign languages 
are considered functionally equivalent. Unless stated 
otherwise, my use of the term verbal is in the second sense. 
In comparing sign and oral language in these terms Myklebust 
states "The question of which is most effective must be 
determined in terms of which is superior as a language. " (p241, 
authors emphasis). Following Clodd's (1900) classification of the 
evolutionary stages of language behaviour, he describes sign 
language as an Ideographic language, i. e. "a picture which is 
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representative and symbolic. " (p241). Within this scheme 
ideographic languages are less well developed than verbal 
languages, in the sense that they are less symbolic, and lack 
the precision, subtlety and flexibility of verbal language. With 
reference to his model of experience he viewed sign language as 
operating mainly at the level of imagery and being tied to the 
concrete aspects of experience. Hence, for Myklebust sign 
language is clearly not a verbal language and "The manual sign 
system must be viewed as being inferior to the verbal as -a 
language. " (p242). Given his statement that ...... only through a 
V erbal language can we expect the human being to attain his 
highest potential-" (p243) it follows that failure to acquire 
verbal language imposes a limit on development, which cannot be 
remediated by sign language. 
To summarise, Myklebust views language as being rooted in 
experience, and at the level of symbolism having a reciprocal 
effect, in that verbal symbolism allows development of and 
access to more abstract levels of functioning. Deafness, which 
occurs at the experiential level of sensation, affects all other 
1-evels of experience, including symbolism and conceptualisation. 
Dependence on imagery, especially visual imagery and failure to 
acquire oral language result in a failure, by the deaf, to 
achieve their potential, by restricting the development of 
certain kinds of abstractio4. The deaf are retarded in all 
aspects of language development, sign language being non-verbal 
and hence functionally different from oral language which is 
verbal. 
Whil-st Myklebust regards the deaf as linguistically deficient, 
Furth (1964; 1966; 1971; 1973) makes the much stronger claim that 
the deaf are functionally alinguistic. Furth (1973) states; 
"If we want to understand early profound deafness we 
must become familiar with this unfamiliar state of 
affairs: a deaf child is a human child without a 
language. " (pl3, authors emphasis). 
Unlike Myklebust, Furth does not deny sign language linguistic 
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status. For example he states, "The gestures that are used 
in the deaf community are without doubt a human language.,, 
(pl4). Moores (1978) lists several more such quotes from 
various writings of Furth's, to highlight the apparent 
contradiction of his position - that the deaf are alinguistic, 
yet sign language is a real language. 
Furth (1966) defines language thus "The term "language" is here 
taken in the narrow sense of the natural, verbal language of a 
society. " (pl. 8). However, when defining linguistic competence 
he is not so specific as to the form a language should take 
"Linguistic competence denotes mastery of the basic structure 
of a language" (Furth, 1966. p15, my emphasis). Given that 
Furth accedes that the deaf readily learn sign, then presumably 
they have linguistic competence in a language, but not in oral 
(verbal) language. However, no attempt is made to assess the 
linguistic status of the deaf in anything but oral language, but 
then his definition of language actually excludes sign language. 
Even so he still feels it necessary to exclude the possibility 
of sign language by arguing that a) 90% of deaf children are 
born to hearing families with no knowledge of sign, b) sign (at 
the time of his writing) is not formally taught in any school 
before the age of twelve, if at all and c) the majority of sign 
language acquisition takes place in interactions with other deaf 
people within the deaf community. Despite this he still 
maintains that, 
"For all practical purposes, however, the typical deaf 
person, whether adult or child, is a language deficient 
person both in his present functioning and his past 
experience. " (Furth, 1966 p. 15), 
which is difficult to reconcile with his statement 
(Furth, 1973) "... perhaps after the age of twelve it 
is no longer true that the deaf person has no 
language, ... " (pl5). 
Furth's definition of language includes the term verbal which he 
applies only to oral language. Even a close reading does not 
make it clear in which sense he uses the term. Implicit in 
Furth's definitions, statements and experimental design is the 
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assumption that only verbal, and hence oral, language has 
relevance when considering the thinking process and its 
relationship to language. Furth does not deny that the deaf 
have symbols, even while maintaining their alinguistic status. 
He states (Furth, 1966); 
"If society does not provide the child with 
conventional symbols, he can still develop intellectually, 
but the symbol system which embodies his thinking will 
be different from the verbal system, so much so that 
the two systems may be actively opposed. " (p209). 
In this respect he comes very close to Myklebust's position. 
Experimenting with Deaf Subjects 
When considering linguistic status a corollary is the difficulty 
the experimenter faces in communicating with deaf -subjects. In 
many comparative studies there is obviously a vast difference 
in the ease with which the experimenter can communicate 
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instructions to the hearing compared to the deaf group. ' The 
procedure sections usually state that instructions are given 
to the deaf child by use of oral language, mime, gesture, and 
demonstration. Again this places a burden on the 
interpretation of results. How can one be sure that the deaf 
are involved in the same experiment as the hearing? If the 
deaf children are at a disadvantage from failure to grasp the 
instructions fully, then this would tend to depress the scores 
of the deaf. The implications of this are that the data 
reflect an inability by the deaf to understand the 
experimenter's attempt to communicate rather than the ability 
or inability to do the task. Of course the observed results 
could be true, but their credibility is compromised. It is worth 
noting here, that Vernon (1967) makes the point that as 
experimenters become more experienced in working with the deaf, 
they are less likely to find differences in performance. Such a 
potential source of 'experimenter effect' (cf Silverman, 1977) 
should not be overlooked when interpreting data, yet it is 
seldom commented on in the literature. 
Consequent on communication difficulty, and the subject's 
40 
perceived linguistic status has been the almost universal 
adoption of 'non-verbal' testing methods. As with the term 
verbal, there is clearly a problem of definition. Conrad (1979), 
Myklebust (1964) and Furth (1966) all make a similar point. 
Furth's (1966) definition is typical; 
"By "nonverbal" I do not imply situations suspending 
all language behaviour in the subject. Obviously, this 
is impossible. In using this term, I mean tasks in 
which words are not used either as stimuli or as 
response, or as the criterion of success. Language 
in the sense of connected verbal language is not an 
essential part of the experimental situation. 
Linguistic competence is not assumed, and 
verbalisation of any kind is discouraged. " (p73). 
Given this state of affairs, Conrad's (1979) point is that 
insufficient attention is paid to precisely what language is 
necessary for, say, understanding the instructions, and what 
difference it might make if the task were solved linguistically, 
even though language is not logically necessary. 
A further point relates to the kind of questions which will be 
asked of the data. Suppes (1974) argues that many reasoning 
tasks given to the deaf are extremely elementary. This is also 
the case with many other tasks. If we assume, for the sake of 
argumept, that a particular test is nonverbal, e. g. it can be 
successfully completed by some infra-human species, and if data 
is to comment on the relationship between language and thoug4t, 
as in Furth's work, in what sense can a non-verbal task tell us 
something about lancruage and its relationship to thought? 
Secondly, if the task can be completed by an infra-human 
species, in what sense can the data comment on aspects of 
specifically human intelligence a. nd its relationship to language? 
To summarise, Myklebust and Furth are both essentially 
constructivist in orientation. Both see development as being a 
product of interaction with the environment. Both view 
language behaviour as being based in experience, but disagree 
on its importance as a factor in cognitive development. They 
disagree on the linguistic status of Sign language, but neither 
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places any significance on Sign language in their experimental 
design or interpretation of data. They depart most radically in 
their a priori assumptions regarding the impact of deafness per 
se on cognition. 
Both appeal to experiential factors to explain the data; 
Myklebust claiming that deaf experience is necessarily 
different, Furth that deaf experience is restricted. In 
principle it seems that the theoretical positions of Furth and 
Myklebust make quite clear contrary predictions, which could be 
tested empirically. However, the situation is confounded by the 
language variable. Furth is, by his own admission Piagetian, 
whereas Myklebust has more in common, especially with respect 
to linguistic influences, to -Vygotsky. If the- deaf are assumed 
to be alinguistic then Piaget would predict no differences in 
cognitive development for the deaf and hearing (though granted 
lack of communication may obscure the fact), whereas Vygotsky 
would predict differences, in the sense that the deaf child (of 
hearing parents) would not have the 'scaffolding' i. e. access to 
the consciousness of another, to allow him/her into the zone of 
proximal development. Hence, any data which potentially 
reflects on the correctness of the two theories can be 
explained by appeal to some linguistic aspect of the situation, 
varying from use of language for instruction to language as a 
form of experience. 
When comparing Furth with Myklebust, the greatest difficulty 
one faces is the contrast in the internal consistency of their 
respective theoretical positions. The apparent contradiction, 
within Furth's account, concerning the linguistic status of the 
deaf has already been raised. A similar case can be made for 
Furth's views regarding the relationship between language and 
thought. Consider, for example; 
"Piaget is the only great psychologist who holds a 
theory of thinking that makes sense of the fact that 
deaf children can grow up into thinking human beings 
even though they do not know much language. " (Furth, 
1973, p106). 
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"Language is a principal and a preferred medium of 
thinking for a developed mind ........ (Furth, 1973. p. 107) 
...... Piaget rejects the notion that mature logical 
thinking finds its explanation or base in the verbal 
symbol. " (Furth, 1966. p194). 
Taken in conjunction with his statements concerning private 
symbol systems in the deaf (e. g. see above), and his definition 
of language, it becomes increasingly difficult to find a 
consistent line in his theorising. As Furth (1966) himself notes, 
considering the problems of deafness causes one to consider 
and question some fundamental assumptions in psychology. Such 
questioning will raise contentious issues and highlight the 
inherent parado_x such reasoning is bound to have (Godel, 1962; 
1979). 
Relative Status of Furth and Myklebust 
In general Myklebust is seldom referred to in the literature. 
For example, Furth (1966) makes onlýý one reference to a study 
by Myklebust and never discusses his theoretical position. 
There are two main reasons for this; 1) He is interpreted as 
implying that deafness imposes immutable limits to development, 
which in turn leads to models of deafness which describe 
deficiency and/or deviancy. 2) With respect to the oral manual 
debate, his position supports neither side; 
"in actuality, the child with deafness from infancy has a 
marked retardation in all aspects of language. 
Furthermore, no educational methodology known has been 
highly successful in overcoming this limitation. " (p233). 
To those advocating manual methods, his views on the relative 
merits of sign and oral languages are seen as supporting 
oralism. However, it should be noted that Myklebust 
specifically states and presents supporting empirical evidence 
that the use of Sign language does not impede or deter oral 
language acquisition, contrary to the strong oralist view. 
Furth's is the most widely quoted, and generally accepted view 
of deaf cognitive functioning. His work was motivated by the 
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discrepancy he perceived between deaf adults whom he knew as 
competent and contributing members of society and deaf children 
who were presented as academic failures. His work is seen as 
contributing to the decreasing trend to view the deaf as 
deviant or deficient (e. g. Moores, 1978). Vernon (1967) basing 
his conclusions on a review of I. Q. studies, comes to the same 
conclusions as Furth. He dismisses Myklebusts suggestion that 
the same results might be obtained by the deaf by different 
means as an improbable coincidence. 
The major criticism which is levelled at Furth is that the data 
are insufficient to warrant the strong claims he makes. For 
example, his attribution of inferior performances by the deaf to 
developmental delays which will remediate through the experience 
gained by living is at odds with the finding that with respect 
to academic achievement the relative deficit increases with age 
rather decreases (Moores, 1970). Meadow (1980) points out that 
attributing developmental delay to an experiential deficit, 
consequent on lack of language, is still a delay due to lack of 
language- 
Recent Developments 
The emphasis of the work up to and including Furth was on 
cognitive structure and development and the relationship of 
language, or rather lack of it, to cognitive development. More 
recently the emphasis has shifted away from cognition per se. 
This shift in emphasis can be seen to derive from three basic 
sources. Firstly, the general conclusion of Furth and others, 
that the deaf and hearing do not differ significantly in 
cognitive structure and development,. and that language, or lack 
of it, does not play a necessary role in development, 
necessitated that alternative factors be looked for which could 
reasonably accouný for the failure of the deaf to achieve their 
academic potential. 
Both Furth and Myklebust, seriously questioned the efficacy of 
extant educational methodologies for teaching deaf children, 
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especially with respect to oral language in all its forms. Both 
these writers argue that there is no logical reason why deaf 
children should not learn to read or write, even if speaking is 
not a realistic aim. This has led to a large body of work 
which deals with educational issues, especially with respect to 
forms of oral language. As this body of work is outside the 
scope of this project, it is not proposed to deal with it here, 
other than to say that with respect to oral language learning, 
the data is not very much different from thall" presented by 
Myklebust i. e. the deaf exhibit both delayed and deviant 
language learning (e. g. Vandenberg, 1971; Streng et al, 1978; 
Webster, 1986; Quigley & Paul, 1984; Savage et al, 1986 for 
reviews). 
Secondly, the work' of Stokoe (e. g. 1960) on American Sign 
Language (ASL) and others (e. g. Klima & Bellugi, 1979 on ASL; Woll 
et al (eds) , 1981 on BSL; Kyle & Woll 
(eds), 1983 various Sign 
languages. ) has demonstrated that sign languages in general 
have to be considered as true natural languages, in that they 
possess linguistic universals, e. g. duality of patterning, 
arbitariness and a grammar. In addition social and political 
changes have led to an increased acceptance of sign language 
and.. a demand by the deaf community that it should be 
recognised as their principal and preferred means of 
communication. This change in the social climate is reflected 
not only in the type of studies being carried out, but also in 
the assumptions underlying them. All this is not to say that 
the oral - manual controversy has been laid to rest, but 
rather that it has become increasingly difficult to deny the 
existence of sign language and maintain that the deaf are 
alinguistic. The result of this has been-not only an increase in 
work on the linguistic aspects of sign language, but also its 
psychological properties, (e-g. Siple, 1978; Kyle, 1983). 
This in turn raises questions about the appraisal of oral 
linguistic data in the light of knowledge about the grammatical 
structure of sign language. It was noted earlier that 
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adherence to a cognitive dominant position, with respect to 
language and the deaf led to a paradox. Sign language may 
offer a solution to this paradox. For example, many 
grammatical deviations by the deaf, can be seen as 
transliterations of sign language grammatical structures. 
Finally, much of the work in the Furth tradition was concerned 
with testing theories about language and thought. Within this 
tradition considerations of the (oral) linguistic consequences 
and influences on cognition were paramount, the influence of 
deafness per se being largely ignored or denied a priori. The 
third shift, evidenced in later work is characterised by the 
emphasis which is placed on direct observations of the deaf, 
and the use of qualitative data, as opposed to strictly 
quantitive comparisons with the hearing. This is very much in 
the spirit of Myklebust, i. e. the deaf are not necessarily just 
like everyone else except they cannot hear. Work in this genre 
includes Gregory (1976), Wood et al (1986) and Kyle (1983), and 
that which is to be reported here. I do not wish to imply 
here that any of these authors make claims, such as are 
credited to Myklebust, about deafness imposing limits to 
development, or that they agree with Myklebust's views on sign 
language. What this kind of work has in common with Myklebust 
is the idea that functional adaptation to the environment in 
the presence of deafness,. may differ -from such adaptation when 
hearing is present. 
The new climate engendered by these developments allows the 
issues surrounding the oral - manual debate, i. e. those 
pertaining to language, and to the relationship between 
language and thought, to be viewed from a different 
perspective. If sign language is functionally equivalent to oral 
language, in a linguistic sense, then is this also true in a 
psychological sense? In_ other words do deaf children who have 
a sign language environment, behave differently from those who 
do not? If so, is this difference equivalent to the behaviour 
of hearing children and is sign language a. sufficient 
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exDlanation? 
Deaf Children of Deaf Parents 
Approximately 10% of deaf children are born to deaf parents. 
In many, but not all, of these families, sign language is the 
medium of-communication. Within these signing deaf families the 
deaf child is in a directly comparable position with respect to 
language acquisition as the hearing child in a hearing family. 
Under these circumstances it is found that deaf children 
acquire sign language in an analogous way to hearing children 
acquiring oral language (e. g. Bonvillian et al 1981; 1983; 
Hoffmeister et al, 1974). For example, they develop a 
vocabulary of a similar content at a similar rate, progress 
from one sign to two sign etc. utterances, make analogous 
grammatical errors such as over generalisation, and erroneous 
pronominal references. If the two languages are indeed 
linguistic analogues then this is what would be expected. 
Currently there is no accepted formal way of assessing the 
linguistic level of a child in sign language. Ho,. 4ever, 
extrapolating from acquisition data would lead us to believe, 
that the deaf children of deaf signing families have linguistic 
competence of the same order as their hearing peers, albeit in 
a different language. 
If language is a factor which influences academic achievement, 
then we might expect the performance of deaf children of deaf 
families to reflect this. If the academic achievements of deaf 
children of deaf families are compared with those of deaf 
children from hearing families the deaf children of deaf families 
achieve higher scores on a range of tests, including oral 
language skills (e. g. Meadow, 1968; Vernon & Koh, 1979; Stuckless 
& Birch, 1966; Stevenson, 1964). This advantage is also to be 
found for tests of psycho-social adjustment. However, 
attributing this improvement in performance to sign language is 
confounded by the fact that these manual samples are drawn 
from deaf families. Hence, the improvement in scores, which 
still do not reach those of hearing children, might be due as 
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much to social, and emotional factors consequent on the 
greater experience, and thereby acceptance of deafness within a 
deaf family, as the use of sign language. This is suggested by 
data reported by Jensema & Trybus (1978) that similar 
educational advantage accrues where only one parent is deaf. 
Corson (1973) and Brasel & Quigley (1977) report studies which 
control for hearing status and method of communication by 
including deaf/deaf families who use oral communication 
exclusively. An additional factor included by Brasel and Quigley 
is the use by deaf parents of signed English. In both studies 
the deaf children of deaf families achieved higher scores on 
oral linguistic measures than the deaf children of hearing 
parents. This leads to the conclusion that method of 
communication is an insufficient explanation of the data. 
Two factors which are seldom considered by either authors or 
commentators, on the influence of sign language and hearing 
status on academic achievement, are 1) that test materials both 
for stimulus and response are in a different language to that 
which is normally used by the child, and 2) the hearihg status 
of the tester is invariabley different to the child. Cross 
cultural studies have highlighted the danger of assuming that 
norms derived in one cultural context, apply and have the same 
meaning in another, leading to the concept of culture fair 
tests. Opponents of manual methods point to the fact the even 
though the deaf children of deaf families achieve higher 
academic achievement scores than their deaf peers from hearing 
families, they still do not reach the levels of hearing children, 
i. e. there is still a deficit between potential and performance. 
If one allows that these children are in a similar position to 
those from different cultural backgrounds, then the possibility 
of experimenter effects, which were raised earlier, applies in 
this instance too. The net result of this would be to depress 
the scores of the deaf children. 
If the adaptive advantages which deaf parents confer on their 
deaf children are as much a' function of their being deaf, as 
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the language they use, then precisely what factors are 
o'QeratingT Work with pre-verbal hearing infants (e. g. Bruner, 
1975) has shown that the basis for language acquisition is 
forged early in the child's life as the consequence of 
contingent interactions between the child and care giver. The 
caretaker 'interprets' the spontaneous actions of the child as 
meaningful and make their response to the child contingent upon 
this action. 
A crucial aspect of this process, in relation to language 
development is the joint attention of care giver and child. 
This process is reciprocal, in that the care giver will mirror 
the child's visual exploration of the environment (Collis & 
Schaffer, 1975), but the infant, as young as four months, will 
follow the care giver's line of gaze when the care giver breaks 
eye contact with the child (e. g- Scaife & Bruner, 1975). This is 
referred to as the 'reference triangle' (Wood et al, 1986). The 
significance of this is that there is an increased probability 
that the. child and care giver are attending to the same thing. 
In this way languaqe and referent are brought together in a 
way which optimises the success of relating language arid 
referent for the child. Implicit in this is that the child can 
attend to both referent and language simultaneously, the 
referent with the visual channel, language with the auditory 
channel. 
Consider now the deaf child in a similar situation. Whatever 
language code is being used, the child must receive it visually, 
the same channel which is to be used for looking at the 
referent. Hence, the deaf child cannot look at and talk about 
something at the same time. This is often referred to as the 
problem of divided attention. This should not be confused with 
the use of the term in theories of attention, such as those of 
Treisman (1969) or Broadbent (1958) where the term applies to 
problems of monitoring and processing incoming information from 
the different senses. The implications of the term, as used 
here, are more akin to those raised in cross modality 
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interference tasks (e. g. Brooks, 1968). The major problem 
attendant on divided attention for the deaf child is the 
difficulty of relating language to the referent. Given that 
deaf children of deaf families acquire sign language in an 
analogous way to hearing children acquiring oral language, it 
follows that the deaf parent must have strategies for 
developing contingencies and overcoming the problem of divided 
attention, which hearing parents do not. 
Evidence in support of this argument comes from a series of 
studies by Wood et al (1986). Teachers, adults unfamiliar with 
the child and hearing parents were observed teaching a child 
how to solve a difficult puzzle. Oral deaf and. hearing children 
acted as subjects. In general the deaf children were more 
difficult to be contingent upon than the hearing children. 
Irrespective of hearing status, children who were taught 
contingently did better than those who were not. The relevant 
point here is that non-verball contingencies and not verbal 
contingencies, were those which were predictive of success, and 
further that the relationship between non-verbal and verbal 
measures differed for the deaf and hearing groups. In the 
hearing group verbal and non-verbal measures were closely and 
directly related, whereas in the deaf group non-verbal and 
verbal measures were inversely related, i. e. those teachers 
most contingent nonverbally were least contingent verbally. 
Wood et al state; 
"The separation of verbal and non-verbal control is a 
symptom of the problem of divided attention facing 
the child and a consequence of count e r-produc tive 
responses such as taking material out of task context 
to 'talk' about it. " (p33). 
Unfortunately, Wood et al did not include a deaf/deaf group. 
However, Gregory and Barlow (1986) observed deaf children 
interacting with their mothers, one group of mothers being 
hearing the other deaf. In play situations they found that 
1. The verbal/nonverbal distinction made here relates purely 
to oral language- Hence nonverbal means use of phatics 
gestures etc. 
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deaf mothers were significantly more likely to be jointly 
engaged on a task, to act contingently on the child's actions- A 
similar pattern of results is reported for the child's actions. 
While this indicates that deaf mothers can and do engender the 
development of contingencies in a way that hearing mothers do 
not, it is still not clear how this is enabled. 
Whilst the foregoing seriously undermines the assumption that 
the deaf are alinguistic for the deaf children of deaf families, 
and thereby poses problems for the interpretation of data 
collected under that assumption, such an assumption is not 
questioned for the 901. of deaf children born to hearing 
f amilies. Feldman et al (1978) examined the gestural language 
development of a small group of deaf children between the ages 
of 17 and 54 months, from hearing families committed to a 
strict oral approach. The essential point here is that the 
extent of the children's hearing loss mean that the aural input 
was virtually nil, and the commitment to oralism, excluded all 
sign language. Never the less the children's main form of 
communication was by gestures. The analyses to which the 
development of these gestures were submitted is detailed, 
complex and the rationale closely argued- The data showed that 
despite the fact that there was no contact between the 
children, there were marked similarities in the type and pattern 
of gestures developed. 
In addition the development of the gestures was linguistic in 
form, in that close parallels could be identified with the 
development of oral language in hearing children. These 
parallels included type and range of vocabulary and rules 
covering combinations of gestures to form longer utterances. 
The authors tentatively concluded that even in the absence of 
structured linguistic input, these deaf children spontaneously 
developed a linguistic system which parallelled, both in form and 
complexity, the linguistic development of children who had a 
linguistic input. 
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Making inferences from a single study with such a small sample, 
within a limited age range, is likely to be speculative. 
However, bearing in mind arguments about innate predispositions 
for language, such a study weakens the strong claim of 
alinguistic. The claim is further weakened by the reports that 
even in strong oralist regimes, deaf children acquire sign 
language from each other, especially the deaf children of deaf 
families. Myklebust (1966) was aware of this, and in fact used 
this knowledge to compare signing and non-signing children, by 
comparing children from residential and non-residential schools, 
children at residential school being more likely to have deaf 
relatives. Furth too was aware of this but argued that signs 
acquired in this way were insufficiently embedded in the 
grammar of sign for them to be considered linguistic. If all 
the children were acquiring was a lexicon of signs this would be 
true. 
However, work on' pidgins and Creoles demonstrates the ability 
of children to impose a grammatical structure on an irregular 
input. That this process also occurs in deaf childreri is 
demonstrated in data reported by Livingstone (1983), which 
indicates that despite an input language model of signed 
English, effectively a pidgin, deaf children's output has a 
grammar which is akin to ASL. 
Suppes (1974), notes that there is little work which examines 
cognitive issues, within a Sign language context. For example, 
when discussing the logical reasoning abilities of the deaf, he 
writes; 
"The real test will not be successful efforts to 
transform more sophisticated forms of inference into 
nonverbal contexts ........ but rather to test the ability 
to communicate and handle such inferences in sign 
language. " (p. 162). 
There is little work which is concerned with specifically 
cognitive issues, which includes sign in its design. This is 
the area which is most directly concerned with the work to be 
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reported here and will therefore be discussed in the context of 
the relevant empirical sections. 
The foregoing discussion has been concerned with the linguistic 
status of deaf children, and the implications current knowledge 
of sign language has on assumptions previously held. In my 
view this knowledge not only seriously undermines previous 
assumptions, but brings into question the interpretation placed 
on earlier data, if not its reliability. On a more positive 
note, accepting the deaf as linguistic, at least in so far as 
children are able to construct grammars (Creolise), helps to 
make some sense of the often contradictory nature of findings. 
Accepting that the deaf and hearing have different patterns of 
interaction, goes some way to accounting for the changing 
pattern of results 'as a function of experience in experimenting 
with the deaf, even if it does not explain it. These 
statements, in turn, imply a set of assumptions; specifically, 
the assumptions on which the work reported here is based. 
These will. be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
- 
Conceptual Framework, Assumptions and General 
Rationale 
Introduction 
The equivocal nature of many of the findings in the cognitive 
area, necessitates a reappraisal of the theoretical and 
methodological approaches used to study the psychological 
consequences of deafness if research is to offer an empirical 
base on which to develop effective cirricula for the deaf. 
Work since Furth indicates that such a reappraisal is taking 
place. This can be seen, not only as a result of 
dissatisfaction with the utility of previous approaches' used 
with the deaf, but also as a consequence of wider changes 
within psychology in general, such as the decline of the 
influence of behaviourism, leading to a research climate which 
affords a wider choice of acceptable conceptual and 
methodological approaches. 
In the previous three chapters I have outlined some definitions 
of relevant topics, given a synopsis of my philosophical beliefs 
and reviewed the existing literature on deafness and cognition. 
This chapter is essentially a synthesis of points raised in the 
previous chapters and will expand on these suggestions, and 
thereby set out the approach, and the assumptions, on which 
the work to be reported here is based. 
The Psychology of Deafness 
Like Myklebust, I have been using the term 'psychology of 
deafness'. This could be taken to imply that the deaf require 
a special psychology, that they are in some sense outside the 
scope of 'normal' psychology. Furth's attempt to explain the 
psychological consequences of deafness within Piagetian theory 
is, by his own admission, a denial of the need for a special 
psychology of deafness; a statement that the deaf are within 
the scope of normal psychology. This point is also discussed 
by Wood et al (1987). 1 do not believe that the deaf are 
outside the scope of normal psychology, but neither do I 
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believe that an understanding of the deaf can be achieved by 
comparing the deaf to the hearing on the basis that the 
observations of the hearing population, and only those, are 
normal. When I use the term psychology of deafness, I use it 
to describe a psychology, in which data from deaf populations 
is given equal weight with that from hearing populations, on the 
basis that both sets of data are descriptive of normal human 
information processing capabilities. Having said that I now need 
to specify what is meant by normal. 
Deviant, Different, Deficient and Normal 
To those who are deaf from birth or soon after, being deaf is 
normal. They develop and adapt to their environment, always in 
the context of being deaf. I assume no-one would argue that 
the subjective experience of being deaf is the same as the 
experience of being hearing. When we ask the question "how do 
the deaf compare to the hearing? ", and some discrepancy is 
found, the deaf are variously labelled deviant, or deficient, 
both having negative connotations. The problem arises because, 
in the case of deafness, we cannot accept a difference as 
being legitimate and normal, yet in many areas of psychology, 
including, developmental psychology, a theory is only considered 
as viable if it can demonstrate how the general (nomothetic) 
processes it postulates can give rise to individual differences 
(i. e. ideographic responses). In other words, difference is an 
acknowledged and acceptable part of psychology. Two analogies 
will help to illustrate my point. 
Figure 4.1 is a well know visual illusion. It is a deliberately 
ambiguous figure which can be interpreted as either a young 
woman or an old woman. If this figure is shown to a group of 
naive observers both interpretations will be reported. In 
other words, the same objective stimulus, gives rise to 
different subjective experiences. This difference between 
observers is never referred to as deviant or deficient. They 
are different, but normal responses; ideographic results of the 
nomothetic process of perception. In other words a similar 
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Figure 4.1 Young Woman Old Woman Illusion 
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process can lead to a different response. Now imagine that 
the illusion had only ever been seen by people who only saw 
the old woman. The experimenter knows that two interpretations 
are possible, but only ever observes one being made. On the 
basis of these results our experimenter concludes that 
perceptual processes are such that seeing the old woman is the 
norm, and constructs a theory which describes and explains 
this. If the figure is now shown to a group of people who 
report both interpretations, how do we explain the behaviour of 
those who saw the young woman? We could look for some factor 
which distinguished the groups. If we could find such a 
factor, we could say that the observed difference in the 
behaviour of the two groups was due to this variable, rendering 
the young woman group, deviant or deficient with respect to the 
old-woman-theory. If no such variable could be found then we 
would be left with no alternative but to question the validity 
of the theory. 
This analogy relates to the comments made in Chapter 3 where 
I questioned*the applicability of hearing derived norms to deaf 
children and extends that argument. Our knowledge of a child's 
deafness predisposes us to ascribe any difference his/her 
performance to that factor which distinguishes, him/hen, it'o. his/her 
deafness, making him deviant or deficient in theoretical terms, 
rather than question the capability of the theory to explain 
his behaviour, and thereby, ascribe deviancy or deficiency to 
the theory. 
Qualitative Differences and Normality 
In chapter 31 also questioned the utility of making purely 
quantitative comparisons; a point made by Myklebust. A second 
analogy is useful here. If we asked a group of Nazis and a 
group of Jews, to describe Hitler, a qualitative measure, then 
we would get quite different responses from the two groups, in 
effect two different people would be described. Further, these 
descriptions would not be recognised as being of the same 
person, by members of the opposite group, nor by an external 
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observer, in the absence of the relevant stimulus. In other 
words qualitative data alone is insufficient. If we were now to 
show a photograph of Hitler, we could not separate the groups, 
in quantitative terms, in that both would give the response 
that they had seen a photograph of Hitler. In other words 
different processes give rise to an identical response. 
Can we describe the qualitative behaviour of one group 
compared to the other as deviant or deficient? As an external 
observer, we can only say that the two groups are different. 
However, the groups may well describe each other with such 
terms as deviant, because each groups description has no 
validity in the experience of the other. By and large, the 
psychology of the deaf is written by the hearing. In this 
respect we are not external observers, but members of another 
group- This kind of argument is advanced as a caveat when 
evaluating cross-cultural data. Erting (1985) argues that 
deafness is a sociocultural phenomenon, similar to ethnicity., 
which in a school setting can give rise to culture clashes 
between deaf and hearing. Kyle (1983) makes a similar point 
with respect to research settings; in effect, that researchers 
bring an implicit ethnocentrism to their research. 
By these analogies I have been attempting to demonstrate that 
what is considered normal, and by implication deviant or 
deficient, is relative rather than absolute and that it is 
possible for difference to be normal, and that we should take 
care not to ascribe deviancy or deficiency, just because some 
observation is outside our realm of experience. The second 
point is that both qualitative and quantitative data are 
required for a complete description of the events under 
consideration. 
Legitimate Data 
What is, or is not regarded as legitimate data within a 
discipline changes with time. A Positivist view of science, 
eschewed hypothetical constructs, such as gravity, considering 
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only directly observable events, such as the effects of 
gravitational attraction, as legitimate data. Tn psychology the 
influence of positivism was evident in behaviourism. The 
decline of behaviourism, has led to a research climate, in which 
the range of legitimate data types is greatly extended, as are 
the legitimate uses to which data may be put, or the questions 
that may be asked of it. 
I have been using the terms quantitative and qualitative 
without qualification. In the work to be reported here I 
distinguish between the two as much by the way data is 
treated, as by any inherent characteristics. Quantitative data 
is that which measures outcome, such as number of problems 
solved or reaction times. By contrast, qualitative data is any 
measure which is used to infer structure, process, or function, 
individually or in combination, which underlie an outcome. These 
data are no less quantifiable or amenable to statistical 
treatment, than outcome measures. Myklebust, described 
examination of test battery profiles as qualitative, in that 
they give information about the structure of, for example, 
memory abilities. This kind of structural approach has been 
used since, for example, by Savage et al (1981), using factor 
analysis and Norden (1975) using latent profile analysis, on 
outcome measures. In Chapters 5 and 91 report on the use of 
a statistical model (Markov chain) to infer process from 
observations of visual behaviours during problem solving. In 
Chapter 81 report on the use of observational data to infer 
the use of language during play. 
Sign Language and the Cognitive Dominant Paradox 
In the previous chapter it was evident that the paradigms used 
to study the psychological consequences of deafness involved a 
separation between language and cognition. This is a logical 
consequence of theories which ascribe dominance to language or 
cognition in the shapinq of thought. Whilst such a separation 
may be possible at the conceptual level, by virtue of 
definitions etc, in practical terms the separation is more 
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problematic. It was also noted that when viewed from the 
perspective of cognition in the assumed absence of language 
(Furth) the deaf are not considered deviant, but when viewed 
from the perspective of oral language development, the deaf 
are considered deviant. in cognitive dominant terms this is a 
parado7, to which, I suggested, Sign language may offer a 
solution. 
If we accept Sign language as a natural language, and an 
analogue of oral language, then we can ask the question "Why is 
Sign language they way it is? " In innatist terms (Chomsky) sign 
language is the way it is because it reflects the innate 
capacity for language- The potential of Sign language to 
comment on the biological antecedents of language is well 
recognised; see, for example, the collection-of papers edited by 
Bellugi & Studdert-Kennedy (1980). Bellugi (1980, p137) gives the 
nub of the argument; 
"We suggest that the abstract grammatical principles 
and constructs shared by natural sign language and 
spoken language arise from the shared central 
processing mechanisms, and that the moiýe superficial 
surface differences are accommodations to the 
differences in the modalities. These differences, 
then, are the surface manifestations of the interface 
between thought and the particular nature of the 
linguistic signal. " 
In other words similar processes give rise to structurally 
different outcomes, which are functionally equivalent. 
Piaget (1980, p23) sums up the constructivist position thLs; 
...... knowledge does not result from a mere recording 
of observations without a structuring aCtiJitV on the 
part of the subject. Nor do any a priori or innate 
cognitive structures exist in man; the functioning of 
intelligence alone is hereditary and creates 
structures only through an organisation of successive 
actions performed on objects- Consequently, an 
e-pistimology conforming to the data of psychogenesis 
could be neither empiricist nor performatist, but 
could consist only of a constructivism, with a 
continual ela 
' 
boration of new operations and 
structures. ; The central problem, then, is to 
understand how such operations come about, and why, 
even though they result from nonpredetermined 
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constructions, they eventually become a logical 
necessary. " 
In constructivist terms, then, Sign language, or the structures 
which underlie sign language, is the way it is because it was 
constructed that way by the deaf subject. If these 
constructions are nonpredetermined, then the possible outcomes 
are only limited by the possible actions performed on objects. 
Assuming that the possible actions on objects are different in 
the presence of deafness, then sign language is the 
construction of language which is a logical necessary, and no 
other. If this argument is accepted then there is no paradox; 
sign language and the underlying cognitive structures are the 
results of deaf actions on objects. 
Viewed in this wzty Sign language is a product of deaf cognition 
and as such, offers an insight into that which produced it. The 
potential of Sign language to comment on cognitive process, 
other than linguistic processes, is hardly explored, which is 
just the point Suppes (1974) makes. 
Sign Language as a Manifestation of Normal Information 
Processing 
The most noticeable difference between signed and spoken 
language is the extent to which they code information 
sequentially. Spoken language is of necessity linearly 
constrained in time; it is impossible to say two words at the 
same time. In Sign language it is possible to compress 
information such that more than one piece of information can be 
given simultaneously. This is not to say that there is no 
sequential aspect to Sign. Consider the following example. A 
child is discussing with his teacher his new sweatshirt, which 
has pictures of Batman and the Joker on the front (see p6l). 
The utterances in lines 1,3 and 4 are sequential with respect 
to information. The utterances in lines 2 and 5 are examples 
of the capacity of Sign to transmit information simultaneously, 
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in this case by distributing two signs in space. This is 
usually 'considered to be a function of the visual channel. 
1. C ME NEWI points2 (to sweatshirt) 
2. T VHO WHb 
I points (Batman) 
ýpoints 
(Joker) 
3. C BATMAN points JOKER points 
-4- 4. T BATMAN GOOD BAD WHICH? 
1,10 5. C JIGOOD (sign made on the picture of Batman) 
VBAD (sign made on picture of the Joker) 
C=Child; T=Teacher; =simultaneous events; -*-linear events 
Consider now an orchestral piece of music, for example, a cello 
concerto. During a concerto information is transmitted in a 
simultaneous ma nner by the orchestra, and sequentially by the 
solo instrument. In Sign, spatial order can affect meaning, i. e. 
what is decoded. Orchestras are made up of sections of 
instruments, first violins, second violins, woodwind, etc. The 
arrangement of these relative to one another, i. e. their 
spatial order, affects what is heard. Some composers make use 
of this, by scoring pieces such that chords are heard including 
a note which is not actually played, or scored. 
The point here is similar to that of Fodor (1972), discussed in 
Chapter 2, Bellugi's (1980) above and also, demonstrates my 
conception of interactionism. These two examples of information 
processing capacities suggest that humans have a capability to 
process simultaneous information, and that what is decoded is a 
function of the spatial arrangements of the elements of that 
signal. This statement is independent of any channel 
considerations, or of hearing status. The fact that this is 
observed occurring via different channels is, to use Bellugi's 
language "manifestations of the interface between thought and 
1. Uppercase words are Sign glosses. 
2. Small case words not in brackets could be glossed, but are 
more ambiguous than upper case Signs. For example, in line 
3 'points' could have been glossed as HIM or THERE or THAT ONE 
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the particular nature of the linguisticl signal". That it is 
observed in people with differential hearing status reflects 
functional adaptation. 
The Use of Comparative Data 
The above example is also indicative of the use of comparative 
data, in which each set of observations is given equal weight. 
The two sets of data are treated rather like a pair of 
simultaneous equations, to determine the values of common 
elements. It is from this point of view that I report 
comparative data, and not that in which the hearing (or the 
deaf) are a 'control' group. 
Having said that, it still remains that I will be reporting, in 
the majority of instances on experiments, which by definition, 
involve the manipulation of variables. My criticism of the use 
of hearing norms to devise experiments, makes it incumbent upon 
me to find an alternative. Before we can begin to answer the 
question "why do deaf children fail to 'actualise their academic 
potential? ", we need a more detailed description of deaf 
children's cognitive abilities than - more rigid, concrete, 
egocentric and impulsive. Are there occasions when the deaf 
can more abstract, for example? 'It so can this ability be 
related to aspects of deaf experience, such as Sign language? 
Do direct observations of the deaf suggest abilities or 
adaptations which would not be predicted from observations of 
the hearing? To what extent are simple descriptions, such as 
more concrete, the result of simple tasks? Will a more complex 
task give us a richer description? It is these kinds of 
questions which have informed my choice of task. 
Summary 
An examination of previous research on deafness and cognition, 
Music came within my definition of language (Chapter 1). 
The perception of a non scored note is no less grammatical, 
or rule governed than the spatial grammatical devices of 
Sign. The rules which govern the perception of a non 
scored note are those of wave mechanics. 
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shows the results to be equivocal if not contradictory. The 
basic paradigm for much of this research has been to appiy 
extant theories, developed with hearing populations, and test 
for goodness of fit. In general the results of such studies 
have shown that: 
a) In some areas the deaf fit hearing norms 
b) In some areas the deaf deviate from hearing norms, showing 
superior or inferior performances. 
c) The patterns of (a) and (b) above are not consistent. 
d) The patterns of (a) and (b) are not easily explained within 
current theoretical frameworks without recourse to post hoc 
explanations, e. g. social and linguistic explanations in Piagetian 
theory. 
Myklebust's argument for the use of qualitative data was that, 
functional adaptation in the presence of deafness may result in 
the psychological processes of the deaf being. organised in a 
manner different from those of the hearing. If, for the sake 
of argument, we accept that this. is the case then what, as a 
consequence, would be observed? Consideripg this, with two 
further assumptions: 
1) The deaf are just like the hearing in so far as they share a 
biological (genetic) heritage.. 
2) The deaf are different from the hearing in so far as they 
do not share a common experience (environment). 
and assuming that functional adaptation is successful, then the 
pattern of observations would be just that found by previous 
research, i. e. the patterns of (a) and (b) above. Considering 
three further assumptions: 
3) Language is a functional adaptation to the environment 
4) Sign and oral language are functionally equivalent but 
structurally different. 
5) The deaf are linguistic. 
can observations, from this perspective, using a process 
oriented approach, suggest an explanation for (c), i. e. expand on 
(d). 
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Aims and Objectives 
In Chapter 2,1 made remarks to the effect that research is a 
product of the cultural context within which it is set. The 
work reported here is no less a product of its zeitgeist, and 
many of the arguments reflect just that. What I am 
proposing is a synthesis of old and new assumptions which 
reflects changes which have taken place in psychology and the 
wider cultural context in which research is set. Inevitably 
such a synthesis will reflect my own predispositions. In the 
course of these first four chapters I have tried to make my 
reasoning as clear as possible, and to demonstrate that the 
perspective I offer is coherent, and not an ad hoc arrangement 
of ideas. However, it remains that all I have offered so far 
is a set of theoretical arguments. Kelly (1955) and Einstein 
(1952), although from different fields of study, agree that the 
only real proof of any theory is its practical utility. 
Therefore, the aim of this project is to assess the Utility Of 
the approach outlined here. This will be done by examining; 
1) the possible influences of deafness on cognition 
2) the relationship between sign language and cognition with the 
focus being on visuo-spatial processing and control of 
attention. 
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CHAPTER 5: Problem Solving Processes in Deaf and Hearing Six 
Year Olds for Lure Retrieval Tasks. 
INTRODUCTION 
Rationale for Problem Solving 
Adapting to the environment requires that one solves the 
problems posed by the environment. Klahr (1986) has argued 
that the task environments created in experimental problem 
solving are miniature worlds which E can specify and over which 
E has more or less control. This allows the examination of 
real world skills in an environment in which the number of 
potential variables to which both E and S must attend is 
reduced, thereby easing some of the problems of interpretation 
of the resultant data. Hence, problem solving is a potential 
source of observations of adaptive behaviours which have real 
world implications. Many tasks which the child encounters at 
school, for example, reading, can be described as a type of 
problem's olving. Therefore, knowledge of how deaf children 
approach ýnd solve problems is of potential use, in remediating 
the discrepancy between potential and performance. Despite 
this, I could find only one study which specifically claimed to 
be investigating problem solving in the deaf (Stafford, 1962) and 
the two on which this study is based (Chulliat"& Oleron, 1955 
and Oleron, 1957) reporting on 'practical intelligence'. This is 
in contrast to the extensive problem solving literature for 
hearing children and adults. On this basis alone an 
investigation of problem solving in the deaf would be warranted. 
It could be argued that there is an element of problem solving 
in any psychological experiment. I would agree with this, but 
argue that problem solving studies involve a different order 
of complexity, in both the experimental environment created and 
in the nature of the psychological processes which the subject 
must engage and hence, are available for investigation. A 
study designed to look at memory, for example, obviously 
requires that the S utilises other cognitive processes, such as 
perception, but it is used passively, as a necessary means of 
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receiving information. Problem solving arises when there is a 
desired goal, the route to which is either not immediately 
obvious, or blocked, requiring the actively integrated and 
strategic use of cognitive processes to reorganise or 
restructure the situation such that the goal can be achieved. 
In this respect it is a situation-in which it possible to collect 
both quantitative data (outcome) and qualitative data (e. g. 
method) which has a discernible relationship, thereby allowing an 
examination of process. 
Selection Criteria for Problems 
The problems chosen were three lure retrieval' problems 
designed by Rey (1935) and used in a_ comparative study of deaf 
and hearing children by Chulliat & Oleron, (1955). These 
problems were chosen for a number reasons; some based on 
arguments advanced in the two previous chapters and some 
based on aspects of the previous research. Specifically these 
were: - 
1) The problems should be theoretically neutral, e. g. non 
Piagetian. This is necessary if reliance on hearing models is 
to be reduced, thereby allowing the possibility of unique 
adaptations of the deaf to emerge empirically. Also the 
interpretation of data from such a task is not so constrained 
by expectations of norms. 
2) There should be sufficient complexity in the task environment 
for process to be demonstrated externally (behaviourally). This 
is necessary if qualitative, as well as quantitative, analysis is 
to be possible and follows from (1) above. This then allows 
that comparison with hearing children can be of both process 
and outcome. 
Problem Solving Characteristics of the Tasks 
In a lure retrieval problem (LRP), a desirable object (in this 
case a sweet) is put in sight of but out of the immediate reach 
of the subject. The problem is to devise a way of retrieving 
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the sweet (lure) with the available resources and within the 
constraints of the situation. 
Problems can be classed as convergent or divergent. The LRPs 
are convergent in that they only admit of one solution, 
although the solution is one of principle rather than exact 
method. For each of the three tasks the child has to use an 
intermediary in a tool like manner. In one task (bottle) the 
child has to make a tool, a hook. There are a number of 
intermediaries available to the child, which are more or less 
efficient. In general the child has to reorganise the elements 
present to'accommodate an intermediary and thus retrieve the 
1-u r e. All stages are goal directed and perceptually given. In 
this sense the LRPs are concrete rather than abstract. 
Language is not logically necessary for the solution of LRPs 
as variants can be solved by inEra-human species (e. g. Kohler, 
1925). Also the visual nature of the problems and their 
construction is such* that the necessity for instruction is 
minimised. Hence the deaf should not be at a disadvantage, 
even if their level of linguistic development is not the same as 
that of the hearing. This is not intended to mean that 
language will not or cannot influence either process or 
outcome. 
On the basis of previous research, the visual, concrete nature 
of the problems, and the limited necessity of language should 
not disadvantage the deaf and therefore, there should be no 
difference in performance between the groups. However, other 
findings, for example Furth (1966), that the deaf are poorer at 
concept discovery than the hearing and Ottem's (1980) analysis 
that the requirement to attend to more than one element of a 
task results in inferior performances by the deaf, would 
indicate a differential performances by the groups on these 
tasks. The LRPs require that more than one element is 
attended to and that a concept is discovered. In the original 
study, Chulliat & Oleron (1955) reported differential 
performances by the deaf and hearing, with the deaf being 
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inferior. In a replication, Oleron (1957) found equivalent 
performances by the deaf and hearing. 
Aims 
The aims of the study are: - 
1) to examine problem solving processes in hearing and manually 
educated deaf children, and also 
2) to assess the problems of conducting studies in sign. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Five severely/profoundly deaf and two partial hearing children 
(N=7), attending a partial hearing unit, attached to a 
mainstream infants school, and eight hearing children from a 
small Church of England primary school acted as subjects. The 
see p105) 
partial hearing unit operated a Total Communication poi 'cy*A 'ý'll 
the children were second year infants, abo ut 6 years old. Both 
groups were the total cohort for that age in their unit or 
school. Both groups used thd same maths scheme and were at 
approximately the same level- 
Apparatus and Description of Tasks 
The apparatus described -here is based on that designed by Rey 
(1935) as described by Chulliat & Oleron (1955). The pieces of 
equipment were constructed on the basis of the written 
descriptions given in the original french paper, and the present 
authors understanding of the tasks. As the descriptions were 
not entirely clear, and as no visual representation of the 
apparatus was given, the apparatus described here may not be 
faithful replicas of the original. However, it is felt that the 
essential aspects of the tasks have been retained. See 
appendix 5 for drawings of the apparatus. 
Cage Problem 
A modified wire hamster cage was mounted in a wooden 
baseboard. In the top of the cage was a hinged wire door, with 
a padlock. The cage was divided in a ratio of 4: 1 by a Perspex 
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partition. The smaller portion of the cage had the wire 
removed from the bottom half of one of the short sides. The 
perspex divide had a small opening at the bottom centre. 
Mounted in the centre of the larger portion of the cage was a 
turn-table, with a 20mm upstand on three sides. On the 
turn-table was a small perspex box containing a sweet. In the 
initial state, the open edge of the turn-table was pointed away 
from (180()) the opening in the perspex partition. The child's 
task was to retrieve the sweet via the opening in the perspex 
partition. Provided, in a box of 'tools', were two wooden rods; 
a grey rod 12mm in diameter which could only be inserted, with 
difficulty, through the top of the cage, and a yellow rod, 9ram 
in diameter, which could be inserted through any part of the 
cage. The yellow rod was the correct 'tool' to effect a 
solution. Also in the tool box were implements intended for 
other tasks. 
Bottle Problem 
A small toy bucket, containing a sweet, was placed in a glass 
jar. Thd opening of the jar was reduced to 3cm by means of a 
plastic insert. The child's task was to retrieve the bucket, 
without removing the insert, or turning the bottle up side down. 
Provided were pipe cleaners, which were too short to reach the 
bucket, and pieces of coloured, easily bendable wire. The 
correct solution was to make a hook with the wire. 
Slider Problem 
Two sliding shelves were fixed into a base by side runners, 
such that each shelf could be moved independently along half the 
length of the base. The shelves were prevented from 
contacting each other by a bar (throat bar) fixed across the 
centre of the base. The height of the throat bar from the 
base was such that the shelves could not pass underneath it. 
One of the shelves (sweet shelf) had a hole in it, which held 
the sweet. There was identical sized hole in the base of the 
apparatus through which the sweet could drop, when the two 
holes were aligned. This half of the apparatus was covered by 
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a hinged perspex lid, which could be padlocked to prevent direct 
manipulation of the sweet shelf. The second shelL f (slider) had 
a large' wooden handle fixed to it. The child's task was to 
find a method of transmittincr movement from the slider to the 
sweet shelf. Provided were coloured wooden bars of 1L "' cm 
(orange, correct length), 2 at 6cm (grey), 4 at 3cm (green), 13cm 
(yellow) and 20cm (black). The apparatus was constructed such 
that the bars which were too long could not be placed in the 
thro a t. This also applied to the rods from the cage problem. 
The wires and pipe cleaners bent when attempts were made to 
use them (but see results). 
The solutions given here as correct are those given by Chulliat 
& Oleron. Pilot studies, with older ý: hildren and adults, in 
general confirmed this. Any solution discovered, which was 
possible by means of an 'illegal' tool i. e. not the one intended 
by E, was prevented by modifying the apparatus or the 'tool'. 
Two modifications were found to be necessary 1) increasýng the 
size of the handle on 
"I 
the slider to prevent illegal bars and 
the rods from being inserted in the throat and 2) reducing the 
gauge of wire used both to make it easier for the children to 
bend and to prevent it from being used successfully for -the 
Slider problem. 
Design 
A mixed design was used with independent measures between 
groups (deaf, hearing) and repeated measures within groups 
(problems). The order of presentation of problems, was that 
used in the original study, which was the same for all subjects, 
was Cage, Bottle, Slider. 
Procedure 
All the children 
their normal cla 
was both signed 
to the children, 
teachers- They 
were tested individually, in a room other than 
ssroom. All communication with the deaf group 
and spoken. For both groups I was introduced 
as a group, in their classrooms by their 
were told that they would be invited by E to 
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play some games and win some sweets and also that how to play 
the games was to be kept a secret by everyone, until all the 
children had played the games. The secrecy rule was violated 
once, by one of the hearing S's on the Bottle problem. The 
behaviour of all other Ss indicated that they had no previous 
knowledge of the problems. 
All subjects were videotaped. The camera was in view 
throughout the session and the children were told that they 
were going to be filmed. The children were shown themselves on 
the monitor and E chatted with the children until they were 
apparently at ease with the situation. Once engaged in the 
tasks the children tended to ignore the camera. 
Communication 
The sessions were conducted in sign and spoken English for the 
deaf group. In the main signs were made in English word order, 
but with no attempt to sign or finger spell those parts of 
English speech, e. g. articles, which do not occur in Sign. In 
these cases I did not use my voice. No finger spelling was 
used, except single letters for names. Hence, f or the deaf 
group the code used was neýither English nor BSL, but a pidgin 
(see Chapter 1 and Chapter 6). 
My level of signing severely constrained my level of spoken 
English. Hence for the hearing group I attempted to use only 
that English which I could sign. Two independent judges 
confirmed that I had used the same vocabulary for both groups. 
My constrained English did not appear to cause any problems 
for the hearing group. 
Instructions 
For each problem, the children were introduced to the 
apparatus, shown the sweet and told they could have the sweet 
if they could find a way of getting it out of the apparatus. 
They were also shown the tool box, but initially they were not 
told directly that they could use the tools. For each problem 
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there is a time schedule (appendix 5) indicating when E should 
give assistance, in the form of suggestions, if the child is not 
progressing toward a solution. The schedules vary slightly for 
each problem, but all take the following form; - 
if not progressing toward a solution after 3 minutes then 
suggest next step; if after a further 2/3 minutes the child is 
not using the suggestion or otherwise progressing then suggest 
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next step; and so on until the child successfully completes the 
problem. 
The timings used by Chulliat & Oleron were adhered to wherever 
possible- However, there were some variations, dictated by 
circumstance, e. g. the child becoming bored, frustrated etc. 
Despite this, times taken to complete the problems did not vary 
significantly between or within groups. 
RESULTS 
Comparison with Chulliat & Oleron's Data 
The child's performance on each problem was classified 
according 
to Chulliat & Oleron's categories. The data are in table 5.1, 
with Chulliat & Oleron's 1955 results for the deaf group and 
Rey's 1935 hearing data. 
The most noticeable feature of these data is the apparently 
much poorer performance of the 1987 Hearing children, in terms 
of spontaneous solutions, compared to the 1935 group. The 
1987 deaf group performance differs from both the 1955 deaf 
group and the 1987 hearing group. Howevqr the 1987 deaf - 
hearing differences are not so pronounced as in Chulliat 
Oleron's data. 
Some of these differences could be accounted for by the use of 
the above coding scheme which was taken from the original 
french paper and was not clearly explained, leading to similar 
solutions being recorded differently by the different workers. 
Also the present data was scored from video recordings, where 
as the earlier data was scored in real time. 
Another possible explanation is the time scale of the different 
codings and the intervening cultural changes, and hence 
experience of the children, which could have affected 
performance. For example, the bottle problem require the child 
to make a hook. Hooks of all kinds were much more in evidence 
in the 1930's, e. g. in the butchers shops, in the kitchen for 
hanging utensils etc. This could be contributory to the large 
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difference in the number of spontaneous solutions of the 1935 
hearing group. 
cage Deaf Hearing 
1955 1987 1935 1987 
without stick 0 0 9.09 0 
Inefficient use 36.36 71.43 0 12.5 
of stick 
Empirical 45.45 28.57 a 62.5 
Spontaneous 18.18 0 90.9 24.0 
Bottle 
can't solve/ 62.5 33.3 0 28.57 
bad choice of hook 
Primitive or 12.5 0 0 0 
empirical 25.0 33.3 0 14.28 
Makes hook 0 33.3 12.5 71.54 
after suggestion 
Spontaneous 0 0 87.5 0 
slider 
can, t solve/ 20 0 5 0 
generalise 
Can't solve but 46.66 85.7 20 25 
can genexalise 
Empirical or 33.33 16.6 AS 62.5 
can use suggestion 
Spontaneous 0 0 30 12.5 
Table 5.1 Comparison of Results 
Thirdly, in the original study the children were 'only given 
those 'tools' which related to the on going task. In the study 
reported here the children had available the 'tools' relating to 
all of the tasks the whole time. This almost certainly added a 
level of complexity to the task, by extending the choices 
necessary to select the correct tool for the job. There was 
also the possibility of interference, in that the last 
successful tool was first choice for the next problem. An 
inspection of the video tapes indicated that this was very 
often the case (see below, for an analysis of relevant data). 
The effect of this would be to reduce the number of 
spontaneous solutions. 
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In view of the above and in order to examine, in more detail 
than the above scheme allowed, qualitative aspects of the 
problem solving process, an alternative strategy was devised. 
The video recordings of each child were transcribed as a series 
of discreet behavioural acts (See Appendix 5 for an example of 
transcription). All subsequent analyses use . the transcripts 
as raw data. Two transcribers, in addition to the author, 
coded two children selected from the corpus at random. 
Inter-judge agreement on number of acts per child per problem 
was in the order, of 98% for all comparisons. A content check 
was made by examination of the transcripts. 
Method Analyses 
Each problem was treated separately, and a coding scheme 
devised which took account of a) necessary conditions for a 
solution; b) Suggestions made by E; c) behaviour of S with 
respect to suggestions. In view of these considerations coding 
schemes for each problem were necessarily different, 
Cage Problem 
Transcripts were scored for the following categories: - 
1. Total number of attempts (A) 
2. Number of attempts before tool use (AT) 
3. Appropriateness of first tool chosen (T) 
4. Solves before suggestion is given (S) 
5. Solves after suggestion is given (SE) 
6. Uses turn-table (TT) 
NB Variables 3 to 6 are categorical. Gr oup totals are for 
positive (+) instances only. 
Table 5.2 gives the scores for each subject in each group. 
This is the easiest and least language dependant problem of 
the set as demonstrated by the fact that infra-human species 
can solve variants of this problem (e. g. Kobler, 1925). 
Inspection of the data shows very little difference in 
performance between the two groups, 2 children in each group 
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solving the problem un-aided and the rest completing the 
problem after one suggestion by the E. 
subject A AT Ts SE TT 
DI 1 1 + + 
D2 4 0 + + 
D3 3 1 + 
D4 1 0 + + 
DS 2 2 + ++ 
D6 8 1 -.. + + 
D7 3 1 ++ 
Total 22 6 52 52 
Table 5.2a. Method scores for Cage Problem: Deaf Group (N=7) 
subject A AT T s SE TT 
Hi 1 0 
R2 8 2 + + 
H3 8 2 + + 
H4 2 0 + + 
H5 1 0 + + 
H6 1 0 + + 
H7 2 0 + + 
HS 6 0 + + 
Total 29 4 7 26 
Table 5.2b Method Scores for Cage Problem: Hearing Group (N=8) 
The two errors 'which were made on this problem were 1) using 
the wrong diameter rod, which made manipula . tion difficult, and 
reduced the number of points in the cage bars through which 
the rod could be inserted. 2) Only inserting the rod through 
the side bars of the cage, which made manipulation difficult. 
The suggestion made by E was to correct one of these errors. 
Attempts made prior to selection of a too-1 were concerned with 
finding a way to open the padlocked door at the top of the 
apparatus- These included picking the lock and jemmying the 
door! Deaf and hearing groups did not differ in this 
behaviour. 
Few children in either group made use of the turn-table. The 
fact that the shelf, on which the sweet box stood, turned had 
to be discovered by the child- Use of the turn-table makes 
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the task easier by reducing the distance the sweet box has to 
be pushed with the rod and also by eliminating the need to 
change the direction in which the box is pushed. Very few 
adults (hearing) attempting the task make use of the turn-table. 
All the children accidently moved the turn-table, but only 3 (2 
deaf &1 hearing) deliberately used this knowledge to aid 
recovery of the sweet. 
Bottle Problem 
The transcripts were scored for the following categories: - 
1. Total number of attempts (A) 
2. Number of attempts before first suggestion (AS) 
3. Number of direct suggestions (S) 
4. Spontaneously bends wire (B) 
5. Bends wire after demonstration (BD) 
6. Modifies hook (M) 
7. Chooses large hook (L) 
NB Variables 4 to 7 are categorical. Group totals are for 
instances only. Scores for each subject in each group are 
given in table 5.3. 
Inspection of the data suggests that the deaf children made 
more attempts than the hearing ( deaf mean 8.6; hearing mean 
6), but with less overall success in terms of the relative 
number of suggestions required by S's for a solution. 
Inspection of the video tapes showed that the deaf children 
gave up on something which did not work rather more quickly 
than the hearing but would repeat the behaviour later, often 
several times. This perseverance in pursuit of ineffective 
solutions was noted by Chulliat & Oleron. 
Only one child (deaf) solved this problem un-aided. The 
commonest error in both groups was to attempt to retrieve the 
sweet with the yellow rod i. e. the correct solution to the 
preceding problem. Once the wire (correct 'tool') had been 
selected only I deaf and 1 hearing child spontaneously bent the 
wire and only the deaf child proceeded to solve the problem 
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without suggestions from E. The groups differed in their 
performance subsequent to E demonstrating bending the wire. 5 
hearing children used the suggestion to solve the problem 
compared to 1 deaf child. Of the remaining 4 deaf children, 2 
failed to choose the correct (i. e. smaller) hook of the two 
offered by E as did the two remaining hearing children. 
SubJect A AS SB BD mL 
D1 8 3 4+ 
D2 5 1 3+ 
D3 16 6 3 
D4 data discarded 
DS 5 2 4+ 
D6 9 5 1++ 
D7 9 7 1+ 
Total 52 24 16 1222 
Table 5.3a. Method Scores for Bottle ProbleM: Deaf Group (N=6) 
tIA AS sB BD mL 
Hi 3 1 Z + + 
H2 10 2 3 + + 
H3 8 5 2 + 
H4 3 1 1 + + 
H5 3 1 + + 
H6 data discarded 
H7 7 4 1 + + 
He a 5 2 + +' 
Total 42 19 12 15 5 2 
Table 5.3b. Method Scores for Bottle Problem: Hearing Group 
(N=7) 
From th is it can be seen that the differences in the 
perform ances of the two groups are almost entir ely accounted 
for by their differen tial ability to make use of suggestions 
offered by E. 
Slider Problem 
Transcripts were scored according to the following categories. - 
1. Number of Attempts (A) 
2. Tries impetus i. e bangs throat bar hard with slider (I) 
3. Number of events before discovery of throat (T) 
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4. Solves correctly i. e- by using 12cm bar or combinations of 
bars up to 12 cm (S) 
5. Partial Solution i. e. solves by a method other than above 
(PS) 
6. Number of events to solution after a partial solution (NS) 
7. Experimenter gives correct bar (E) 
NB Variables 2,4,5 &7 are categorical. An E in a category 
indicates that the -experimenter gave the child that variable. 
Group totals are for (+) instances. 
Scores for each subject in each group are given in table 5.4. 
These data show more between groups differences than those 
for either of the two preceding problems. Again the data 
suggest that the deaf make mor: e attempts than the hearing. 
However the. difference is almost entirely accounted for by the 
very high score of D2, mean scores being comparable (6 v 6.5) 
with D2's score excluded. 
The solution requires that movement is transmitted from the 
slider to the sweet shelf. The use of impetus is one potential 
solution to this kind of problem. In this case it will not work 
as the constricting throat bar and base are sufficiently 
massive to absorb most of the energy. All the deaf children 
tried this solution but only 1 hearing child. Hearing adults who 
attempted the problem were more likely to behave like the deaf 
children than the hearing children. 
This difference, in the use of impetus, is possibly accounted 
for by the fact that 6 of the 8 hearing children immediately 
discovered the throat connecting the two halves of the 
apparatus, in contrast to only I deaf child. Of the two hearing 
children who did not discover the throat immediately 1 also 
attempted an impetus solution. When watching the video 
recordings this difference in behaviour is most striking; the 
hearing children appear to be actively searching for the 
opening, whereas the deaf children appear to discover the 
opening by accident, if at all- E had to point out the opening 
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to 2 of the deaf children. This behaviour of the deaf children 
is count e r-intuitive, in that one might expect a group of 
children who rely so heavily on visual input for information to 
be more inclined to visually search novel objects. 
subiect A 1 T s PS NS- E 
Dl 5 2E 
D2 27 is 
D3 7 IE + 
D4 5 + 0 + 
D5 5 + 2 + 
D6 6 + 1 + 
D7 8 + 2 4 
Total 1.63 7 26 0346 
Table 5.4a. Method Scores for Slider Problem: Deaf Group (N=7) 
SubJect A IT S PS NS E 
Hi 2 0 + 
H2 7 0 + 3 
H3 8 1 + + 
H4 5 2 + 1 
H5 3 0 
H6 10 0 + 7 
H7 8 0 + 4 
Ha 9 0 + 5 
Total 52 13 17 20 2 
Table 5.4b. Method Scores for Slider Problem: Hearing Group 
(N=8 
only 1 child (hearing) solved the problem un-aided. Partial 
solutions were defined as solutions which used a 'tool' other 
than the 12cm bar or a combination of bars to l2cms. 3. deaf 
and 7 hearing children offered partial solutions. The most 
common solution offered by both groups of children was to push 
the sweet shelf with a wire (i. e. the correct 'tool' in the 
preceding problem)- This solution was counted as illegal as the 
sweet shelf was moved by applying force directly to the wire, 
and not by pushing on the slider. When the children tried this 
solution they were stopped by E and asked if they could think 
of something else they could use instead of the wire. Of those 
children offering partial solutions 5 hearing children went on 
to give the correct solution. 
so 
One deaf child was also counted as having solved the problem 
after offering a partial solution, even though he did not use 
the bars to solve the problem. His solution was to bend the 
wire into a 'U' shape and insert the wire into -the slot such 
the force applied to the slider was transmitted - that through 
the point of the 'U' down the two arms-, which had the maximum 
possible set)aration at the sweet shelf. This allowed the sweet 
shelf to be moved without the wire bending, which it did if a 
single strand was used. The arrangement of the wire was 
deliberate and the solution was counted as correct as the 
Motive force was applied to the slider. 
Of the remaining children 6 deaf and 2 hearing children had to 
be shown the correct solution (Le- given the 12cm bar and told 
where to put it). All the children, irrespective of solution 
offered, were given the generalisation task. All the children 
successfully generalised the solution whether they had 
discovered it for themselves or had been given it by E. 
To summarise, inspe-ction`of the ýdata- shows, that Ahe deaf 
children's .f irst - ýattempt at a- solution 1. was lalwayg impetus. -- -In- 
contrast the, hearing: children actively: searched. for, and 
discovered, '- th6- throat., ., The hearing: children were-more-likely.. ý 
to of f er ý a'-partial -solution ý and: were ý. more able.. to; use, this 
'6xperience; to discov6r.; the correct solution..,! . -. 
However,,, - once the 
solution ý wa s. -known both. groups ý could! use the., inf ormation 
e'qually-; well,, - inithat both successfully : generalisedý-the solution. 
These., data: - are in line, -with Furth (1966) who:. showed that . -deaf 
childremvete, poorer. at. concept_. discovery thaný -their,. 
hearing. 
peers, butýequally able to use the concepts when supplied. 
Bphavioural Analyses 
The preceding analyses have suggested that while the two 
groups do not differ in terms of overall success, i. e. number of 
spontaneous solutions, they do differ in their ability to make 
use of information supplied by E, or discovered in the course 
of problem solving. Watching the video tapes three things were 
81 
immediately obvious in the behaviour of the deaf children;! ) 
The high level of activity; 2) the high frequency with which the 
children looked at E other than for communication; 3) the low 
frequency of visual exploration of the materials. 
Table 5.5 shows the total number of behaviours transcribed for 
each group for each problem. As there was little difference in 
the amount of time the children spent on any one Problem, 
either within or between groups, time is not taken into account 
in analyses. 
cage Bottle Slider Total 
Deaf E 526 420 421 1367 
n 7 6 7 20 
x 75.14 70 60.14 68.35 
Hearlg E 247 - 221 294 762 
* a 7 8 23 
* 30.48 31.57 42 33.13 
Table 5.5 Number of Behaviours for each Group for each 
Problem 
Inspection of the data shows that the deaf group engage in 
'ýpýrokimately- twice as'--mahy acts*ýýas'-theýýhearihg' group. 
Manh-Whitneý'. 'U' tests' show thisdifferehce to be significant 
forl'dllý-thr6& probl emE i (Cage 110= lp'' p =. 'O 006: '- 'Bottle 0 =0;, . ý'. 'O Oi2. '-*' 
Slider U=l0; '`p=. 04; all, tests:, t'wo-tail6d;, ties uncorrectdd)'. 1-"'. As 
time"taken- does not vary between the, group Is it'dan; be: - 
concluded that' the 'dif f ere'nce' between tfi6 groups' is lin level 
of ý' actiVi ty- per se, thus confirming observation 1. 
The test the observation (2) that the deaf group looked at E 
more often than the hearing group, the percentage of 
behaviours which were looks at E and not part of a verbal 
(speech or sign) act, were calculated for each problem. These 
data are shown in table 5.6. 
These data confirm the observation (2) that the deaf children 
looked at E more frequently than did the hearing group. It is 
not only the absolute frequency which is greater, but also the 
82 
percentage of total behaviours which looks to E accounts for. 
The difference in the proportions is significant for the cage 
(X2 = 11.47; df 1; p<. 0001) and bottle problems (y2 = 18 ý -15; df 1; 
p<. 0001), but not the slider problem. The data for this T)roblem 
show that both groups change their behaviour with respect to 
E, but in opposite directions; the hearing group increasing the 
frequency of looking at E, the deaf group decreasing the 
frequency. 
Deaf -Hearing 
W of total of total 
acts E acts 
Cage 125 23.76 32 12.95. 
Bottle 102 24.28 22 9.95 
slider 68 16.15 42 14.28 
All Problems 295 21.58 96 12.58 
Table 5.6 Percentage of Behaviours Which Were Looks to 
Experimenter 
Given that the looking behaviour examined above is independent 
of direct verbal acts either from or to E, the question arises 
as to what function, if any, such behaviour serves for the deaf 
group. Observation 3 suggested that, for the deaf group, thcre 
was a relatively low frequency of visual inspection of the 
materials, even though this is an important aspect of the 
problem solving process. A crucial aspect to the solution of 
all the probltýms is the selection and use of an appropriate 
tool arid visual behaviour is likely to be important as a means 
of gathering the necessary information for tool selection. The 
problem solving environment of the children contained four 
potential sources of information; the apparatus, the tools, the 
experimenter, and the child's own experience in trying to solve 
the problem. The relative saliancy of these sources may 
become apparent by examining the distribution of the child's 
behaviour to these. 
To test observation 3 and to e7amine the functional 
relationship of visual behaviours to the problem solving 
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process, the acts immediately preceding a tool change were 
coded according to the following scheme: - 
Experimenter (E) -S looks at E while choosing tool or looks at 
E before using tool or E gives S tool 
Apparatus (A) - placed previous tool in box then looked at 
apparatus then selected tool 
Tool Box (T) - placed previous tool in box then looked in box 
then selected tool 
Use of Tool/Empirical (U) - swopped tools and returned to task 
with no interruption of movement or pause 
This scheme coded the data exhaustively. The data summarised 
in table 5.7 shows the percentage of tool changes preceded by 
6ach category, for each problem. The data are also shown 
graphically in Fig. 5.1. (Raw data is in appendix 5) 
Inspection of the data shows that S's behaviour is 
dif f erentia lly distributed across the categories, both between 
groups and between problems. As the nature of each problem is. 
different, then one might expect that different aspects of the 
problem solving environment become more or less salient to the 
problem solving process. The distribution of behaviours by the 
deaf and hearing is most different for the Cage and Slider.. 
problems. For all problems E is the most frequent event 
preceding a tool change for the deaf group, whilst for the 
hearing group T is the most frequent preceding event. For 
both gr6ups A is the least frequent preceding event. 
Cage Bottle Slider All 
Deaf Hear Deaf Hear Deaf Hear Deaf Hear 
E 70.00 24.13 46.93 33.3 52.94 14 53.39 23.68 
A 0 13.79 8.16 9.52 2.94 14 4.85 12.28 
T 5.00 48.27 16.32 21.42 26.47 53.49 17.47 40.3S 
u 25.00 13.79 28. S7 35.71 17.65 18.6 32.74 23.68 
Table 5.7 Distribution of Events Preceding Tool Change 
As with any form of group data, information is lost regarding 
the behaviour of individual S's. Inspection of individual data 
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(appendix 5) shows consistencies not apparent in the group data. 
The individual data emphasises the saliancy of E for the deaf 
group,. e. g. for the cage problem 6/7 S's scoring 100*o in the E 
category. 
Whilst the above data demonstrate the saliency of E for the 
deaf group in absolute terms, they give no indication as to the 
relationship between this behaviour and success in solving the 
problem. Table 5.8 shows the distribution of events preceding 
choice of the successful 'tool' expressed as a percentage of 
successful choices. The data are also shown graphically in fig. 
5.2. 
Cage Bottle slider All 
Deaf Hear Deaf Hear Deaf Hear Deaf Hear 
E 100 75 66.6 14.29 85.71 31.5 85 39.1 
A 0 25 00 0 12.5 0 13.04 
T 0 0 00 14.29 37.5 5 17.39 
u 0 0 33.3 85.71 0 12.5 - 10 30.43 
Table 5.8 Distribution of Events Preceding Successful Tool 
Choice. 
Looking at individual problems, we see that for the cage (first) 
problem the majority of successful choices are preceded by E 
for both groups, 100'. of choices being accounted for in the 
deaf group. As this was the first problem of the set then one 
might expect factors such as test anxiety, strangeness of the 
situation and the of E etc., to increase the child's need for 
reassurance. As this could only come from E, it would increase 
behaviours directed towards E, for both groups. 
For the Bottle (second) problem, two categories, E and U, 
account for all successful choices in both groups, but the 
relative distributions differs; E being the predominant category 
for the deaf group, and U for the hearing group. From the 
method analyses it was evident that the difference in 
performance of the two groups was in the differential ability 
of the hearing group to use suggestions made by E to discover 
the solution. The suggestion made by E was a demonstration 
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that the wire bent, but without E making a hook. To discover 
the solution from this would involve the child manipulating and 
modifying the wire until a serviceable hook was made, resulting 
in a final preceding event of U. This was the case for all 
children (2 deaf and 6 hearing) who contribute to the U 
category. 
For the Slider (third) problem, E again is the most frequent 
event preceding the choice of a successful tool for the deaf 
group. For the hearing group, the majority of preceding 
events (approx. 2/3) are in categories other than E, T being the 
most frequent and equal to E. All the childr: en who were 
successful following discovery of a partial solution (1 deaf and 
5 hearing) had a final preceding ev'ent in a category other -than 
E, hence E is not related to success. Again events preceding 
successful choice of tool and the ability to make use of 
information gained in the course of problem solving can be 
rela ted. 
Whilst the above data may be indicative of process in the 
hearing group, it still fails to provide an adequate description 
of the behaviour of the deaf, and hence only goes some way 
towards explaining the differences between the groups. In 
discussing the solution of concrete problems Saugstad 
Raaheim (1960) wrote; 
"In problem situations of. such a concrete nature the 
solution is attained by the use of definite objects in 
definite ways and, in the attainment of a solution, 
the objects may be said to serve definite 
functions ...... The solution may be conceived of as the 
arrangement of a number of functions into some 
definite sequence. ". 
Using this as a definition of process, two further analyses 
were carried out, which made use of the series of events, in 
terms of tool changes, leading to the solution. These were an 
analysis of the dominance of the categories and a Markov chain 
analysis. 
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Matrix Analyses 
The category preceding each tool change was listed in the 
order in which it occurred, for each problem, for each child in 
each group. The relationship between each successive pair of 
tool changes was recorded in a4 (preceding category) x4 
(succeeding category) matrix. The frequency matrix thus 
produced is given as table 5.9. 
DEAF HEARING 
Cage Problem 
HATUEATU 
E7000E1000 
A0000A011 
T0001T1062 
u1004u0031 
Bottle Problem 
RATUEATU 
H 13 016E5007 
A2001A10 0* 3 
T2033T40 
U41 .34U .3034 
Slider Problem 
EATUHATU 
12 0 1-1 H3000 
0010A0-023 
2041T11 13 A 
10141051 
Table 5.9. Frequency Matrices of Events Preceding Tool Change 
From t-hese frequency matrices, dominance matrices (D) were 
constructed. Dominance between any pair of categories was 
determined by the relative frequencies with which each member 
of the pair was a succeeding category. In general terms 
category X was considered dominant to category Y if the 
frequency of Y to X transitions was greater than X to Y 
transitions. For example, in table 5.10a, the entry in cell U, T 
(3) is greater than the entry in cell T, U (1). Therefore, T is 
considered the dominant category of the pair. This is recorded 
in the Dominance matrix (table 5.10b) by assigning a value of 1 
to cell T, U and a value of 0 to cell U, T. 
Cells in the main diagonal, i. e. those representing self 
dominance for a category are given a value of 1, if there is an 
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entry in that cell, otherwise a value of 0 is given. The 
complete set of dominance matrices (D) are contained in appendix 
5. These matrices give the first order relationships between 
categories. By raising the matrices to the power of n, nth 
order relationships, i. e. indirect dominance of categories n 
steps apart, can be calculated (Bradley & Meek, 1986). 
EATu 
- 5 0 0 7 
1 0 0 3 
A 0 4 1 
3 0 3 4 
5.10a 
Tu 
1 0 
0 
1 
0 
S. lob 
Table 5.10 Example of Frequency and First order Dominance 
Matrices for Bottle Problem (Hearing) 
A number of criteria can be used to determine the number of 
times the power of the matrix is raised. Here the degrees of 
freedom (categories - 1) was used and hence the matrices were 
raised to the power of 3. The second order matrices (D2) and 
third order (D2)D, Le. D3. The second and third order 
matrices were weighted by dividing the cell entries by the 
power of the matrix. A summary dominance matrix (S), was 
calculated for each problem, according to the following 
f ormula: - 
0S=D+ D2/2 + D3/3 
The dominance score for each category was found by summing 
the values in the cells in each row. These row totals were 
then ranked. The rank order of dominance for each category, 
for each problem is given in table 5.1-1 below. These data show 
that, for each problem, there is no significant difference in 
the rank order dominance of the categories between the groups. 
For the Cage and Slider problems, E emerges as dominant for 
both groups, Whilst for the Bottle problem U is the dominant 
category. 
Relating these data to those for category preceding final 
choice of tool and success, a difference in the behaviour of 
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the two groups is indicated. For the Bottle problem successful 
children, predominantly hearing, were those whose final tool 
choice was preceded by the dominant (U) category. This further 
supports the view that the difference between the groups 
performances, on this problem, was their differential ability to 
make use of information gained in the problem solving process. 
cage 
Deaf Hearing 
Bottle 
Deaf Hearing 
Slider 
Deaf Hearin 
_ E _ 1 1.5 22 1 1 
A, 44 44 3 4 
* 2.5 1.5 33 3 2 
* 2.5 3 11 3 3 
Table 5.11 Rank Order Dominance for Categories Preceding A 
Tool Change. 
The data for the Slider are more problematic. E is the 
dominant category for both groups, however, a final tool change 
preceded by this category is not related to success; success 
being related to a final category other than E; pr: edominantly T, 
i. e. the second (joint for the deaf) ranked category. The 
dominance matrix reduces the original frequency information to 
binary data. Referring back to the original frequency matrix we 
find that the relative frequency of T and E being succeeding 
categories is reversed for the two groups; E having the higher 
frequency for the deaf group and T for the hearing group. 
This difference is almost entirely accounted for by the entries 
in the E, E and T, T cells, i. e. the frequency with which the same 
category followed itself. 
Markov Chain Analysis 
The preceding analyses have all indicated that the problem 
solving processes of the deaf and hearing differ with respect 
to their utilisation of information. Another emergent factor is 
a consistency in the data of the deaf across problems which is 
not so apparent in the data of the hearing, even though -the 
hearing are relatively more successful at solving the problems. 
Given that the nature of the problems changes, then if the 
hearing children are learning to solve the problems, this might 
91 
account for the absence of consistency in their data. Tha 
the behaviour of the deaf children remains relatively 
consistent across problems, would then be taken to indicate 
that they were not learning to solve the problems per se, but 
were engaged in some other, more constant activity. If this is 
indeed the case, then we should be able to use the earlier 
behaviour of the deaf children to predict their later behaviour, 
whereas with the hearing children their earlier behaviour would 
not be predictive of their later behaviour. A model which 
allows such a test is that of a Markov chain process. 
By casting the original frequency matrices into transitional 
-probability matrices (i. e. a matrix in which the row totals are 
1), we can set up a Markov chain model to tes_t this hypothesis. 
A Markov model requires two assumptions regarding the process 
under consideration; 
" 1) The transitional probability matrix does not 
change as the process moves from one stage to the 
next and 2) the state of the-process at any given 
stage depends only on these constant transition 
probabilities and its state at the immediately 
preceding stage. " (Bradley & Meek, 1986). 
These assumptions are consistent with the arguments advanced 
to account for the behaviour of the deal' children. If Qýur 
hypothesis is correct then the data of the hearing children will 
be in violation of these assumptions, leading to a failure of 
the model to predict the behaviour of the hearing children. 
If the data being considered here represents a Markov process, 
then the state of the process at time t is the probability of 
being in one of the four categories- This is a row vector (pE 
pA pT pU]. The transition matrix at tl represents the 
probability of moving from one category to another-. If this 
matrix, ti, is premultiplied by the row vector of the immediately 
preceding. stage, t, the resultant row vector, vi, is the state 
of the process at 'Lime tl. If the process is Markovian then 
the predicted state of the process, calculated by the 
premuliplication will be the same as the observed state of the 
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process. Raising the power of the matrix at tl by n will give 
the transitional probabilities for the process at tn. 
Premultiplying the matrix tn by the row vec tor for vn-1 will 
give the state of the process at time n. 
As the Mark9v process continues, the probability of being in a 
given state increasingly reflects the transition process, 
becoming independent of the starting state and tending towards 
an equilibrium state. If the power of the matrix, tl, is raised 
repeatedly then the rows of the matrix will become Adentical. 
Any row in this matrix is equal to the equilibrium probability 
vector. Premultiplying the matrix, tn, by the equilibrium 
probability vector will give the state of the process at time n. 
This is -a direct consequence of the two Markovian assumptions. 
The transitional probability matrices, derived from the 
frequency matrices in table 5.9 are given in appendix 5. The 
associated probability vectors (observed vectors) are derived 
from the column totals of the frequency matrices. Assuming 
that the start of the process is the *state immediately 
preceding the cage problem, and that at the start of the 
process the probability of being in a given state is at chance 
level, then the probability vector will be- 
EATU 
. 25 . 25 . 25 . 25 
If the process is Markovian, then premultiplying the cage matrix 
by this probability vector, will give a row vector which is the 
same as the observed row vector for the cage problem. The 
results of this for both groups are tabulated below (table 
6.13). 
DEAF 
HAT 
observed row vector . 61 00 
Predicted row vector .3 . 2S 0 
IMRING 
uEATu 
. 38 . 33 0 . 476 . 19 
. 45 . 36 0 . 425 . 223 
Table 6.13 Observed and Predicted Probability Vectors for the 
Cage Problem. - 
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Inspection of the table shows that the predicted probabilities, 
and the observed probabilities, are in close agreement for the 
hearing group but not the deaf group. 
Model for the Deaf Group 
Still assuming a Markovian process, these data would indicate 
that for the deaf group the process immediately preceding the 
cage problem, is in a state determined by some factor other 
than chance. Alternatively these data might indicate that the 
process cannot be described by a Markov model. Premultiplying 
the bottle problem transition matrix by the observed probability 
vector of the cage problem will decided between these two 
alternatives. The observed and predicted probability vectors 
are given in table 5.14. Inspection of these data shows that 
there is close agreement between observed and predicted 
probabilities (all X2 n. s. ). The observed probability vector for 
EATU 
Predicted probability vector . 538 . 026 . 116 . 307 
observed probability vector . 488 . 023 . 163 . 326 
Equilibrium probability vector . 467 . 025 . 164 . 312 
Table 5.14 Predicted, Observed and Equilibrium Probability 
Vectors for Bottle Problem. (Deaf Group) 
the Bottle problem is close to the equilibrium probability 
vector, which is reached by raising the bottle transition matrix 
to the power of 8. Premultiplying the Cage problem transition 
matrix by the equilibrium probability vector gives a predicted 
probability vector which is in close agreement with the 
observed vector (X2 n. s. ) (table 5.15). 
EA 
Predicted probability vector . 529 00 . 414 
observed probability vector . 61 00 . 38 
Predicted probability vector Sep . 622 00 . 32 
[Sep - slider equilibrium vector] 
Table 5.15 Predicted and Observed Probability Vectors for Cage 
Problem. (Deaf Group) 
From these data we can conclude that the process under 
consideration is described by a single Markov chain model, and 
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that the state of the process immediately preceding the first 
observed step (cage problem) is not described by chance!. 
Hearing Group Model 
The predicted and observed probability vectors for the cage 
problem were in close agreement. -Assuming a Markovian process, 
then premultiplying the cage matrix raised to the power of 3 
[C)3) will give a predicted probability vector for the slider 
problem (see table 5.16). Inspection of the data shows that 
there is little correspondence between the two vectors. 
Further the observed vector for the slider problem cannot be 
predicted from the immediately preceding state, ' i. e. the 
probability vector for the bottle problem (Bp). However, 
premultiplying by the chance vector (Chp) does predict the 
observed probabilities. Hence the process cannot be described 
by a single Markov chain model. 
R A T u 
Predicted probability vector Chp . 298 . 023 . 448 . 238 
observed probability vector . 147 . 029 . 588 . 235 
Predicted probability vector [C]3 . 687 0 . 235 . 077 
Predicted probability vector Bp . 442 . 01 . 442 . 103 
Predicted probability vector Cp . 381 . 024 . 46 . 13 
Table 5.16 observed and Predicted Probability vectors for 
Slider Problem (Hearing Group. ) 
The first step of the process, from chance to cage vector, was 
consistent with Markovian assumptions. If the bottle transition 
matrix is premultiplied by the observed cage probability vector 
(Cp), the resultant vector accurately predicts the observed 
probabilities, as does premultiplying the bottle matrix by the 
chance vector (Chp) (see table 5.17). The observed probabilities 
for the bottle are close to the equilibrium probability vector 
reached by raising the bottle transition matrix to the power of 
8. Premultiplying the cage matrix by this vector gives: 
1. The models for both groups can be further proved by varying the 
permutations of vectors and matrices used for premultiplication. 
These can be found in appendix 5, with relevant Chi-squares. 
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464 0 . 
391 
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Reference to table 5.13 shows that this predicts the observed 
probabilities for the cage problem. These data suggest that two 
Markov chain models are required to describe the hearing 
groups processes. The first to cover cage and bottle 
problems, the second the slider problem. However, raising the- 
cage transition matrix to successively higher powers produces 
an equilibrium vector of: 
EATU 
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which does not agree with the bottle equilibrium vector. Hence, 
the cage and bottle do not 'represent two steps of. the same 
Markov chain. Raising the power of the slider matrix gives an 
equilibrium probability vector identical to the cage equilibrium 
vector. As premultiplying the slider matrix by the observed 
cage probability vector does not predict the observed slider 
vector (table 5.16), the cage and slider- cannot be steps in the 
same Markov chain. 
H A T U 
observed probability vector . 371 0 .2 . 429 
Predicted probability vector (Cp) . 401 0 . 262 . 318 
Predicted probability vector (Chp) . 352 0 . 185 . 451 
Equilibrium probability vector . 371 0 . 215 . 398 
Table 5.17 Observed and Predicted Probability Vectors for 
Bottle Problem (Hearing Group) 
To summarise, the data is sufficient to claim that the 
processes under observation are Markovian. However, they 
cannot be described by a single model, but require a different 
model for each problem. The state of the process immediately 
preceding the observed state is at a chance level for each 
problem, but this vector operates on transitional probabilities 
specific to each problem. For the cage and slider problems, the 
equilibrium state of the process is identical. 
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Comparison of the Deaf and Hearing Markov Models and 
Relationship to Hypothesis 
In line with the hypothesis, a single Markov chain model is 
sufficient to describe the behaviour of the deaf, whereas the 
behaviour of the hearing requires three models. The state of 
the process before the first observation is described by 
chance for the hearing but not the deaf, suggesting that the 
process which the deaf group brought to bear on the problem 
solving tasks was not a function of the problem solving 
environment per se. 
One interesting point of overlap between the groups is the 
probability vectors for the bottle problem. The observed 
vectors show similarity as do the equilibrium vectors which are 
reached at the eighth power of the transition matrix in both 
cases. Chi-square analysis of a contingency table comprising 
of the observed totals in each category for each group, and 
predicted totals obtained by multiplying the equilibrium vector 
of one 'group by the total number of tool changes (grand total 
for bottle frequency matrix) of the other gro*up shows the 
distributions are not significantly different (X2=4.28; df 9; n. s. ) 
The reason for this is not immediately obvious. 
A second point of interest is the equilibrium states of the 
cage and slider problem processes for the hearing group. 
These predict that ultimately the responses of the hearing 
group will be exclusively in the E category. From earlier data, 
it might have been expected that this was descriptive of the 
deaf group rather than the hearing group. 
Interference 
It was noted earlier that the children had available all the 
'tools' relevant to all the problems and that this may have 
increased the difficulty of the task compared to the original 
study, by introducing an element of interference. Table 5.18 
shows the order of tools selected by S's for the bottle and 
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Slider problems. This data shows that, for the bottle problem, 
Subject Bottle Slider 
Deaf D1 Rod E 
D2 Rod Rod Wire E 
D3 Rod Rod Wire E 
D4 Rod E 
Ds Rod Rod E 
D6 Rod Rod E 
D7 Wire Rod Wire Bar 
Hearing HI Rod Rod E 
H2 Rod Bar Wire Bar 
H3 Rod Rod Wire E 
HA Wire Bar Wire Bar 
HS Wire Bar 
H6 Bar Rod Wire Bar 
H7 Rod Wire Rod Bar 
H8 Rod Rod Bar Wire Bar 
Table 5.18 Tool Chosen First for Bottle & Slider Problems 
5/6 deaf and 5/7 hearing S's selected the previously successful 
tool first. This would support the hypothesis of interference 
of previous learning, which affects both groups equally. 
For the slider problem, the deaf again show a preference for 
the rod (successful tool in first-problem) 6/7 choosing this 
first. 3/7 children made a second choice, which was the wire 
(successful tool in the second problem), in all cases. The 
ýehaviour of the hearing children was less uniform. 4/8 Chose 
a bar, 3/8 a rod, and 1/8 a wire. Here interference is less 
clear, although the data could be indicative of successful 
learning. The tool box contained three classes of tools; Bars, 
rods and wires. A different class of tool had been used for 
each of the preceding problems and successful learning of this 
would lead to the selection of a tool from a different class 
i. e. a bar. 
DISCUSSION 
Summary of Results 
The results showed that there was little difference between 
the groups, in terms of spontaneous solutions. However, more 
detailed analyses demonstrated group differences on a number 
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of measures. To summarise, three groups of analyses were 
carried out: method analyses which examined the functional 
aspects of the children's problem solving in terms of, for 
example, number of attempts, use of suggestion, etc.; 
behavioural analyses which examined the behavioural correlates 
and their relationship to the problem-solving process: and 
Matrix analyses. 
The method analyses showed little difference between the two 
groups for the Cage problem, but for the Bottle and Slider 
problems group differences were apparent in the ability of the 
children to use suggestions made by E, or information gained in 
the problem solving process, the ability pf the hearing group 
exceeding that of the-deaf group. 
The behavioural analyses showed that the deaf children, were 
significantly more active than the hearing, performing 
approximately twice as many acts for each problem, and were 
significantly more likely to look at the experimenter, looks not 
concerned with direct verbal (speech or sign) acts, being three 
times more likely for the deaf children. 
The visual behaviour of the children and its relationship to 
success was examined further by categorising the visual 
behaviour immediately prior to a tool change. Four categories, 
Experimenter, Apparatus, Tool Box, and Use exhaustively coded 
the data. For the Cage and Slider problems the behaviour of 
the two groups was differentially distributed across the 
categories, for all tool changes. For the final, i. e. successful, 
tool change the distribution acro. ss categories was again 
different for the groups, but for all problems. For the Cage 
problem Looks to the experimenter were associated with 
successful choice of tool for both groups. For the Bottle and 
Slider problems final success was associated with a category 
other than E. 
The purpose of the matrix analyses was to examine the 
functional saliency of the visual behaviours as a process. A 
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dominance analysis showed no significant difference in the rank 
order dominance of the categories between the groups. For the 
Cage and Bottle problems there was a clear relationship 
between success and a final tool choice being preceded by the 
dominant category. For the Slider problem the data were less 
clear cut, but were suggestive of a differential use of 
information by the two groups. 
A Markov chain analysis indicated that the behaviour of the 
deaf group could be described by a single model and that the 
state of the process immediately preceding the first 
observation (problem) was not described by chance. The hearing 
group required a model for each problem, with the state of the 
process immediately preceding each observa*tion being determined 
by chance. 
The order in which tools were chosen was examined for the 
Bottle and Slider problems, to' examine the extent to which 
previous learning influenced subsequent problem solving. For 
the Bottle problem, interference was found for both groups, the 
majority of children selecting the previously successful tool as 
their first choice. For the slider problem, the deaf group 
again showed evidence of interference, the order of selection 
of tools being the order in which tools had been successful for 
the two preceding problems, i. e. rod, wire. The hearing group, 
however, showed evidence of successful learning, in that 5/8 
chose a bar, i. e. a tool different from those which had been 
previously successful. 
Interpretation of Results 
The foregoing results admit of a number of interpretations. 
If one considers only spontaneous solutions, then one must 
conclude that there is no difference between the deaf and 
hearing in this kind of problem solving. This would be in line 
with the data from Oleron's (1957) replication, but not the 
original 1955 study. As the coding scheme used by Chulliat & 
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Oleron was considered unreliable and to enable a more detailed 
analysis, the coding schemes reported here were developed. 
The most consistently emerging result is the failure, on the 
part of the deaf children, to make use of information 
discovered or supplied in the course of problem solving, to 
discover the solution. 6n the basis of these data we would 
have to conclude that the deaf are less able than the hearing 
to discover solutions in this kind of problem solving. The 
question then arises as to why this should be the case, given 
that they are concrete visual problems and they do not 
logically require language for their solution, the deaf should 
not be at a disadvantage, even if the level of language 
development differed in the two groups. 
Problem solving was chosen as a first study into deaf cognition 
as it offered the potential for the analysis of both 
environment and. process and their interactions. The analyses 
have all assumed that the deaf and hearing were engaged on the 
same task, i. e. solving the actual problem, which the . 
experimenter set, and hence interacting with the same 
environment. The results of the dominance analysis can be 
taken as indicative of the extent to Which the deaf children 
were engaging with the problem solving environment and 
organising it in similar ways to the hearing. Despite this the 
outcomes for the two groups are different. It could be the 
case that the deaf group are engaged in a different kind of 
problem solving than the hearing. 
The dominance analysis takes only partial account of relative 
frequencies of the visual behaviours, and only in relation to 
tool changes. Overall the deaf were significantly more likely 
to look at the experimenter than the hearing, and from the 
analysis of tool changes and inspection of the video tapes, 
this appears to be at the expense of visual exploration of the 
apparatus and tool box. This lack of visual exploration, on the 
part of the deaf, is counter intuitive, for a group who, of 
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necessity, must rely more heavily than the hearing, on their 
vision for environmental information. If the deaf are indeed 
engaged in a different kind of problem solving to their hearing 
peers, then what problem are they solving and in what way does 
their environment differ? 
Meadow (1980) has suggested that the biggest problem the deaf 
child has to solve is that of communication. If this is indeed 
the case then the children who acted as subjects here, will at 
6, be well rehearsed at solving this kind of problem. Also the 
experimenter differed in hearing status from the deaf but not 
the hearing children. In this respect the problem solving 
environments oft the two groups differed and it is to this 
aspect of the environment that the behaviour of the two groups 
differed. The Markov chain analysis was suggested by the 
observation that the data of the deaf children showed more 
consistency than that of the hearing group. It was argued 
that as the nature of the problems change, learning to solve 
the problems per se would lead to a lack of consistency in the 
data across problems;. consistency would be the result of some 
other, more constant, activity. As the experimenter remained 
constant across problems it is entirely possible that the 
problegi which the deaf children were learning to solve was the 
experimenter. The result of the Markov chain analysis is 
certainly consistent with this argument. A single model, not 
preceded by chance, was sufficient for all three problems. The 
probability vectors of the bottle and slider problems were near 
equilibrium, indicating the process was well advanced. 
If the deaf children were employing strategies developed for 
solving the problem of communication, then this might involve 
visual monitoring of E for cues, unconsciously signalled by E, 
as in the Clever Hans phenomenon. Numerous instances of this 
kind of behaviour can be found on the video tapes; for e. xa. mple, 
the deaf children would commonly feel around in the tool box 
with their gaze constantly fixed on E. This would give rise to 
the high frequency of looks to E reported here. It would also 
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lead to an apparent increase in level of activity as any task 
related behaviour would also require an associated look to E 
to monitor the appropriateness of the behaviour. This is 
consistent with the finding that the deaf performed 
approximately twice as many acts per problem as the hearing 
children. For the Slider, which is the most difficult problem, 
the frequency of both looks to E and the overall number of 
behaviours changes for both groups, but in opposite directions. 
Also for this problem all but I of the deaf children were given 
-the correct solution by E, which, if their strategy was to 
elicit the solution for E, indicates that they were highly 
successful. 
If these arguments are correct then one cannot -conclude that 
the deaf are less able to solve the kind of problems used, as 
they were not engaged in the same task as the hearing group. 
However, these arguments are clearly post hoc and, therefore, 
speculative. The crucial premise of the argument is that, for 
the deaf group, the differential hearing status of the 
experimenter is the most important aspect of the problem 
solving environment and consequently the one to which problem 
solving strategies are directed. The obvious test OEL -the 
arguement is to repeat the emperiment, using a deaf 
exr)erimenter. This will be examined in a later study. 
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CHAPTER 6: Establishment of a Pre-school Sign Language Nursery 
Introduction 
The second objective to the study reported in the previous 
chapter was to gain insights into experimenting with deaf 
children in Sign and the attendant data collection. This second 
objective was felt to be necessary for a number of reasons. 
Vernon (1967) reports that as experimenters become more 
experienced at working with deaf children they are less likely 
to find differences in the performance of the deaf and hearing. 
I had little previous experience of deaf children, and none in 
the role of experimenter with deaf children. In addition, 
communication with the children was to be in Sign where, again, 
my experience was limited. The limited availability of deaf 
subjects meant that extensive piloting was not a practical way 
of gaining experience. 
Conducting Studies In Sign 
Languages are not static systems of communication, but dynamic 
processes which evolve to meet the needs of the communities 
which use then. For example, when members of different 
language communities have to live together, and neither 
community knows the language of the other, a common language 
will emerge, which is a pidgin (see Chapter 1). One aspect of a 
pidgin is its lack of a consistent grammar. Children whose 
input language model is a pidgin, will produce an output 
language which differs from the pidgin to the extent that a 
grammatical structure is imposed. This is a Creole. 
BSL and English are languages which have evolved to serve the 
needs of the deaf and hearing respectively. The interaction of 
the deaf and hearing and their languages produces a continuum 
of languages from BSL through Creoles and pidgins to English. 
This is especially likely to be the case where manual methods 
of communication are used, although it can apply to vocal and 
written communication too. 
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Which language an individual will use, or where on the 
BSL-English continuum his/her language will fall, will vary as a 
function of the language model(s) to which the person is 
exposed, the age of exposure, hearing status, in so far as it 
affects access to oral language models, previous language 
learning and motivational factors. 
Approximately 90% of deaf children are born to hearing families. 
Typically these families have no previous experience of 
pre-lingual deafness and no knowledge of Sign language. It is 
also the case that the vast majority of teachers of the deaf 
are hearing with oral language as their first language. Where 
either teachers or theses parents use Sign they use it as 
second language learners. Most Total Communication systems 
involve the use of both spoken English and signs with signs 
being made to follow English word order. Where deaf children 
are exposed to language models from deaf adults, these may 
vary from Signed English (pidgin), Creoles or BSL. Livingstone 
(1983) presents evidence that deaf children, like hearing 
children exposed to pidgins, Creolise Signed English input. 
This then raises the question as to what language deaf children 
use, for themselves and as an output language and where on 
the BSL-English continuum does it fall? Is it more BSL-like or 
more English-like? It also brings into question the nature of 
the language used by the experimenter in the previous study, 
and the extent to which it equates with the language used by 
the deaf children (see below). 
The foregoing discussion indicates that there is a problem in 
the use of the terms Sign, Sign Language and BSL, and the 
languages (on the continuum) to which they apply. The criteria 
for deciding are not clear cut, neither are they purely 
linguistic, with cultural and political considerations playing a 
part. However, experimental design requires operational 
definitions. In the case of the studies reported here, where I 
am the experimenter, the Sign language used is almost certainly 
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a pidgin (but see below). However, I refer to it as Sign as it 
is not intended to be a sign system as defined in Chapter 1. 
I may not speak French very well, but the language I use is 
still referred to as French. Although I used voice when 
Signing, my intention was to use Sign as far as possible. Also 
I had been taught Sign by deaf adults who intended to teach me 
BSL and not Signed English. Hence I would use Sign alone when 
signing English word order was physically difficult, or it 
contravened what I knew as grammatical in Sign. Where the 
experimenter is deaf, then the language used is BSL. This is 
the term she uses to refer to her language. 
Previous studies (see Chapter 3) have demonstrated that the 
deaf children of deaf parents show enhanced scholastic 
achievement over deaf children of hearing parents. A consensus 
view of the evidence is that where hearing status and language 
(Sign or English) are not confounded, language is not a 
sufficient explanation of the data. In line with this, in the 
previous study it was suggested that the hearing status of the 
experimenter may be an important aspect of the experimental 
situation and hence explanatory of the data. It was suggested 
that this may be tested by having a deaf experimenter. From 
the previous discussion it is clear that a change in the 
hearing status of the experimenter also means a change in 
linguistic status. This means that where hearing status and/or 
linguistic status are appealed to explanatory factors they are 
inevitably confounded in the research reported here. This 
problem is not unique to current research, however, the issues 
are somewhat different to those involved in the interpretation 
of the Furth or Myklebust positions. There hearing status was 
confounded with the presence or absence of language. Here 
language is actively acknowledged, the problems of 
interpretation arise because of an imperfect knowledge of which 
language is being used by whom. This point will be discussed 
further in Chapter 9. 
The study highlighted a number of practical consequences with 
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respect to the use of Sign, which highlight some of the issues 
just discussed. 
1) My productive Sign exceeds my receptive skills, which is not 
uncommon in hearing signers, and the Sign language of some of 
the children was more advanced than my own. These two taken 
together meant that communication was largely one way. Whilst 
I could give instructions in Sign answering questions, or 
recognising that I had been asked one, was difficult. This was 
further compounded by the fact that children's signing can be 
'childish' in the same way that hearing children's spoken 
language is. 
2) My deaf sign teachers tell me that I use signed English i. e. 
signs in English word order, with some BSL constructions. The 
children used both codes. I was not skilled enough to know 
which code I was using and had no way of knowing which code 
the children thought I was using. Jordan (1983) suggests that 
code confusion may result in poorer performance by deaf 
children. 
3) Related to (2), the level of my signing made giving complex or 
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abstract instructions problematic. This arose partly from my 
lack of competence with BSL grammar, but also from a lack of 
knowledge of the area under study; how do the deaf represent 
problems to themselves? 
4) The data clearly demonstrate my lack of sensitivity to the 
nonverbal communicative aspects of the situation. I feel that 
this arose a) because I am not deaf and b) again lack of 
knowledge of the area under study; where and how do the deaf 
obtain their information? 
There appeared to be three possible solutions to these 
problems; 1) devise studies in which the child acts without an 
experimenter or rely purely on observational data, 2) improve 
my signing skills and 3) use a deaf experimenter. 
Other Problems and Considerations 
The requirement that studies should be conducted with children 
with experience of Sign limited the potential pool of subjects. 
The acceptance of Sign language and consequent, total 
communication policies, in schools is relatively recent and still 
not widespread. Also, Sign is subject to regional, or 
residential scho ol based, dialects. For these reasons, and 
limited funding, my subject pool was confined to Leeds children. 
Visits to two of the partial hearing units in Leeds and 
discussions with teachers impressed upon me the problems 
associated with teaching the deaf. Of particular relevance 
here, was the length of time required to compensate for the 
deaf child's lack of incidental learning, not only of oral 
language but of knowledge in general. This was especially 
apparent where follow up work was being done on a subject 
taught in an integrated class, i. e. not by specialist teachers 
of the deaf. In addition there were already a number of 
demands on the deaf child's time in classroom, from the 
audiologist, the speech therapist, educational psychologist, 
e tc.. Therefore it was felt that, however well intentioned the 
research may be, it would be ethically unacceptable to propose 
studies which made high demands on the deaf child's time in the 
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classroom. 
Any data collection which involves the use of sign clearly 
requires the use of video recording. This study demonstrated 
that both parties in an interaction need to be directly in 
front of the camera. To do this without changing the nature of 
the interaction, involves using two cameras and a live mixer. A 
portable set was not available, nor the funding to acquire one. 
However, a fixed system was available in the department. 
Solution 
As the department had a purpose built child development unit 
with spare capacity, complete with obs. ervation facilities and a 
v. ideo studio. the obvious solution was to run a nursery group 
for the deaf. The L. E. A. was approached and happily this idea 
coincided with their own plans. The result was the inception of 
a playgroup for deaf pre-schoolers in October 1987, which is 
still in operation. 
Aims and Objectives pf the Nursery 
The Hearing Impaired Service 
+ 
in Leeds operates a Total 
Communication (TC) policy. TC can mean many things to many 
peopljý, depending on how manual communication is seen in 
relation to oral language; as a distinct language or as support 
for English. The emphasis in Leeds at the inception of the 
nursery was moving towards bi-lingualism, i. e. a recognition that 
BSL is as distinct from English as French or Punjabi, and hence 
teaching methods appropriate to each language are required. 
In the ideal case, those severely and profoundly deaf children, 
for whom oral language was not expected to develop normally 
BSL would be their first language and English taught as a 
second language. Conversely, for those who would develop oral 
language manual communication would be used as support in the 
form of signed English. Currently there is no reliable way of 
predicting, from an early age, who will or will not develOD oral 
English. Audiogram data alone is insufficient (see Chapter 1), 
and is in any case. only partially reliable for very young 
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children. 
Bilingual, in this context, implies more than recognition of 
language and extends to aspects of culture. For those who 
adopt the Soviet view of development, language and culture are 
inextricably bound. Erting (1985) and others, - make the case 
for there being a deaf culture which is distinct from that of 
the hearing world and to which, many deaf children of hearing 
families have 'no access until their teens. Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that it is possible for deaf children to grow up 
never meeting a deaf adult, and thereby acquiring a belief that 
they too will be hearing when they grow up. Whatever credence 
one gives to this, it cannot be denied that there is a high 
incidence of emotional and behavioural disturbance amongst the 
young deaf (Denmark et Al., 1985). These authors also present 
evidence that early manual communication is preventative of 
such disturbance. 
To summarise, commitment to a TC policy, with an emphasis on 
bi-lingualism in its fullest sense, combined with evidence that 
deaf children of deaf families tend to achieve better scores on 
a range of scholastic and ad3ustment tests than the deaf 
children of hearing families (see Chapter 3) provided the 
motivating force for the nursery. As there is no reliable way 
of predicting which language 'Code the child will ultimately 
prefer or be most able to use then both should be provided to 
the child. It is always recognised that the child must learn 
English if he or she is to participate fully in education and 
the hearing world in general. The children already had access 
to hearing role and language models both at home at school, 
and deaf role and language models were provided by the L. E. A., 
both in school and for home visits. If the advantages which 
accrue to deaf children of deaf parents are a function of 
deaf/deaf interaction per se, rather than the code used, or the 
parent-child relationship, then there is the potential for these 
to occur with deaf adults in general, and if so observing these 
deaf/deaf interactions may be instructive for both parents 
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teachers. 
Hence, for one afternoon a week the children were provided with 
an environment, in which being deaf is the norm. As well as 
providing the children with an unambiguous linguistic and social 
environment, it provided the opportunity for parents and 
teachers to observe the children and the deaf adults and their 
ways of interacting, and to collect data on levels of 
development etc.. The sessions also acted as an informal 
support group for the parents. 
Physical description of NurEiery 
The child development unit is self contained and consists of an 
entrance hall witIf shoe lockers and coat pegs, a large 
playroom, with adjoining toilet and kitchen facilities and a small 
playground. Separating the playroom from the video studio is a 
large one way observation screen. There is a second, smaller, 
one way screen in the wall of an adjoining storeroom. . 
The 
playroom is equipped with the usual range of preschool 
equipment, such as sand tray, climbing frame, play house and 
ride on toys. 
Recording Equipment 
Initially, the nursery was served by a single tripod camera, 
located behind the one way screen and one remote control 
camera located in the playroom. Dummy cameras were fitted to 
two other camera points until functional cameras were installed, 
in the autumn of 1988. This gave a total of three remote 
control cameras, fitted with pan and tilt units and motorised 
lenses. Signals feed to a Panasonic special effects unit, 
allowing feeds from any two cameras to be live mixed and a 
date and time signal added- There are no microphones in the 
nursery and therefore, no sound tracks on any recordings. 
Social Description of the Nursery 
The nursery came into being to fulfil the aims and objectives 
of both the L. E. A. hearing impaired service and this project. 
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The distinguishing feature of the nursery is that it is staffed 
by deaf adults whose first or preferred language is BSL. 
Hearing teachers of the deaf observe sessions from behind the 
one way screen, as do parents if they chose to come. 
Characteristics of the Children 
During the course of the project, 24 children between the ages 
of 2 and 6 years have attended the nursery. Six of the 
children were from ethnic minority groups. Of these, three had 
parents whose mother tongue was not English. 
All the children were considered to be severely or profoundly 
deaf, on the basis of audiogram data, where this was available, 
and the extent to which the child was developing oral language. 
All the children used Sign as their primary means of 
communication in the nursery. As part of the L. E. A. 's provision, 
the children were visited at home by a deaf instructor and 
both parent and child given Sign language instruction. Some of 
the older children attended an integrated (deaf/hearing) nursery 
on a daily basis, which the deaf instructors also attended ]ýart 
time. 
Etiology of hearing loss was unknown for apgroximately half the 
children. Known causes included, maternal rubella, consanguinity, 
Hurley's syndrome and meningitis. Three children were multiply 
handicapped with motor and or visual impairment and 
developmental delay. All the children were from hearing 
families, although three had deaf siblings. 
Activities 
To a casual observer, the activities in the nursery do not look 
any different from those to be found happening in any other 
pre-school group. As has already been stated the equipment 
was standard. This was checked by visits to hearing nurseries. 
A typical session comprised of a free play time, with access to 
the playground and ride-on toys. After approximately half an 
hour the children were brought in from the playground 
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and freeplay continued in the playroom. During this part of 
the session the children were encouraged, although not 
compelled to take part in table based activities such as form 
boards, painting, etc. Other activities were available to the 
child, such as sand and water tables, playhouse, shop, dressing 
up box etc. After the free play all the children and deaf 
adults came together for 'tea-time'. During tea-time the 
children were given food and drink, which varied from week to 
week. The purpose of this was to provide a set-Ling for more 
formal language work and to develop the group 'listening' and 
turn-taking skills which would be needed once the children 
started school proper. The length of tea-time was extended as 
the children grew older so that language games and stories 
could be added at the end of the session. 
Details of which activities were to- be included in each session 
and also the layout of large equipment and tables was at the 
discretion of the deaf instructors. It was envisaged that the 
role of hearing teachers of the deaf was to be advisory. In 
the early stages the deaf instructors were reluctant to assert 
their ideas and the majority of the activities were instigated 
by the teachers. The furniture and equipment layout was 
determined by.. myself so as to facilitate video recording with 
the limited equipment then available. Four different floor plans 
were used for the first three months (see appendix 6). 
changes which took place during the course of the project will 
be discussed in Chapter 7. 
Matters Arising - Yet More Problems! 
Solving one set of problems invariabley seems to create 
another set, and this case was no exception. In one sense, 
the nursery itself was experimental; we could find no other 
group which was functioning in a similar way. Hence, there were 
no yardsticks or guide-lines which could be appealed to. Hence, 
there was a sense of insecurity in the early part of the 
project, amongst all concerned. 
- 
Not all teachers or parents 
were initially enthusiastic about the idea, some being very 
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suspicious of the whole venture. This wariness -, rose in par-',, 
from the location of the nursery in a department of psychology 
and partly from the controversy which surrounds -the 
oral/manual debate. 
The deaf instructors were also unsure Of -their position and 
their role. They were acutely aware of not being qualified as 
teachers and found it difficult to believe, after their own 
experience of the education system, that their views, as deaf 
people, would be taken seriously. It took some time for -them 
to fully accept that the focus of interest was in how they as 
deaf people, chose to structure both events and environment in 
the nursery. Once they did accept this, thev began to take a 
much more active part in planning the nursery, and imposing 
their own structure on it. 
As the deaf instructors grew in confidence, they also took a 
much more active interest in the research possibilities which 
the nursery offered. By the middle of the first year of 
operation, regular discussions took place between myself and 
the deaf instructors concerning the integration of research 
objectives into the planning of activities. I was concerned 
that the major influence on the nursery should be the deaf 
instructors and not my own ideas and prejudices on what I 
thought ought to be the case. The formula which was arrived 
at, was that I would indicate broad areas of interest, e. g. 
symbolic play, and details of how that was to be included in 
the program was left to the deaf instructor. One of the deaf 
" as experimenter and experimental instructors had agreed to acLI 
studies were discussed in detail with her and the other deaf 
adults. 
The nursery was, and still is, very much a working nursery, 
integrated into the L. E. A's provision for the ldeaf:, as 
a whole. Anine vitable consequence of this is an instability in 
the population as children are transferred to other schools, 
either because of age or educational requirements. However, a 
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core group of children, albeit a small one, have stayed with the 
nursery throughout the life of this project, and these form the 
main group of subjects for whom data is reported. 
It was hoped that the nursery would solve the problems of 
regular access to subjects, without undue interruption to their 
education, conducting experiments through sign and recording. 
In most respects the nursery was successful in this. However, 
the eventual subject pool was, at the best of times, small. No 
child was forced to participate in a-study against his or her 
will and parents were encouraged to exercise their right to 
refuse permission for a child to *be a subject in a study. This 
latter was felt to be necessary to counteract any pressure 
the -parents may have felt themselves to be under, given that 
the nursery was a part of the L. E. A. provision. These two 
conspired to reduce the actual number of subjects in studies 
to very small numbers. 
Access was not always as regular as it might have been. All 
the children who came to the nursery did so in transport and 
with escorts provided by the L. E. A.. Unavailability of 
transport, people being ill or leaving, and industrial action 
have all caused problems, particularly towards the end of this 
project, resulting in fewer experimental studies being completed 
than were planned. 
Postscript 
The end of this project has not seen the end of the nursery. 
It has now become an established part of the Hearing Impaired 
Services provision for pre-school deaf children. The number of 
sessions is planned to increase from two to four a week. one 
of the most encouraging and exciting developments is the 
introduction of a reception class. All the first year infants 
from the resourced schools in Leedsý come to the child 
development unit, now doing duty as a classroom, for one 
afternoon a week. As before, only deaf instructors are in the 
classroom with the children, hearing teachers of the deaf 
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observing from behind the screen. All of these children have 
pre 
* 
viously attended the nursery, and for many of the children 
this is their third year at the University. 
+ The term 'hearing impaired' is considered as derogatory by 
many deaf people. It also carries the negative connotations 
associated with the deficit model of deafness. I use the 
term in this chapter and elsewhere as the proper name for 
the L. E. A. 's service for deaf children. 
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CHAPTER 7: Some Observation of Deaf Children Playing 
Introduction 
Whatever theoretical position one takes regarding the function 
and significance of play, it cannot be disputed that children 
spend a lot of time doing it. Conceptions of the functional 
significance and hence the value, of children's play have 
changed markedly over time, in a way that reflects the changing 
conceptions of childhood. Current conceptions of play, are 
integral parts of developmental theories, with play being seen 
as important in the development and maintenance of the child's 
intellectual, social and emotional well being. Play is not a 
uniquely human attribute, it being observed in the young of 
many species. However, the uniquely human attribute of 
language, and its interaction t, 7ith play gives rise to questions 
which are only pertinent to the human child. Is play necessary 
for language to develop? Is language necessary for play, or 
certain types of play? These questions are, of course, 
contextual variants of the question "what is the relationship 
between language and thought? ". 
This chapter is intended to be a relatively informal look at the 
play observed ijý the nursery. It was these observations which 
led to the emphasis on visuo-spatial processing and control of 
attention. The chapter begins with a subjective report of the 
play of the children attending the departmental nursery. This 
was written after the nursery had been in operation for two 
months and before the extant literature on deaf children's play 
was examined. This was a deliberate ploy on my part, in an 
attempt to be as naive an observer as possible. This 
subjective report will then be discussed with reference to the 
literature on deaf children's play. I will then report on the 
changes in the running of the nursery, effected by the deaf 
adults over the course of the project, and some further 
observations of the children's play. 
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Subjective Report of Deaf Children's Play 
The following is an attempt to characterise the nature of deaf 
pre-school children's play in a semi-structured playgroup 
setting. The salient aspect of the group is that the playgroup 
leaders are themselves profoundly deaf and all communication is 
in BSL. 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Activity level and Attention. 
Overall the activity level of the children is very 
high. The most popular toys seem to be the ride on 
toys. The children move about the room a great de-al, 
but with little apparent purpose. They seem to be 
easily distracted. The distraction takes two forms. 
1) their attention span with some activities seems 
very limited. These are activities which one might 
suppose require thought or imagination on the part of 
the child, such as form boards, building bricks, dolls 
house etc. 2) Other children' coming into their line of 
sight. When the child is playing in the presence of 
an adult the adult often acts to redirect their 
attention to the task; when the child is alone this 
seems not to be the case. 
Paradoxically the children do appear to be capable of 
quite long periods of concentration. This is 
especially apparent at the group table sessions sL., ch 
as teatime and to a more limited extent story time. 
The distinguishing feature of these activities in the 
nursery setting is the social element and usually the 
presence of an adult. The sand pit and water table 
are also areas where the children will play for quite 
long periods. This is almost inv. ariabley solitary 
play, although some parallel play does occur. Very 
little co-operative play is observed; that which is 
tends to be with adults or when adults are present. 
The playground is one setting where both sustained 
attention and co-operative play is seen, without the 
presence of adults. 
The children spend a lot of time watching. This often 
occurs as a result of a distraction and is also 
evident when a child and adult are interacting in the 
presence of another child. The watching child often 
exhibits highly sophisticated turn taking skills, 
correctly anticipating change overs in the 
interactions. 
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GENERAL SYMBOLIC FUNCTIONING 
Symbolic Play 
In symbolic play situations the children seem to have 
very limited scripts which recur frequently. These 
are often easily recognisable daily routines such as 
making food or drink. There is little evidence of 
pretend games which require/involve planning, and 
very few games develop which involve more than one 
child taking roles. These are much more lik-ely to 
occur when adults are involved with the play. There 
appears to be a tendency for the children, some at 
least, to exhibit highly stereotypical movements. 
However this could just be a signal that the 
activities are pretend or play. 
Linguistic Mediation. 
The children do exhibit behaviour which indicates that 
sign is used as a cognitive mediator in the free play 
situation. The best 
, 
example of this is signing in the 
mirror during play in the play house or sand-pit etc. 
H owever there is also evidence that the children sign 
to themselves when making decisions during table 
based activities. 
Drawing Activity. 
The children do not voluntarily draw or. engage in 
behaviour which is analogous, with any frequency. 
Paints, as opposed to crayons tend to be preferred. 
When the paints are out the children tend to paint 
the whole page in one colour. On one occasion a 
child did start to paint what looked like a man then 
seemed to become distracted part way through and 
went on to fill in the whole paper in one colour. 
Again the presence of adults seems to act as a focus 
and in this situation where the adult actively 
participates in the activity verbally the child begins 
to paint/draw in a manner which suggest the ability 
to behave symbolically. Painting activities which 
produce whole shapes, e. g. potato prints, or 
non-representational tasks, e. g. string painting, are 
the most preferred painting activities. in these 
instances there does not appear to be any attempt on 
the part of the child to create a structured pattern. 
Use of Books and Pictorial Material. 
The children do not use the book corner with arr: 
frequency. Those that do tend to be the older 
children, either school age or just pre-school. Apart 
L. rom one child, the time the children spend lool"ing at 
the pages of the books is limited, i. e. the children 
turn each page very quickly. The design of the 
playroom means that there is little available wall 
space for hanging pictures, posters etc, at a level 
which is clearly visible to the children. Those few 
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posters which are displayed are rarely looked at or 
pointed to. 
Conclusions. 
The main impression gained from the above is that the 
children prefer those activities which involve 
movement or use of or manipulation of materials, and 
those in which an adult is involved. Despite the high 
level of activity, much of it appears aimless. 
Activities which require visual manipulation or which 
have a high visual requirement, such as drawing, form 
boards etc are not sought out by the children. The 
range of types of play seems to be limited, for 
example there is little evidence of agonistic play or 
indeed any other type of play which involves peer 
interaction. Interactions with adults appear to more 
frequent and sustained than one would expect in a 
hearing nursery group. The presence of adults 
serves to increase attention span by reducing 
dis tractability. and by redirecting the child's 
attention to the on going activity. 
Previous Research on Deaf Children's Play 
There is very little research which looks specifically at play 
in deaf preschoolers, and none involving an all deaf BSL. 
environment. That which does -exist gives an overall picture 
very much like the subjective report (e-g- Darbyshire (1977) 
Higginbotham & Baker (1981) investigated the free play of orally 
educated deaf children, with a view to determine the .. 
relationship between language and play. Social participation 
and cognitive play were observed in deaf (age 47 to 66 months) 
and hearing (age 47 to 63 months) children, attending separate 
pre-school nurseries, during free play sessions. Social 
participation and play were coded according to the scheme 
developed by Higginbotham & Baker (1980). 
For the social participation categories, they found that the 
deaf children spent significantly more time in solitary play and 
less in cooperative activities. For cognitive play categories, 
it was found that the hearing children spent significantly more 
time in dramatic play than the deaf. Within groups, the pattern 
of play differed with the deaf spending significantly more time 
in constructive play than dramatic or functional play. The 
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hearing group spent approximately equal amounts of time in 
dramatic and constructive play, and s-ý. aificantly less time in 
functional play. 
Combining social and cognitive play categories, they found that 
as social participation increased in complexity, from solitary to 
cooperative, the hearing group spent increasing amounts of time 
in dramatic play; for the deaf group this trend was reversed 
with the deaf spending significantly more time in solitary 
dramatic play. These authors concluded that the differences 
between the play of the deaf and hearing, were due to the 
hearing children's use of language, allowing more complex play 
patterns. 
Whilst these authors implicated language they also suggested 
that other social factors, such as the type of nursery, 
integrated against segregated, or teacher style may affect the 
patterns of play. The subjective report above, was written 
very early in the life of. the nursery and it is possible that 
play patterns may change as the influence of the deaf 
instructors grows. 
Changes in the Nurstýry 
As the nursery became more established and the confidence of 
the deaf instructors grew, they began to take a much more 
active role in the organisation and planning of the nursery 
curi-icf1la Whereas at the beginning of the project I had been 
totally responsible for furniture and equipment layout and had 
a large influence on the types of the materials which were 
provided, by the end of the first year of operation the deaf 
instructors had assumed complete responsibility for this. 
The most noticeable change was a reduction in the visual 
complexity of the environment- Current practice in nursery and 
reception classes is to provide a visually rich and stimulating 
environment, with posters and displays of objects to introduce 
the children to topics with the purpose of stimulating curiosity 
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language etc- It is also common practice to divide playrooms 
into distinct areas such as the home corner, wet area etc. 
Increasingly there is a trend to make these areas such that 
there is restricted visual access from other parts of the 
room. The deaf instructors created an environment which was 
almost the opposite of this- Furniture was reduced to a 
minimum and laid out such that any part of the room could be 
seen with a minimum of head movement, and also to leave a 
large area of clear floor space. To my eyes, and the hearing 
teachers of the deaf, the playroom looked spartan and 
uninteresting. When questioned directly about their choice of 
arrangement the deaf instructors usually replied that it helped 
them to see all the children all of the time. Spontaneous 
comments were usually concerned with the feeling of space 
treated, and that this felt more comfortable and was much 
better. - 
It will be recalled that the playground was an area where the 
children displayed sustained attention and co-operative play 
without the presence of an adult. A playground is, of course, 
an open unstructured and visually uninteresting space. In the 
case of the playground attached to the nursery, it is 
surrounded by a high wall on two sides and buildings front onto 
the other two sides. one other observation is relevant here. 
During the first summer the children were. taken on a picnic to 
St Georges Field, a large open green space on the campus. I 
was not especially worried about taking a group of children who 
could not be controlled at a distance by voice into such a 
situation as I assumed that they would display exploration 
behaviour typical of the under fives, i. e. short excursions with 
frequent returns to the caretakers. In fact I assumed that 
their lack of hearing would increase the likelihood of their 
staying close to the caretakers- In the event I was totally 
wrong. The children immediately strayed long distances from 
the caretakers and had to be brought back rather than come 
back voluntarily. They did however always maintain visual 
contact. 
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The changes which the deaf instructors made were disquieting 
to those of-us with conventional ideas and training about what 
constituted an optimal nursery environment. The changes did 
not appear to reduce the level of the children's activity but 
th,, -- play seemed to 
become more purposeful and easier to 
empathise with. The deaf instructors were quite clear that 
iheir purpose in the group was increase play participation and 
facilitate language development. If their structural changes 
were a means of improving these then we might ezpect to see 
some changes in the character of the children's play and 
interactions. 
Interactions 
The description of the childrýen's play given above indicates a 
high rate of adult/child interaction and a low rate of 
child/child interaction- To confirm the validity of this 
observation the children's interactions were monitored. Each 
child was observed for a five minute period during the first 
two play sessions of January 1988. Observations werre made 
from behind the smaller one way screen. The interactions were 
categorised on the basis of the initiator and recipient,, the 
three categories being Adult to Child (AC); Child to Adult (CA) 
and Child to Child (CC). The CC category included only those 
interactions which were initiated by the child under 
observation. The teatime activity was included in the sessions 
with the specific aim of facilitating -the development of 
language skills. If this were succeeding then this may be 
reflected in the relative frequency of initiations. Hence, data 
for teatime and free play sessions were recorded separately. 
The data are suLnnarised in table 7.1. 
AC CA CC 
Free play 43.63 38.18 18.18 
Tea 'Gime 28.12 56.25 15.625 
Table 7.1. Percentage of Initiations in Each Category 
These data confirm the observation that interactions involving 
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adults are the most frequent type, accounting for over 7006 of 
the observations. The context in which the interaction takes 
place, free play or teatime, affects the relative frequency with 
which child and adult initiate interactions. The child is twice 
as likely to initiate an interaction at teatime as the adult, 
whereas in free play the adult and child are equally likely to 
initiate interactions. 
Considering only child initiated interactions (CA & CC) the 
recipient is significantly more likely to be an adult than a 
child in both free play and teatime situations. 
The children's interactions were monitored 6 and 1-1 months after 
the original, using a modified coding scheme. Originally only 
the parties involved in an interaction were noted. This was 
extended to include the method of getting attention and the 
number of turns each interaction lasted, and instances of the 
children signiTig to themselves. 
Coding Scheme and Rationale 
1. METHOD OF INITIATION 
The purpose of this section is to gain inEormation regarding 
the child's attention getting strategies in social interactions. 
The categories chosen reflect the possible methods available to 
the child, and piloting indicated that the four categories, as 
defined below, exhaustively code7d the data. Deaf adults use all 
four methods, choice of method being a function of hearing and 
linguistic status, proximity and age of the recipient. 
Voice any vocalisation directed to another person 
signalled by eye direction or body posture 
Touch contact with the body or clothing of another 
person, e. g. tapping, pulling clothing, moving 
face, etc 
Sign a recognisable formal BSL sign made in the 
direction of, or in the eyeline of another 
person, or to self. It may be preceded by 
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eye contact or a short wave- 
Mixed Any combination of the above, or a non-sign 
gesture 
2. DIRECTION OF INTERACTION AND STATUS OF PARTNER 
All interactions in which a child was involved, either as 
initiator or as recipient were scored. Categories 
2a Interactions directed to the child by. Adult Child 
2b Interactions from the child to. Adult Child Self 
(the child forms a signed utterance where there is no obvious 
recipient). 
The self category was included as it had been observed that 
children would sometimes sign to themselves during play (seL- 
Chapter_8). It was included here to allow an indication of the 
frequency with which the children engaged in this behaviour 
relative to social interactions. 
3. NUMBER OF TURNS. 
This is a count of the -number of times control of the 
interaction changes. The number of turns in a an interaction 
can be taken as a measure of language functioning (Wood, 1980). 
Method 
Each child was observed for a five minute, period, during the 
free play session, and all interactions scored on a prepared 
sheet (see appendix 7). Observations were made in the playroom 
or playground, depending on the location of the target child 
when observation began, in view of the child. E was well known 
to the children and her presence did not appear to disrupt the 
activities of the children. Previous Piloting, under the same 
conditions had prompted interest from the children, leading to E 
being asked questions. Hence, at the time of data collection 
her presence was both commonplace and understood. An 
alternative strategy would have been to use video to follow 
the children. However, at this point in the project, the 
equipment was unavailable owing to rebuilding work in the 
studio. 
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A second set of data was collected 5 months later using the 
same method and coding scheme, (Elf, 1988/9). Part of the 
piloting work referred to above, had included familiarisation of 
Elf with the coding scheme. This had involved independent 
coding, by the two observers, of the same child during the same 
five minute period. Inter-rater reliability was checked-again 
after the second data collection by both observers coding a 
video recording of a five minute period of one child. 
Results 
The results are summarised in table 7.2. The January figures 
(group A) are included for comparison. Data for group C 13 
months, is from Elf (1988/9). Elf observed the children for up 
to 4 sessions. The data reported here-is taken from the last 
observation made for each child. 
Method From child to To child from Turns 
Group Age v T S H A C S A C x 
A 2mtha 47.4 . 68 . 32 / 1 ./ 
B BmthS 53.6 . 18 . 02 . 49 . 31 . 54 . 23 . 23 .7 .3 1.08 
c smths 50.2 . 12 .1 . 38 .4 . 44 . 44 . 11 . 54 . 46 1.6 
C 13mth 55.6 .1 . 17 . 53 . 19 . 41 . 56 . 03 . 54 . 46 1.57 
N. B. Number of months after group letter, is number of months that group had 
attended the nursery 
Table 7-2. Proportion of Interactions in Each Category. 
Inspection of: the : data shows:. Cthat sign and,. mixed'- -me tho d s,, of -_ 
ihitiation-,, l are_. thos6'most: tfre(: fuently used-and that. -use'--of sign. 
tends.: to increase slightly, -at;. the expense oE. '. mixed methods; as 
length. of time. -in - the. - nursery. increases. 
The length of time the child spent in the nursery also affects 
the relative frequency with which the child directs interactions 
to an adult or a child. Early observations indicated that 70% 
of the child's interactions were directed to adults. After 
eight months other children and adults were equally likely to be 
the recipients of an interaction. It will be recalled that the 
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children knew one another and the adults, before the start of 
this nursery, from their integrated nurseries. This would 
reduce the probability of these trends being due to increased 
familiarity, although it does not rule out the possibility. 
Social and Cognitive Play 
At the beginning of the second year of the nursery an 
observational study of the children's play was undertaken by 
Elf (1988/9), using the categories devised by Higginbotham & 
Baker (1980). Elf compared the social and cognitive play of 
two age groups of children from the nursery, and also the data 
from Higginbotham & Baker. Of interest here are the data 
from the older Leeds group and the data from Higginbotham and 
Bakers deaf and hearing groups. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 give the 
percentage of time each group spent in each cognitive (7.3) and 
social (7.4) play category. 
Functional Constructive Dramatic 
Leeds Deaf 30.89 31.53 31.75 
H&B Deaf 10.24 57.86 18.74 
H&B Hearing 7.77 45.48 41.79 
Table 7.3 Percentage of Time Spent in Each cognitive Play 
Category 
u 0 s p A c 
Leedo Deaf . 79 9.41 34.8 24.38 29.98 2.04 
H&B Deaf 1.51 11.67 39.68 21.99 18.81 6.35 
H&B Hearing . 94 5.94 12.31 14.99 28.19 37.3 
Key: U- unoccupied; 0- onlooker; S- solitary; P- parallel; A- 
Associative; C- Cooperative 
Table 7.4 Percentage of Time Spent in each Social Play 
Category 
Inspection ý of' ýthese data : shows that --the-- distribution ý: 6frplay'. I. ý 
ýacross 1ý cognitive ý categoribsifshowsl the ! Leeds. ýdeaE! Ao,, Spend:,,. 
equal amounts of-time.; in each: category. -: OIn this,. respect C they 
are. -, different to either of the other two groups. 
The distribution of play across the social participation 
categories shows little difference between the two deaf groups, 
with the exception of the associative play category. Within 
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groups, the Leeds deaf spend roughly equal amounts of time in 
the solitary, parallel and associative categories. By contrast 
the Higginbotham deaf spend more time in solitary play than 
parallel or associative. 
one of the reasons for creating an all deaf nursery was that 
the advantage which accrues to the deaf children of deaf 
parents, may also be gained by the deaf children of hearing 
parents, if other significant adults in the child's life are deaf. 
Elf's (1988/9) data, indicates that even though the play profiles 
of the Leeds children are not identical to the hearing, there is 
a trend toward play which would be considered age appropriate 
in hearing term s. A second point is that this trend is evident 
in an environment created by the deaf adults, to be comfortable 
to them, an environment I characterised as spartan and 
uninteresting. 
Symbolic Fýunctioning 
The subjective report indicated that drawing was not 'an 
: -activity which the children voluntarily entered into with any 
frequency. Also when the children did engage in either drawing 
or painting the nature and qualities of those drawing differed 
from those observed in a comparable hearing nurtery. it was 
also the case that the children seldom used the book corner, 
or spent time looking at pictures- 
Reviews of I. Q. studies of deaf children have suggested that 
deaf children have I. Q. 's within the normal range, but with a 
depressed mean. The Goodenough-Harris Draw-A-Man Test fulfils 
the non-verbal criteria, and has often been used with the deaf. 
Results give rise to a depressed mean (e. g. Vernon, 1967). 
Vernon feels that research using the Goodenough test has to 
be disregarded because; 
"the directions it requires are beyond the language 
comprehension of a large number of deaf groups to 
which it is administered. " (p329). 
He argues that administration would require a demonstration 
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drawing which would then act as a model ffor the testee, thus, 
presumably negating the results. However, if this were the 
case, one might expect that the children's drawings show an 
increase on average rather than the depressed means reported. 
Also Harr-is (1962) suggests that young children's drawings are 
not, on the whole, influenced by models but reflect what the 
children believe to be the case, or their model of the referent. 
If this is the case then one can assume that if the children 
produce a drawing then the instructions have been sufficiently 
understood, and the score should reflect the child's ability. 
However it still remains to be explained why the deaf 
consistently score below. hearing norms, given that this is not 
the case with other non-verbal I. Q. tests, nor what would be 
expected from a sampling distribution. Vernon suggests tha t 
any comparison of the cognitive abiliti-es of the deaf and 
hearing should take into account the possible existence of CNS 
damage over and above the deafness and also that "the deaf 
come from a somewhat submerged socio-ecconomic group" (p330), 
as both of these factors are as. sociated with lowered cognitive 
performance. However, these should equally influence other 
test results. 
A case in point is the WISC test. Vernon cites the results of 
four studies using WISC. In three of the four the mean I. Q. of 
the deaf is normal- WISC correlates well with the Draw-A-Man 
test in hearing samples, yet of the four insta nces of the 
Draw-A-Man test cited by Vernon, none re port a no rmal mean. 
Twelve of the children, aged 42 to 60 months (average 48.3 
months) were given the Draw-a-Man test by a deaf instructor- 
On the first occasion the testing was done in the playroom, on 
an informal basis as part of the free play period. The child 
was invited by the deaf instructor to draw a man. Ij- the child 
seemed to be reluctant or not to understand then the 
instructions were repeated using Daddy. 
126 
This procedure produced 2 scoreable drawings from 9 that were 
completed. In view of the low number of scoreable drawings, it 
was decided to make the testing situation more formal, and in 
view of the general reluctance of the children to draw, to 
offer an incentive. 
On the second occasion, one week later, the children were 
invited by the deaf instructor, to go to a small room off the 
main playroom. They were told that if they drew a very good 
picture of a man they would win some sweets. All the children 
were asked to draw a man like Daddy. After completing this 
they were given a half formed stylistic man, based on that used 
by Gesall., and asked what was wrong with him and could they 
make him better. After the completion of both tasks they were 
given a small packet of sweets. 
This procedure produced drawings for the draw-a-man test with 
raw scores in the range 0 to 14, which when converted to age 
norms, gave standard scores in the range, 58 to 95, with a 
mean of 76.25 (S. D. 10.98). None of the children tested were 
considered below average intelligence by their teachers, and 
certainly not to the degree suggested by these scores. 
Explaining these results is problematic. The observation that 
the children preferred painting activities which produced whole 
shapes, suggested that their performance on the Gessell test 
would show an improvement over the draw-a-man test. Given 
Harris's assertion that children are less influenced by models 
than what they believe to be the case, a higher score on the 
Gessell test would indicate that the children knew what should 
have been drawn, but that this was inhibited for some reason, 
on the draw-a-man test. If language is a factor in the 
draw-a-man test, then the visuo-spatial demands of the 
language and the task are potentially interfering. The Gessell 
complete-a-man would effectively reduce visuo-spatial 
processing load, thereby making the task easier for the deaf 
children. The completed Gessell figures were certainly 
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tive of this. Unfortunately, an extensive search failed suggest 
to discover a set of norms for the Gessell test and I was 
unable to devise a method of comparing results in which i had 
any confidence. 
Cartoons 
It was noted that the children spent little time looking at 
books or other pictorial material. It was also noted that the 
children were highly sensitive to movement. Considering these 
together led to the idea that moving pictures may be of more 
interest to the children. 
During one free play session video recordings of a familiar 
cartoon (Tom and Jerry) and an unfamiliar cartoon-(Pluto) were 
played. The children's attention was not specifically drawn to 
the cartoons. None of the children showed any interest in 
these during free play, and only one child commented on the 
cartoons during tea time. 
summary 
The observations in the nursery indicate that Within this all 
deaf environinent, deaf children develop patterns of social and 
cognitive play, which, with time, begin to approach those of 
hearing children. Visual aspects of the situation are 
important; observations in the Playground indicate that in this 
kind of visually simple environment, the children show sustained 
periods of attention and increased cooperative play. Also the 
deaf adults reduced the visual complexity of the environment 
within the playroom. 
Sustained attention was also noted in the presence of adults, 
and it was suggested that the adults served to increase 
attention, by redirecting the child's attention to the on going 
activity. The third place sustained attention was noted was 
when the children played in front of the mirror. Wood et al 
(1986) discussing the importance of contingent interactions to 
develop the child's ability to concentrate say; 
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"The most important single resource in the classroom 
is, for us, the teacher and other adults. " (p45). 
The next chapter suggests that the deaf children here have 
discovered another, possibly more potent, resource - 
themselves. 
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CHAPTER 8: Mirror Interactions 
INTRODUCTION 
The Child Development Unit, in which the nursery is held, 
contains two one way screens, hence there is a large area of 
mirror surface in the room. It was noticed early on, that the 
children made use of this as a personal resource, especially 
the large mirror which separated the unit and the video control 
room. 
Initially it was felt that the novelty value of mirrors in a 
classroom, could reasonably account for the children's interest 
in them. However, mirrors are not novel per se, being common 
items in everyday use. I expected, therefore, that as the 
children became familiar with the new environment, the mirrors 
would loose their attraction. This did not appear to be the 
case, if anything, their use increased, with the children 
deliberately seeking out th e mirrors on occasion. 
This led me to consider the possibility that the children's 
interactions with the mirrors were of some functional 
significance. Deaf adults, who had signed as children, 
reported that they had enjoyed signing to themselves in the 
mirror, suggesting a language function. 
Child's Knowledge of Mirror Images 
Reacting to mirror images can be problematic as evidenced by 
_/_1 tracking studies etc, or less formally, the problems encountered 
when putting on make up, or trying to cut ones own hair. The 
major feature of a mirror image is lateral inver's , ion, with 
preservation of vertical information. The children appeared to 
be quite sophisticated in their appreciation of mirror images. 
They appeared to have no problem in interpreting signed 
utterances in the mirror, when these came from other people. 
They would also follow conversations between two people, one 
being a mirror image, the other -real. The point here is that 
the signing would be by an apparently left handed person. 
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Signing follows handedness, in that one handed signs are made 
by the dominant hand and two handed signs with the dominant 
hand taking the lead. Therefore, the deaf person has to be 
able to interpret a signed utterance irrespective of the 
handedness of the sender. At least two of the deaf 
instructors were left handed, and therefore, the children had 
experience of left handed signers. 
The children were able to track moving objects in the mirror 
accurately and could also reach out for, or strike objects (or 
persons), with the mirror image being used for hand eye 
co-ordination. However some tracking errors were made. These 
were a consequence of the tracked object or person being 
obscured and then reappearing. The typical error was to 
anticipate reappearance at the point where the person or 
object had disappeared. These occasions invariabley elicited 
c hecking between the mirror image and the real object. 
That these. checking moves by the children led to learning is 
suggested by the children's use of the mirror to observe 
otherwise obscured events. For example, one boy was following 
an interaction between one of the instructors and one of the 
other children as they walked across the room. As the 
instructor obscured the child, and consequentially the 
interaction, the observing child immediately turned to the 
mirror and looked at such an angle so as to be able to 
6ontinue to observe the event. This suggests quite a high 
level of intuitive knowledge of the optical properties of 
mirrors for a 3/4 year old child. 
Mirror Images and Sign Language 
All of this begs the question why do the children apparently 
invest so much learning into the mirror. It has been suggested 
that the experience of deafness is a visual experience (Erting, 
1985). The mirror provides visual experiences which are novel 
(inversions) useful (environmental monitoring) and rewarding 
(feedback, contingencies). These three might be sufficient to 
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explain the children's interest in them, but would apply equally 
to hearing children. No evidence that hearing children do 
engage in the same kind of behaviour has been found. An 
inspection of video tapes recorded in a nursery for hearing 
children, through similar observation screens did not reveal 
any mirror interactions as described here. Perhaps the unique 
aspect of mirror images in relation to deaf children is the 
relationship they bear to sign language. 
Efficient use of sign language requires an appreciation of 
spatial relations, both in the environment and as they pertain 
to observers from different perspe6tives, i. e. the treatment of 
space, and time, which is also marked spatially, is relativistic 
in Sign. In discussing -the development of ASL from Signed 
English input (Livingstone, 1983) argues that certain structures 
cannot emerge until the child has acquired sufficient cognitive 
skills to deal with the spatial structures of the language. 
Space is used in four ways in sign language: - 
1) it is the medium in which it is transmitted 
2) -it is used grammatically e. g. to mark tense, or more general 
aspects of time, pronominal referencing. 
3) it is used to represent itself. 
4) to compress information (see Chapter 4). 
Many of these spatial grammatical devices require that the 
participants in a conversation can construct a structure 
between them and then refer to it as a set of locations which 
is spatially independent of the person who constructed it (see 
figure 8.1) 
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Fiq. 8.1: An Example of Placement 
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In the above figure A&B are participants in a conversation 
and 1&2 represent two events or persons who are being 
talked about. Let us assume that B introduces a person into 
the conversion. B gives the person a location in space (1) by 
signing the persons name and then pointing to a location. 
Subsequent points to that location refer to that person. 
Location 1 is to the right of B. Now person B introduces a 
second person into the conversation who also requires a 
location for subsequent reference. This is location 2 on B's 
lef t. Person A now makes a comment about person 1. To refer 
to this person A must point to left i. e. the absolute location 
of 1 in space not the relative location (to the right of the 
person talking about 1). Similarly with location 2. This is 
precisely the situation encountered in a mirror image. 
This facility is not confined to pronominal referencing but also 
applies to spatial descriptions. For example a scene containing 
a social element, such as a person, is described as though the 
person was experiencing it, not as though they were looking at 
it. Hearing people learning sign have great difficulty in 
learning to use placement correctly. Much of the difficulty 
appears to stem from an inability to treat aspects of space 
isotonicaly, or perhaps to be unable to divest objects or 
persons of chiralityl. In fact the hearing person encountering 
placement is in the position of the child performing Piaget's 
three mourýtains experiment, only in this case the correct 
solution is to be egocentric! 
The production of oral language, under normal circumstances, is 
accompanied by simultaneous feedback, such that the producer 
hears exactly what the receiver hears. This feedback allows 
the producer to control his speech, by, for example, correcting 
pronunciation errors. If feedback is prevented, say by masking 
1. Handedness, describes a variable with two values; left and 
right. Chirality, describes the same kind of variable, i. e. one 
with two values. It is this neutral aspect of handedness which 
I wish to describe by using chirality as opposed to handedness. 
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with white noise, the person's speech becomes louder as they 
try to compensate. If compensation is not possible, then 
intonation and some pronunciation becomes disrupted and 
sentences become shorter. The speech of people using personal 
stereos is an everyday example. In the case of sign language, 
feedback is different. Because sign language involves the face 
and body as well as the hands feedback is kinaesthetic, whereas 
reception by the recipient is via the visual channel. The 
producer may receive some feedback visually, if they look at 
their hands, but what they see will be very different from that 
which the receiver sees. A mirror allows feedback which is 
much closer to the view of recipient. Although not identical, 
due to the lateral inversion, it could be a useful device for 
allowing the relationship between kinaesthetic sensation and the 
visual form of the total sign to be learned, such that 
necessary corrections can-be made on the basis of kinaesthetic 
information alone. 
Hence, the efficient use of sign language requires three skills 
which have a direct relationship to mirror images, in that they 
require an appreciation of lateral inversion; understanding 
opposite handed signers, pronominal referencing, and placement. 
Egocentric Speech and Imaginal Dialogue 
All young children talk to themselves a phenomenon termed 
? egocentric speech'. However, the meaning of this term varies 
according to the developmental theorist using it. The variation 
in meaning arises from the functions ascribed to it and its 
postulated developmental roots. Vygotsky (1962) argues that 
between the ages of 2 and 7 speech performs two functions; 1) 
an external function of communicating with others i. e. social 
speech and 2) an internal function of monitoring and directing 
thought. Initially the child is unable to distinguish these 
functions and both take the form of overt utterances, which 
the child assumes will be understood by others; which is 
egocentric speech. As the internal and external functions 
separate, egocentric speech becomes increasingly symbolic and 
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less intelligible to others, eventually being internalised, at 
around age 7, as verbal thought. Vygotsky bases his arguments 
on two lines of evidence; firstly the grammatical structure of 
egocentric speech becomes increasingly like (that of inner 
speech, sometimes described as predicate only speech. 
Secondly, experimental evidence concerning the conditions under 
which egocentric speech is present. The social origin, and the 
assumption by the child that his speech is understood, is 
demonstrated by a decrease in egocentric speech in situations 
where the child is either not able to be understood, e. g. in 'the 
presence of deaf or foreign language children, or when the child 
is alone. Egocentric speech is also found to decline where the 
child is unable to hear himself or others. 
Piaget initially viewed egocentric speech as a running 
commentary on the child's behaviour, a monologue, which does 
not perform the adult function of communicating ideas to 
others. At around the age of 7 egocentric speech is replaced 
by socialised speech which does performs the adult function of 
communicating to others. Some commentators (e. g. Gross, 1987; 
Dobson et al, 1981) now argue that Piacret agrees with the views 
of" Vygotsky, that egocentric speech serves the function of 
planning and directing behaviour. 
Some overt speech, both in children and adults, has a 
grammatical structure which is identiczal with that of social 
speech, yet is not directed to some other person. This has 
been termed imaginal dialogue (Meek, 1985), on the basis that 
this is speech which is directed towards to an imaginal other. 
Amongst the functions which Meek discusses, the relevant one 
here is the role of imaginal dialogue in play. Imaginary friends 
are not uncommon, and these are spoken to as though they were 
real. Symbolic play is often signaled and disambiguated for the 
observer by the language the child uses. The main point here 
is that imaginal dialogue differs in structure to egocentric 
speech and also in function, in that it is an end product 
rather than a means to an end. 
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Deaf Children and Egocentric Speech 
Given the emphasis on the relationship between language and 
thought in much of the previous work on the deaf 'there is 
little if any raention of egocentric spe-ech. I ha-ve not been 
, ýble to find any empirical reports of egocentric speech in deaf 
children for e-ither oral or sign language. This- is- especially 
surprising in the cas e of Lewis (1966) as this worl- has 'the 
specific aim of investigating the role of language, or lack of 
it, on the development of internal controls on social and 
emotional aspects: of behaviour, e. g. perceptions of and 
attitudes towards self and others, impulse control, etc. - He 
uses the term orectic behaviour to describe this behaviour 
generally- Given that his theoretical base is that of Luria 
(e. g. 1966), which posits language as a second signal system, 
allowing just such an internal control, for both cognitive and 
orectic behaviour. Egocentric speech, wh ich is an overt and 
developing manifestation of such internal control would seem 
worthy of investigation in this respect. Denmark ett al (1985. ) 
reporting on emotional disturbance in -the deaf, argue that 
early manual communication is protective. I'Ll- they are correct 
then, it could be that what this early input of sign language 
gives the child is the means to internally represent and 
control his behaviour. Egocentric sign language would be 
indicative OLE 'this. All this presupposes that ecroce. ntric speech 
is indeed a manifestation of linguistic control of behaviour- if 
not thought, and that such processes and functions are 
equivalent in 'the deaf and hearing and with oral and sign 
languaqe. However, irrespective ol- considerations regarding 
internal self control, if egocentric speech is seen as nothing 
but a practice of developing linguistic skills, then to 'those 
who argue that sign and oral language are furicýional 
equivalents, which develop in analogous ways, then a 
demonstration of egocentric sign language, or at least sign 
lanquage used for the self, would strengthen their arguments. 
Evidence for Linguistic Basis to Mirror Interactions 
Initial interest'was focused on examples of the children signing 
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to themselves in the mirror. These examples are 
incontrovertibly linguistic in nature, in that -they are composed 
of connected discourse in sign which is meaningful to an 
outside observer. However, there are a large number of 
interactions which are not overtly linguistic, Le. are not 
composed of recognisable signs made with the hands. However, 
these interactions do involve face and body postures which 
could accompany signs. Given that the children are often using 
-their hands for the current game/activity it is possible that 
these face and body postures are the overt part of an 
imagined utterance. If this is the case then these interactions 
also have a linguistic base and would have the same 
characteristics as overt sign sequences. One characteristic of 
dialogue is turn taking and such behaviour should be evident if 
the children are behaving linguistically. 
Other Uses of the Mirror 
Not all the mirror interactions were linguistic nature. In line 
with Myklebusts 'organismic shift' hypothesis, the deaf child has 
to monitor his/her environment purely visually, whereas 'the 
hearing person can also use the auditory channel. It was 
noticed that thi, s constant visual monitoring of the environment 
could prove disruptive to the children as their.. attention was 
constantly being drawn away from the on going activity. Two 
situations were observed where the children showed more 
sustained periods of attention, in the sense that they were 
not so likely to be distracted by their environmental 
monitoring. One was in the presence of adults and the other, 
when play was in the proximity of the mirror. In cases where 
the play house was positioned against the mirror, lack of 
environmental distractors could reasonably account for this. 
The play house, by its nature, restricts the amount of space in 
which the child is operating. However, in the cases where 
interactions took place around the sand-pit, or at one of the 
table activities, the amount of space in which' the child is 
operating is identical to any free play situation. 
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Control of Attention 
There are two possible reasons why the mirror apparently 
increases attention to the on going activity. 1) The contingent 
nature of the interactions is of itself sustaining 2) the mirror 
increases the ease oil environmental monitoring. The large 
surface of the mirror makes it possible to observe a large 
part of the room. This means that the children have immediate 
access to events occurring behind them as well as being able 
to monitor their own activitv. That the children were 
monitoring the environment, as well as themselves, is evidenced 
by the fact that the children would often choose to look at 
the result of their action in the mirror rather than at the 
real object when each was equally easy, or indeed it meant an 
extra movement to view the activity in the mirror. That ýhey 
used the mirror to scan the environment is evidenced by -the 
fact that the children wcruld sometimes check the mirror image 
with the real world event. This activity seemed on occasion to 
be initiated by behaviour of a person or object in the mirror 
which was surprising to the child as evidenced by a) a change 
of facial expression and/or b) an error in locating the real 
world object. 
In the absence of systematic data, all such discussion is 
speculative. The above considerations alone are enough to 
warrant a closer examination of these interactions. The 
nove-Ity of these interactions, may give rise to some ads-givings 
about the validity and utility of such an investigation. I have 
argued elsewhere (Chapter 4) that an understanding of the deaf 
Lch is derived from obser,. requires data whi. lations of the deaf, 
such that any unique adaptations may emerge. Not to examine 
these interactions, just because identical observations cannot 
be made for the hearing, would be a contradiction. The validity 
or utility of such an investigation can be determined by the 
outcome; by the presence cr absence of discernible patterns or 
structure in the data. Therefore, an observational study of 
the children's interactions with the mirror was carried out and 
is reported below. 
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Aims and Objectives 
The aim of the present analysis is to determine the 
developmental and or functional significance of the children's 
interactions with the mirror by examining: - 
1) The type of interactions, e. g. linguistic, environmental 
monitoring, etc. 
2) The structure of interactions 
3) The relative distribution of linguistic and non-linguistic 
interactions 
4) The effect of social variables, e. g. presence or absence of 
others on interactions. 
5) The effect of symbolic play on interactions 
6) The effect of age on 1-5 above- 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Two groups of children attending the departmental nursery on 
separate afternoons acted as subjects. The older group (N=6) 
had an age range of 46 to 60 months, with a mean of 52.66 
months, and the younger group (N=6) an age range of 37 to 48 
months with a mean of 42.33 months. 
Data Source 
Video tapes of nursery sessions over a consecutive four week 
period, which had been recorded. for another purpose, were 
examined for mirror interactions- The recordings were made 
using, a tripod camera, through the observation screen. -k t 
this stage, the children were unaware that there were people 
present behind the screen and that they could be observed or 
filmed through it. 
Although the groups attended on separate afternoons, the 
layout of the nursery was identical for both sessions. All 
interactions during the four week period were coded according 
to the scheme described below. 
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Coding Scheme and Rationale 
A mirror interaction is taken to have occurred when the child 
has engaged in some behaviour in which the focus of attention 
is an image reflected in the mirror. The image may be social 
(i. e. self, other(s), or non social i. e. some aspect of the 
environment, toy, etc). Behaviours directed at the mirror per 
se do not count as interactions, e. g. hair brushing, teeth 
cleaning, adjusting clothing. However these events may lead to 
subsequept behaviours which are mirror interactions. 
The scheme was designed to allow an examination of both the 
structure and the content of the interaction as it occurred in 
time. Informal observation suggested that the interactions 
were deliberate acts by the child. The first set of categories 
allows a test of this. The focusl categories indicate to whom 
or what attention is directed, at the start of an interaction 
i. e. the stimulus, and the location categories, where the 
stimulus is situated relative to the child. Whether the child 
was alone or with others, and whether the child was engaged in 
symbolic play or not was also recorded. This gives a complete 
description of the initiation and context of an interaction. 
The decision to dichotomise play as symbolic/non- symbolic was 
twofold. Firstly, the coding scheme, without play categories, is 
already complex. Secondly, symbolic play is the type of play, 
which in the hearing has been related to language (e. g. 
McCune-Nicholic, 1981). She defines symbolic play as 
"The juxtaposition of a real action and an intended 
fantasy provides the underlying structure of symbolic 
play... In symbolic play the child transforms 
activities from their real objectives and objects from 
their real counterparts. This transformational 
quality is the defining attribute of symbolic play 
(Fein, 1975). (p785/6)" 
From this definition it is clear that the major problem which 
confronts the observer is deciding whether there is an 
"intended fantasy" or not. For example, a child sweeping the 
floor with a toy dustpan and brush may or may not be engaged 
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in symbolic play. If the child is sweeping the floor because 
Mum says dirty floors should be swept then this is not symbolic 
play, even though the child is using toy props and not real 
(adult) implements. If, however, the child is pretending, either 
to sweep up imaginary dirt, or to be some adult engaged in 
sweeping the floor, then this is symbolic play even if there is 
real dirt and or even if the child had been using adult 
implements. To infer pretence, the observer must rely on cues 
in the child's behaviour. The pretence may be signalled by 
language. Some children adopt a stereotyped gait and body 
postures when they are pretending. Dressing up, treating 
inanimate objects as animate (e. g. dolls), the non literal use of 
objects, e. g. using a broom as a horse, are all indicative of 
pretence. Also symbolic play is characterised by being 
organised and thematic. 
intention 
incidental 
deliberate 
not known 
continuation 
the child's attention is attracted by 
the mirror image 
turns or otherwise indicates intent to 
look/comment at self or other 
already engaged in interaction at start 
of recording 
previous event a mirror interaction 
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f ocusl 
self sees self 
other sees other person 
event sees event/group activity 
location 
front all locations relative to child. 
behind Multiple entries indicate diagonals. 
Location is of the stimulus event 
left 
right 
Content of Interactions 
Interest in the children's interactions with the mirror was 
initi ally confined to instances of clearly discernible. sign 
utterances. However, closer examination of the tapes showed 
that these episodes formed only a proportion of the children's 
interactions. The present analysis includes all instances of 
mirror interactions. Some interactions although not clearly 
sign utterances apparently involved 'turn taking'. S ome 
evidence for this was apparent in the behaviour of the deaf 
instructors during these interactions. The deaf instructors 
waited until the child was at a 'turn taking' point before 
attempting to gain the child's attenti6n, i. e a competent 
language user behaved as if the interaction with the mirror was 
linguistic in this sense. Attempts to interrupt the child at 
points other than these would fail to gain the child's attention 
until such a point had been reached. It is this type of 
behaviour which the converse category records. 
interaction type 
watch continuous looks 
converse interrupted looks. turn taking but not 
overtly verbal 
comment single sign or facial expression 
dialogue connected discourse 
initiate attracting attention of other 
explore checking image to real world 
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monitor checking glances 
number of turns a count of the number of apparent turns 
in the converse and dialogue categories 
The f0cus2 categories indicate to whom or what the interaction 
is directed. This may or may not be the same as in focus,. 
The major difference between the two sets of focus categories 
is that the recipient of the interaction is described in more 
detail. 
focus? 
self per se 
self as actor own activity not self per se e. g. 
watching sand-pie come out of the 
bucket. 
self as other 
child 
adult 
environment some non-social aspect of the situation 
imaginary directed to space as well as mirror 
These categories parallel the location categories of the 
initiating event, in that they are an attempt to record the 
degrd'e to which the mirror was necessary for the event to 
take place. 
direction 
Necessary either considerable physical movement 
required to gain information e. g. event 
occurring directly behind S. 
Peripheral Event could have been seen out of side 
of eye i. e. some element of choice in 
using mirror 
optional deliberate choice to use mirror i. e. 
event could easily have been observed 
or interacted with, without use of 
mirror e. g. looking at an object S is 
holding/playing with 
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Termination of Interaction 
The final categories are concerned with what terminates events. 
If the mirror increases attentional control then we might 
expect to see a low frequency of distractions for example. 
Also recorded is the time elapsed, in seconds, from the 
beginning of the interaction. 
type of end event 
distracted change in focus of attention S passive 
interrupted active distraction of child by another 
person 
switch to real attention is redirected to real person 
or event 
another mirror new focus of attention, but still a 
mirror image 
return to activity 
All categories except number of turns and duration are nominal. 
The above coding scheme exhaustively coded the data. The data 
was coded using a Bull AP-L lap top computer, and SMART 
spreadsheet. Frequency counts, percentages, and transitional 
probabilities were calculated using the softwares resident 
statistical provisions. Chi-square and Mann-Whitney analyses 
were calculated on an Amstrad PCW using the AMSTAT package. 
RESULTS 
Distribution of Interactions 
In a four week period 125 interactions were recorded for the 
older group and 112 interactions for the younger group. The 
percentage of interactions falling in each category for each 
age group is tabulated below (Table 8.1). Chi-square values are 
for tests of independence of distribution amongst categories 
with age. All tests are two tailed. Table 8.1a gives 
chi-square values for each group of categories for each age. 
Re-coding after an interval of one month gave 90.4% agreement. 
b6tweeh.; th6... two ýdata spreadsh6ets. '. This, was asses, sed;, by 'a 
simple cell by cell comparison of the two data sets, by the 
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Old Young 
Intention 
incidental 9.6 17.85 
Deliberate 69.6 52.95 
Continuation 20.0 29.46 
X2-7.88; df 2; p <. 05 
rocusl 
Self 79.2 60.75 
other 19.2 28.57 
Event 1.6 2.68 
----- 
X2-3.3; n. s. 
------------------------ -------- --------- 
Content 
Watch 48.8 64.28 
Converse 12.8 9.82 
Explore 1.6 1.78 
Comment 32.14 19.64 
Dialogue 8.0 3.57 
X2-6.98; n. s. 
Focus2 
Self 29.6 23.21 
Self as Other 20.0 14.28 
Self as Actor 24.0 33.04 
Total Self 73.6 70.53 
Child 4.8 12.5 
Adult . 
16.8 16.07 
imaginary 4.0 0 
Total other 25.6 28.57 
Environment 0.8 1.78 
----- 
X2-12.82; df 6; 
------------------------ 
p<. 05 
-------- --------- 
Termination 
Distracted 4.0 9.04 
Interrupted 8.8 A. 46 
Switch to Real 23.2 25. OD 
Another Hirror 20.0 29.46 
Return to Activity 43.2 33.04 
X2-7.1; n. s. 
Table 8.1 Percentage of Interactions in Each Category. 
old Young 
Group X2 X2 df 
intention 77.73 21.13 2 
Focusl 124.14 74.48 2 
Type 90.08 150.67 A 
Focus2 65.23 62. OD 6 
Termination 58.58 38.5 4 
P<. 00001 for all casea 
Table 8.1a. Chi-square Values and Siqnificance Levels for 
Distribution Across Cateqory Groups 
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computer, ý,;. The ýmajor difference between the two sets, of codinq 
was that,: the- second set recorded- more -: 
interactions. -. -ýThis ý, was 
probably-as'-a result of increased familiarity with the 
instrument and the material. 
Intention 
As can be seen f rom table . 
8.1, the - distributions f or the two 
groups follow a similar pattern, both being significantly 
different from chance. The majority of interactions are 
deliberate, for both groups. However, the relative frequencies 
differ for the groups, with the younger group having nearly 
twice as many interactions which are incidental. The chi-square 
analysis shows that the distribution of events amongst the 
categories is age dependant. These data tend to support the 
view that mirror interactions are intentional behaviours and 
further, that deliberate use of the mirror increases with age, 
suggesting that learning is taking place. Further confirmation 
of this view comes from examining the first interaction of each 
episode. For the young group 75% of episodes began with an 
incidental interaction as opposed to 38.899z for the older group. 
Focus and Intention 
The distribution of interactions amongst focusl categories 
follows the same pattern for both gr6ups, with self being the 
most frequent initiating focus. Chi-square analysis shows that 
distributions differ from chance for both groups and that the 
distribution of interactions amongst categories is independent 
of age. 
The transitional probabilities for intention and focus; i. e. given 
an intention what is the probability of a given focus, are 
shown in Table 8.2. 
Focus 
intention self other Event 
old Young Old Young old Young 
incidental . 67 . 75 . 33 .2 0 . 05 
Deliberate . 91 . 81 . 08 . 19 . 01 0 
Continuation . 48 . 64 . 52 . 36 . 04 . 06 
Table 8.2 Transitional Probabilities From Intention to Focusl 
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'Inspecti'on -of), th6-, --data'., 'sli'ows'., that;, for Lth'e, yoýinger qroup'-self 
is,, -, thiý ! mob t:: Probable--, fo i-. u s- irre'spe-ctiVe,., ofiýintention,, - whereýis--. - 
f orý! the, --bld6r -groUp-. ýself ý is moiýt; --probýtbl6ý'f oll6wing- incýiidentzil-- 
and-1-- deliberate' categories, and -ýothee. is fm6ist; 4probable--ý f 61lowing. 
a, ocohtinuation-ýz- Foýi-botlicgrotipS-! ýelf-ýfoll6wi 4.. d6liheratiýlis figl 
highly. -Ipr, obabl6iý occuCr: i-hg2i-nr-91%ýý-and7--'81%7-, of. *,, ca: se ST, ! -; Forý: Jb6th 
group .s.. sociah'stimuliiý-acdountl for. - nearly all cases. 
Content of Interactions 
The distribution of interactions across event types again 
follows the same pattern for the two groups and is 
significantly different from chance in both cases. Although the 
relative frequencies vary between the groups, a chi-square 
analysis shows this to be independent of age. The predominant 
category is watch for both groups, with the younger group 
having the higher percentage (64.28% v 48.8%). The second 
largest category for both groups is comment, with the older 
group having the higher percentage (32.14% v 19.641. ). 
This data could indicate a trend from non-linguistic to 
linguistic interaction as age increases. If the cells are 
collapsed to give a linguis tic/non-linguis tic distribution for 
both'"age groups, a chi-square analysis of the resultant 
contingency table (table 8.3) shows the distribution to be age 
related (X2=5.94; df 1; p<. 02). The younger group has a highe*r 
old Young 
Linguistic 49.6 33.9 
Non-linguistic 50.4 66.1 
Table 8.3 Percentage of Interactions in Linguistic and 
Non-linguistic Categories for each Group 
proportion of non-linguistic interactions, whereas for the older 
group, there is little difference in the proportions of 
linguistic and non-linguistic interactions. These data support 
the view that use of linguistic categories increases with age. 
Duration of Interactions 
The above considered only frequency of interactions. The 
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amount of time spent in any one kind of interaction may also 
vary between linguistic and non-linguistic interactions and 
between age groups. Table 8.4 gives the distribution of 
interaction types with respect to time (in seconds). These data 
show that the proportion of time spent in linguistic and 
non-linguistic interactions is reversed for the two groups, the 
Old youn g 
Type Dur. % total N avg. ed Dur- total N avg. ad 
Non-ling uistic 
Watch 141 34.5 61 2.3 2.3 262 62.4 72 3.6 2.9 
Rxplore 7 1.7 
.... .. 
2 
...... 
3.5 
...... ........ 
5 
........ 
1.2 
. 
2 2.5 
. ........ 
Total 
....... 
148 
. .. 
36.2 63 2.4 267 
......... 
63.6 
...... 
74 
..... 
3.6 
.... 
LingUiStiC 
Converse 87 21.3 16 5.4 3.3 Be 20.9 11 8.0 4.7 
Comment 38 9.3 36 1.1 .3 33 7.9 23 1.4 .6 
Dialogue 136 
.. 
33.3 
........ 
10 
...... 
13.6 
...... 
14.4 
....... 
32 
......... 
7.6 
.......... 
A 
. . 
8.0 
. . 
3.4 
. ........ 
Total 
... .. 
261 
. 
63.8 62 4.2 153 36.4 
.... 
38 
.... 
4.0 
... 
Table 8.4 Distribution of Interactions with Respect to Time 
(seconds) 
younger group spending nearly 2/3 of the time engaged in 
non-linguistic behaviours, the older group spending nearly 2/3 
of the time in linguistic behaviours. This difference between 
the groups is almost entirely accounted for by the categories 
watch (non-linguistic) and dialogue (linguistic). 
Owing to the marked skewness of the distributions Mann-Whitney 
was used to test for the significance of the difference 
between age groups in the time spent on types of interaction. 
These showed a significant difference between the two age 
groups for the watch category (U=1443; p< . 001, t-tailed ties 
corrected) and the comment category (U=276; p<. 01, t-tailed, ties 
corrected). The amount of time each group spent in the 
converse and dialogue categories was not significantly 
dif fe rent. 
Considering frequency and duration together, inspection of the 
raw data shows that for the watch category 55.75% of the 
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interactions had a duration greater than one second for the 
older group, compared to 75% for the younger group. Hence 
not only is frequency of watch greater for the younger group, 
but also the duration. For the comment category the situation 
is somewhat different. For the older group 8.33% of 
interactions had a duration greater than one second compared 
to 39% for the younger group. Hence although the two groups 
spend a similar proportion of time engaged in comment the older 
group has a higher frequency of shorter duration interactions. 
The non significant differences for the dialogue and converse 
categories indicate that although a greater proportion of time 
is spent engaged in dialogue by the older group, this is due 
entirely to higher frequency, the duration of a dialogue being 
similar for both groups. 
The converse and dialogue categories are characterised by turn 
taking. Consistent with the abo. ve data there was little 
difference between the groups in the average number of turns 
per interaction (young R=3.75 (sd. 3.362) range 1-19, older 
SE=3.272 (sd. 5.487) range 1-40). Some caution is needed here as 
the distributions were markedly skewed, as indicated by the 
ranges. The duration of a turn was also consistent between 
the'groups (young 5E=l. 875(pd-., -0.2,7,5) older K--1.721(sd.. 
0.334) 
Bellugi & Fischer (1972) in comparing sign and spoken language 
show that in adult signers signs are produced at the rate of 2 
to 3 per second and that propositions are produced on average 
at the rate of 1 per 1 to 2 seconds. That the children have 
similar temporal patterns gives support to the view that the 
converse category is linguistically based. 
It was noted earlier that the younger group had a high 
proportion of comment interactions over 1 second. It could be 
that these longer interactions in this category reflect a 
transition in linguistic development, as the temporal pattern 
was consistent with a2 turn interaction. 
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Interaction Focus 
The second set of data labelled focus in table 8.1 is the focus 
of the interaction per se as opposed to the focus of the 
initiating event. The sub totals for self and other give an 
indication of the extent to which interaction focus differs from 
initiation focus. 
The distribution of interactions across categories differs for 
the two groups, both being significantly different from chance. 
A chi-square analysis shows this distribution to be age 
dependant. Although the relative frequencies of all self and 
all other categories is the same for both groups, for the older 
group self is the most frequent category, whereas for the 
y ounger group self as actor is the most frequent. This 
distribution perhaps reflects the relative frequencies of 
events in the linguistic and non-linguistic categories. Table 
8.5 gives the transitional probabilities of interaction type and 
interaction focus. 
old Deaf 
Self 
Self as 
other 
Self as 
actor child 
Focus 
adult imag. environ. 
Watch . 18 o . 49 . 05 . 26 0 . 02 
Converse . 37 . 44 0 . 06 . 13 0 0 
Explore 0 0 0 5 .5 0 0 
Comment . 55 . 39 0 0 . 05 0 0 
Dialogue 0 .8 0 0 0 .2 0 
Young Deaf 
watch . 11 0 .5 . 15 . 24 0 0 
Converse . 18 . 73 0 . 09 0 0 0 
Explore 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Comment . 66 . 17 . 04 . 08 . 04 0 0 
Dialogue 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 8.5 Transitional Probabilities of Focus2 Following Event 
The major differences between the two groups are in the 
transitional probabilities associated with the converse and 
comment categories to the self categories. The high 
transitional probability for converse to self as other, for both 
groups, again suggests a linguistic base for this category. 
One interesting point is that Dialogue is never addr essed to 
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Self, in either group, in contrast to the other linguistic 
categories. 
Termination 
The distribution of events between termination categories was 
significantly different from chance for both groups and 
independent of age (X2=7.1; n. s) suggesting that termination is a 
function of interaction type. The low frequency of distraction 
and high frequency of return to activity gives support to the 
suggestion that attentional control is increased in this 
situation. 
Table 8.6 shows the transitional probabilities from event type 
to termination. The high transitional probabilities for the 
return to activ ity category reinforce the frequency data with 
respect to increased attentional control. This is especially 
evident for the linguistic categories. The very high 
transitional probability associated with dialogue category for 
the older group raises the possibility of the linguistic control 
of attention. 
Switch Another Return 
Distract Interrupt to Real Kirror to Activity 
0Y 0Y 0Y 0Y 0Y 
Watch . 06 . 08 . 08 . 03 . 38 . 32 . 23 . 26 . 24 .3 
converse . 06 . 18 . 19 . 09 . 06 . 09 . 19 . 18 .5 . 45 
Explore .5 .5 .5 .5 
Comment . 08 . 05 . 16 . 22 .5 . 64 .3 
Dialogue . 25 . 25 .2 .8 .5 
Table 8.6 Transitional Probabilities Interaction Type to 
Termination 
Factors Affecting Interactions 
The preceding analysis indicated that the two groups differed 
in the time distribution between linguistic and non-linguistic 
interactions and also in the frequency distributions of 
interaction focus. Both of these results may be a function of 
the type of play they were involved in at the time of the 
interaction and/or the presence of others, as both of these 
have been shown to be related to linguistic behaviour. 
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Note on Treatment of Data in Remaining Sections 
It will be recalled that the data was derived from video 
recordings which had not been made specifically for the purpose 
of this study. As a result of this the number of observations 
in some of the following conditions is such that analysis is 
compromised. The decision to continue with the analyses in 
spite of this was taken on the basis of the uniqueness of the 
observations and the desire to determine if future 
investigations of these mirror interactions might provide useful 
data. 
The following example is typical of the data sets which will be 
reported on pages 150-154. The small number of events 
observed when the children are alone and the relatively large 
numbers of categories amongst which the observations are 
distributed makes statistical treatment of the data 
problematic. Inspection of individual children's data for the 
'with others' category shows a good deal of consistency in the 
data, which is not evident in the 'alone' data. Table 8.7a shows 
the distribution of interactions amongst interaction types 
expressed as a percentage of each child's interactions. 
Alone others 
wE cv cDwB Cv cD 
old Deaf 
si 16.6 83.3 
S2 
S3 62.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
SA 25.0 25.0 50.0 
65 
YoUng Deaf 
S6 
S7 83.3 8.3 8.3 
Be 100 
S9 100 
sio 
59.0 36.36 4.54 
52.38 4.16 9.52 38.09 0 
40.0 4.0 12.0 28.0 20.0 
50.0 11.11 29.62 7.4 
50.0 50.0 
64.7 2.9 8.8 26.4 
SO. 0 50.0 
66.6 16.6 7.14 9.52 
75.0 25.0 
54.54 45.45 
Keyo W-watch; B-OnViZonMOnt; CV-COnVerse; C-COMMent; D-Dialogrue 
Table 8.7a Percentage of Interactions in Each Category for Each Child. 
The table also shows more consistency in the data of the older 
group, than in that of the younger group. In any event it is 
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the relative distribution of linguistic behaviour between the 
two situations which is pertinent. If one considers total 
Linguistic versus total non-linguistic interactions in the 
presence of others then a Wilcoxon test shows that the young 
group have significantly more non-linguistic interactions (T=O; 
N=5; p<. 05, t-tailed), whilst there is no significant difference 
for the older group. Between groups comparisons using 
Mann-Whitney U tests show no significant between groups 
differences for either linguistic or non-linguistic interactions. 
It was not felt appropriate to compare the data between 
conditions (alone v presence of others) by this method. Also 
there is a problem with using multiple comparisons, in what is 
essentially a multivariate design. 
Pooling individual subject's data and using Chi-square analysis 
gives comparable results for the data just analysed (see 
below). Whilst recognising that this use of chi-square with 
repeated measures is not correct, the data for this section 
and that relating to symbolic play will be "summarised" in this 
way. The intention is to provide a description of the data, 
which is indicative of trends, and hence may the indicate the 
usefulness or otherwise of further investigations, and not to 
claim the findings as substantive. 
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Presence of Others 
The presence of others has been shown to affect the presence 
of egocentric speech (Vygotsky). Hence if the children are 
engaged in egocentric speech, then we might expect to find a 
differential distribution between linguistic and non-linguistic 
categories in the presence or absence bf others. 22.05% of 
the older groups interactions and 15.93% of the younger groups 
interactions occurred when the child was alone. Immediately 
obvious here is the high percentage of interactions which 
occurred in the presence of others. It will be recalled that 
the data was collected from video tapes made for another 
purpose. As that purpose was to examine interactions per se 
the camera was inevitably focused on groups, rather than single 
children. Therefore no "significance can'be attached to the 
distribution. In any event it is the relative distribution of 
linguistic behaviour between the two situations which is 
pertinent. 
The distributions of interaction types for being alone or with 
others is given in table 8.7 for both groups. The presence of 
others makes no significant difference to the distribution of 
interaction types either within or between groups. Therefore 
the distribution is not age related. 
old young 
alone other alone others 
ff ff 
watch 13 48.2 48 49.0 12 66.6 60 63.8 
Explore 0022.04 1 5.6 1 1.1 
Total 
1--13 
48.2 so 51.04 13 72.12 61 64.9 
converse 4 14.8 12 12.2 1 5.5 10 10.6 
Comment 8 29.6 28 28.6 i 22.2 IS 19.1 
Dialogue 2 7.4 8 
--- 
8.3 
----------- 
0 
-------- 
0 
----- - 
4 
------ 
4.2 
-------- --------- 
Total 
----- 
14 
1 
--------- 
51.85 
- 
48 49.1 
-I 
5 
- 
27.7 32 35.1 
Table 8.7 Distribution of Interaction Types When Child is Alone 
or With others for Young and Old Deaf 
Collapsing cells and considering linguistic versus non-linguistic 
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categories again shows no significant differences either within 
or between groups, although a trend is evident in the 
comparison between the old and young groups in the presence of 
others, where the chi-square just fails to reach significance 
(X2=3.584; df 1; p=. 0552), the younger group having a higher 
proportion of non-linguistic interactions in the presence of 
others. The older group have roughly equal proportions of 
linguistic and non-linguistic events in the presence of the 
others. 
Presence of Others and Event Focus2 
The presence of others might be expected to effect the focus 
of the interaction, if for no other reason than more choice is 
available to the child. The distribution of interactions across 
fOcus2 categories is given in table 8.8. 
self 
Self an other 
Self as Actor 
............. 
Total 
old young 
alone other alone other 
17.85 32.32 33.33 21.05 
35.71 15.15 5.56 15.78 
17.85 25.25 22.22 34.74 
71.74 72.57 1 61.11 71.57 
Child 3.57 5.05 22.22 10.53 
Adult 10.71 18.18 11.11 16.84 
Enviroment 3.57 1.0 5.56 1.05 
imaginaxy 7.14 3.03 
----- 
0 
.. . 
0 
Total 28.26 
---- 
27.43 
.. 
38.89 
..... 
28-43 
Table 8.8 Percentage of Interactions in each Category 
According to Presence of Others for Young and old Groups. 
Chi-square analyses show that the distributions do not differ 
significantly either within or between groups. The alone/not 
alone classification was determined by the state of affairs at 
the beginning of the interaction. That this changed during the 
course of the interaction is indicated by the presence of 
entries in the child and adult categories for the alone 
distributions. of more interest is that the presence of others 
does not reduce interactions which are directed to the self 
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categories. This is the case for both groups. Inspection of 
the table suggests that the presence of others may affect 
distribution of interactions within the self categories. For 
the older group the distribution of interactions differs 
significantly depending on the presence or absence of others 
(X2=6.835; df 2; p<. 05). This difference is almost entirely 
accounted for by the categories self and self as other, self 
being more frequent in the presence of others, self as other 
being more frequent when the child is alone. The difference in 
the distributions for the old and young groups when alone just 
failed to reach significance (X2=5.4; df 2 ; n. s. ). The most 
noticeable difference here is the low frequency of interactions 
to self as other for the young group compared to the old 
group. There are no other significant differences either 
within or between groups. 
Play and Interaction Type 
A reciprocal relationship has been suggested between the 
development of symbolic play and language. Therefore, we might 
expect to find both type of play, and age having an effect on 
the distribution of interactions. 24% of the older children's 
and 38% of the younger children's interactions were observed 
during symbolic play. The same caution apply here, as to the 
previous analyses, about attaching any significance to the 
relative amounts of symbolic and other play observed. 
The distribution of interactions across types for symbolic and 
non-symbolic play is given in table 8.9 for both groups. The 
distributions do not differ significantly either within or 
between groups. 
Considering total linguistic and total non-linguistic 
interactions, Chi-square analyses show that the distribution of 
linguistic interactions across symbolic and other types of play 
differs significantly from chance for the older group (X2=3.75; 
df 1; p<. 05)but not the younger group. The distribution is age 
dependant for symbolic play (X2=5.72; df 1; p<. 02) but not for 
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other types of play. Hence linguistic interactions increase 
with age during symbolic play. 
old young 
symbolic other symbolic other 
Watch 30 54.74 57.14 69.57 
Explore 3.33 1.05 4.76 0 
Total 1 33.33 55.79 1 61.9 69.57 
Converas 10 13.68 9.52 10.14 
Comment 40.0 25.26 28.57 14.49 
Dialogue 
. 
16.67 
........... 
5.88 
................... 
0 
....... 
5.8 
......... 
Total 66.67 44.82 
........ 
38.09 
........... 
30.43 
Table 8.9 Percentage of Interaction Types According to Type 
of Play for Old and Young Groups 
Type of Play and Event FOCUS2 
Table 8.10 contains the distribution of interactions across 
fOCUS2 categories for symbolic and other types of play. For 
the older group self is less frequent during symbolic. play than 
other types where it is the most frequent. During symbolic 
play self as other is most frequent. For the younger group 
there is no difference in the distributions for the three self 
categories. The major differences for the young group are in 
the relative frequencies of interactions to child and adult, 
child interactions being more frequent during symbolic play. 
old 
symbolic other 
young 
symbolic other 
Self 10.0 35.79 25.58 21.754 
Self as other 33.33 28.42 11.63 1S. 94 
Self as Actor 23.33 28.42 30.32 34.78 
Child 3.33 S. 26 23.26 5.8 
Adult 16.66 16.84 4.65 23.19 
Environment 0 1.05 4.65 0 
imaginary 13.33 1.05 0 0 
Table 8.10 Percentage of Interaction Focus According to Type 
of Play. 
These distributions between symbolic and other types of play 
differ significantly for both the older group (X2=14.97; df 6; 
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p<. 05) and the younger group (X2=16.06; df 5; p<. 05). Also they 
are age dependant for symbolic play (X2= 21.04; df 6; p<. Ol) but 
not other types of play (X2=10.33, n. s. ) - 
DISCUSSION 
Summary of Results 
The results show that the children make deliberate use of the 
mirror and that deliberate use of the mirror increases with 
age. Interactions are structured, in that distribution of 
interactions amongst categories is significantly different from 
chance. Overall, the distribution of interactions according to 
type is not age related. However, when total linguistic 
interactions are compared with total non-linguistic interactions, 
the distribution of interactions is age related with the older 
group having equal frequencies of linguistic and non-linguistic 
interactions, whilst the younger group has a frequency of 
non-linguistic interactions nearly twice that of linguistic 
interactions. The termination of the interactions is 
characterised by the low frequency of distraction and the high 
frequency of return to activity. This indicates that the 
mirror functions in some way to aid attentional control. This 
is reinforced by the transitional probabilities from interaction 
type'to terminating event. High transitional probabilities for 
the linguistic categories for both groups raise the possibility 
of linguistic control of attention. 
The presence of others did not affect the distributions of 
interaction types between or within groups overall, although an 
age related trend in distribution between linguistic and 
non-linguistic categories was evident. Overall the fOCU-92 Of 
interactions did not differ either within or between groups with 
respect to the presence of others. However, the presence of 
others did significantly affect the distribution of interaction 
types across the three self categories for the older group. 
Irrespective of the presence of others a high percentage of all 
interactions were addressed to the self categories for both 
groups. 
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Overall, type of play did not affect the distribution of 
interaction types either within or between groups. However, 
type of play affected the distribution of linguistic and 
nonlinguistic interactions for the older group, but not the 
younger group. The distribution of linguistic and non-linguistic 
interactions is age dependant for symbolic play, but not other 
types of play, with linguistic interactions increasing with age. 
The distribution of interactions across f0cu32 categories 
differed significantly from chance between symbolic and other 
types of play for both groups. Also the distribution for 
symbolic play is age related but not for other types of play. 
The Linguistic Basis of Interactions 
Whilst the dialogue category 
, 
can be seen to be'linguistic, in 
that it is composed of formal signs this is not the case for 
the converse category and to a lesser extent the comment 
category. The comment category included single formal signs, 
single gestures and single facial expressions. Converse 
included combinations of gestures and facial expressions which 
showed turn taking characteristics. The formal signs pose no 
problem, however, in a sign language environment assigning 
linguistic status, or otherwise, to gestures and facial 
expressions is problematic. Facial expression and use of the 
body is a part of sign language. Gestures could well be 
'mumbled' signs or even signs, not recognised by the observer. 
In the preceding analyses I have given both these categories 
linguistic status. My initial reason was, as already stated, 
the turn taking character of the converse category and the 
behaviour of deaf adults towards children engaging in such 
behaviour. In the event, I would argue that the data gives 
support to my contention that these interactions are linguistic. 
The temporal characteristics are indicative. The linguistic 
categories are mainly addressed to self and self as other for 
both groups but are also addressed to adult and child. That 
age related changes were found in the frequency of these 
categories, with age increasing their frequency, is also 
indicative. 
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Functions of Linguistic Interactions 
Two possible functions have been suggested for overt linguistic 
behaviour, not directed specifically to real others; 1) 
egocentric speech, as a means of planning and directing on 
going behaviour or as a running commentary on behaviour and 2) 
imaginal dialogue as an adjunct to symbolic play. 
Language for Self 
Approximately 705.1 of interactions involved self categories, 
slightly over half of which were linguistic with comment being 
the predominant category. In other words 33% of the younger 
groups and 43% of the older groups interactions were self 
addressed and linguistic. By contrast 2% of the young group's 
and 4% of the older groups interactions were linguistic and 
addressed to others. In addition a high proportion of 
interactions were intentionally addressed to self, 915. and 81-5.1 
for old and young groups respectively. Is this, in concert with 
the other analyses sufficient to show evidence for either or 
both egocentric speech and imaginal dialogue? My intuitive 
feelings, both on observing the behaviour for the first time 
and after spending many hours viewing the tapes, is that these 
interactions are integral and functional aspects of the child's 
behaviour. However, it is incumbent upon the data to show 
formal support for such intuitions. One of my intuitive 
reasons was that I reacted to the linguistic interactions as 
though they were messages, i. e. I attempted to interpret them. 
The deaf adults behaved in a similar way. When shown tapes 
of dialogue interactions, the deaf adults agreed that they were 
examples of sign language, but had difficulty in interpreting 
some of them, which surprised the adults. Their comments were 
that the child was missing things out, it was as if they were 
seeing only half a conversation and that some of the signs 
were partial or mis-formed. These comments were also made 
regarding samples of converse interactions. The dialogue 
category included only examples of formal signing which were 
recognisable to a relatively unskilled signer and therefore, it 
not surprising that the deaf adults agreed with the 
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observation. Of more relevance to the point in question is 
that the adults did not find the language used wholly 
intelligible in all cases. 
Imaginal Dialogue 
The reactions of the deaf adults, then, lends some support for 
both egocentric speech and imaginal dialogue. One of the 
fOcus2 categories was imaginary. This was defined as 
interactions directed at space as well as the mirror. This 
categor y was used by only one child aged 57 months. There 
were five of these interactions, all dialogue including as many 
as nineteen turns, distributed between the child's mirror image 
and a single definite location in space. Four of these 
interactions occurred during symbolic play and were clearly a 
part of that play. Had a hearing child, using oral language 
been observed similarly engaged there would be no hesitation in 
stating that the child was engaged in an imaginal dialogue. I 
can see no reason why the deaf child's sign language behaviour 
should be treated dikferently. In addition the majority of all 
other instances of dialogue were addressed to self as othýr 
and for the older group linguistic interactions in general were 
more prevalent during symbolic play. On this basis I would 
conclude that deaf children in a sign languzige environment 
engage in imaginal dialogue. 
Egocentric speech 
Some characteristics of egocentric speech have already been 
noted, with respect to the dialogue and converse categories; 
abbreviated form, low intelligibility, and not being addressed to 
another person. In the case of the converse category it could 
be the case that these interactions are not intended to convey 
meaning- Whilst this may be true for some instances, the 
similarity of temporal patterns between converse and dialogue, 
the addressing of these interactions to self as other as well 
as other people, and the reactions of competent language users 
all suggest a linguistic intent. By and large instances of 
converse interactions occurred when the child's hands were 
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occupied with the on going activity, which would effectively 
preclude the formation of signs, although not necessarily 
prevent a gesture being made. In this sense these interactions 
represent a physically abbreviated form of language, if not the 
grammatically abbreviated form associated with egocentric 
speech. I 
Contrary to what would be expected, if these linguistic 
interactions are examples of egocentric signing, the presence 
of others did not increase linguistic interactions, although a 
trend was evident for the older group- However, presence of 
others is not the only factor which affects egocentric speech; 
if a child cannot hear himself then egocentric speech declines. 
The feedback possibilities of the mirror were raised in the 
introduction. The mirror not only provides feedback to the 
signing child, but increases it, by giving the child a 
perspective on his own signing which he has no other way of 
obtaining. If the interactions are in fact instances of 
egocentric signing, it is possible that this unique access to 
feedback maintains the level of production in the absence of 
others, leading to the observed results. 
Evidence 'that these interactions are involved in the planning 
and or control of behaviour would strengthen the case for 
egocentric signing. The content of some interactions is clearly 
of this nature. These include the child telling themselves to 
be careful, choosing which colour paint to use next 'out loud', 
signing to the mirror image of self that whatever the sand 
represents is hot, indicating to the mirror image of self 
where the sand-pie is going to be put, asking a question of the 
mirror image of self and answering it, etc.. More formal 
evidence is found in the transitional probabilities from type of 
interaction to terminating event. Vygotsky's (1962) formulation 
of egocentric speech and Luria's (e. g. 1981) views on language as 
a second signaling system have in common the idea that 
language can function to bring behaviour under conscious 
control, by freeing the person from the perceptual pull of the 
159 
immediate context. All types of interaction are resistant to 
distraction, but an additional feature of the linguistic 
categories is the high probabilities associated with return to 
activity. This suggests that the interactions are embedded in 
the on going activity. Further confirmation of this comes from 
examining the raw data for temporal contiguity between 
interactions. There are few single interactions, the majority 
occurring in clusters during short intervals, 5 in 10 to '15 
seconds is not uncommon, with longer periods, between clusters. 
I feel that there is sufficient weight of evidence to support 
the view that at least some of the linguistic mirror 
interactions are examples of egocentric signing, which functions 
to direct on going behaviour. 
Other Linguistic Functions 
one final point is that not all linguistic interactions were 
addressed to aspects of self. As was noted earlier a small 
proportion of interactions are directed to others, i. e. the 
mirror is used for direct inter-personal communication. This 
use of the mirror was not confined to the children; the deaf 
instructors communicated both with the children and between 
themselves via the mirror. There seems to be no other 
reason for this other than the mirror is there and it allows 
eye contact with someone who's back is turned. 
Other Functions of Mirror : Interactions 
Not all mirror interactions were linguistic. Overall, half the 
mirror interactions were in non-linguistic categories mainly 
watch. Descriptions of oral deaf pre-schoolers play indicate 
that they spend more time in onlooker behaviour than hearing 
children (e. g. Higgenbotham & Baker, 1981), are easily distracted 
and attend to themselves more (e. g. Gorrell, 1972). The data 
reported here could be indicative of just that; the watch 
interactions being instances of distractions, with self 
addressed interactions being instances of self attendance and 
interactions addressed to others being examples of onlooker 
behaviour. I do not dispute that this description may be true 
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of some interactions, but would argue that aspects of the data 
make this description inadequate for all cases. 
A distractor is, by definition, some event which causes the 
person to unintentionally switch his attention from an on going 
activity to itself. Where an interaction has an entry in both 
the watch and incidental categories then this is almost 
certainly a case of distraction. A watch which has an entry 
in the deliberate category cannot be seen as a distraction. 
Methodological Note 
The mirror provided a window t hrough which we could observe 
the secret world of -these 
deaf children. Through it a world 
much richer in language and imagination, than might be predicted 
from previous work, is observed. This chapter is an example of 
direct observations of the deaf demonstrating unique 
adaptations. 
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CHAPTER 9: Problem Solving Processes in Deaf Pre-school 
Children for Lure Retrieval Problems 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of problem solving in deaf and hearing 6 year olds, 
reported in Chapter 5, suggested that for the deaf group 
social interaction was as important as language per se in the 
problem solving setting. Whilst in absolute terms, number of 
spontaneous solutions, there was little difference between the 
groups in their ability to solve the problems set there were 
differences between the groups in their ability to make use of 
information discovered or supplied during the course of problem 
solving. Various analyses suggested that this was a function 
of the way the different groups interacted with elements of 
the problem solving environment, including E. A Markov chain 
analysis demonstrated a well developed unitary process- for the 
deaf group, which was not the case for the hearing group. This 
unitary process, suggested that the deaf child's problem solving 
strategy was directed towards some consistent factor in the 
problem solving environment. It was suggested that E might . be 
this constant factor and that the process in which the deaf 
children were engaged was the application of strategies 
developed to solve the problem of communication. 
Experimenter effect is well documented (e. g. Rosenthal & 
Jacobson, 1966). Vernon (1967) has reported that the more 
experienced an E is in working with deaf children, the less 
likely they are to find differences in behaviour between deaf 
and hearing groups. In both cases the experimenter used the 
language code appropriate to the hearing status of the child 
Le sign or oral English, therefore any effect could not 
reasonably be ascribed to language per se. Brasel & Quigley 
(1977) cite evidence which indicates that the improved 
achievement of the deaf children of deaf parents, is apparent 
irrespective of the language code used by the parents. it is 
argued that social and emotional factors are important; that in 
a deaf family, deafness is accepted and understood and, 
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therefore parent - child interactions are not disrupted by the 
trauma of discovering that one has a handicapped child. Work 
by Mogford et al (1980) with pre-verbal deaf children has 
suggested that the interactions between deaf mothers and their 
babies are qualitatively different from those of hearing 
mothers with deaf babies, in a number of contexts. Further it 
is . suggested that the effects of this are not purely social 
and emotional, but may also have cognitive implications . The 
major difference between the two groups of mothers seems to 
be in the way deaf mothers develop contingencies in their deaf 
children by directing and controlling their attention. 
The problem of 'divided attention' has been raised by many 
writers (e. g. Wood et al., 1986). Divided attention in this 
context means that by virtue of his deafness the deaf child 
cannot look at and talk about a referent at the same time. 
This is true whatever languaqe-code the child and caretaker 
use as reception must be visual. What the deaf mother appears 
to be able to do is to make clear to the child the intended 
referent and the manner in which the message relates to that 
referent. 
Observations 
' 
ýn the nursery suggested (but were not formally 
tested) that the deaf children were aware of, and showed a 
preference for those adults who were themselves deaf. If, as 
suggested above, the deaf person can act contingently with the 
deaf child in a manner which the hearing cannot, then this is 
not altogether surprising. However, it does imply that any 
special qualities in interactions with deaf children are not 
confined to mother-child interactions but are general to 
deaf-deaf interactions. 
If this is indeed the case then it is possible that in the 
previous study the hearing Es lack of this special quality was 
eliciting the behaviours found, either to compensate for Es lack 
of contingency or in "an effort after meaning" by the child, or 
perhaps even both. The most obvious test of this is to repeat 
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the experiment using a deaf experimenter with the deaf children. 
If the hearing status of E is a causal factor, then the 
behaviour of children in a deaf environment should differ from 
the behaviour observed in a hearing environment. 
A strict replication proved impossible as there were no deaf 
children of the correct age and with a similar language history 
available. Chulliat & Oleron (1955) reporting Rey's 1935 hearing 
data indicated that problems were suitable for nursery age 
children and therefore it was decided to use children attending 
the departmental nursery as Ss. A second group of nursery 
aged hearing children was not tested for two reasons. Firstly, 
the focus of this study was the difference in the behaviour of 
the deaf groups with Es of different hearing status. Hence, 
the relevant comparison was deaf/deaf not hearing/deaf. 
Secondly, the 1935 and 1955 data showed that performance on 
the tasks increased with age. Although no data for nursery 
age deaf children was reported there was no reason to suppose 
that their behaviour would differ from that of the hearing in 
this respect, i. e. that the problems would be easier for the 
younger deaf children. Therefore, it was expected to find an 
age related decrease in absolute performance. 
In view of the more limited attention span of the younger 
children, only two problems were given the cage and the slider. 
These two problems were chosen as they showed the least and 
most difference in behaviour between the groups and are also 
the easiest and most difficult problems. 
Aims 
The aim of this study is to examine the influence of hearing 
status of E on the problem solving behaviour of deaf children. 
METHOD 
Subjects and Experimenter 
Six pre-school deaf children attending the departmental nursery 
acted as subjects. Ages were in the range 26 to 56months, 
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mean age 38.8 months. A deaf Instructor, well known to the 
children, acted as experimenter. All communication was in BSL. 
Apparatus 
The Cage and Bottle problems, described in Chapter 5, were 
used. Drawings are in appendix 5 
Procedure 
All the children were tested individually, in a small 'booth, 
situated in the playroom, directly in front of the observation 
screen. The booth was a play house, with the windows blocked, 
to prevent other children looking in. The sessions were 
recorded through the observation screen and the children were 
not aware that they were being filmed through the screen, 
although they were aware that the video cameras permanently 
mounted in the playroom were used to film them. In all other 
respects the method was as described in Chapter 5. 
RESULTS 
Method Analyses 
The video tapes were transcribed as a series of discreet 
behavioural acts, and these transcripts were used for all 
analyses. 
Cage Problem 
The data were scored according to the coding scheme described 
in Chapter 5. The data are shown in table 9.1., along with the 
totals for the older deaf group. 
The young deaf children made twice as many attempts on 
average (mean 6.67) than the older group (mean 3.14)and were 
less likely to choose the appropriate tool at the first 
attempt. 
Despite this 3Y. 6 of, uthe r yolifi4br_! i childrenjo compa reds t6ul? /i7aEof 
the older deaf -.,; childeen; .9 61ved -the, cprobl6m, ')4ithoIit7EsýuCj4es tion 
froinieE, ththrernaining. - children fin'.!. -I tliý_- clildren in 
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both groups solving the problem after- a suggestion from E. 
None of the younger children used the turn-table to assist in 
recovering the sweet. 
ect I A- AT Ts 
D1 20+ 
D2 90+ 
D3 90+ 
DA 40+ 
DS 61+ 
D6 10 1++ 
Total 40 22330 
old Deaf(K-7) 22 65252 
Table 9-1 Method Scores for Cage Problem: Young Deaf (N=6) 
Slider Problem 
The transcripts were scored according to the coding scheme 
described in Chapter 5. The data are tabulated below, along 
with the totals for both the deaf and hearing older children 
(table 9.2). Data from S's D2 and D4 were lost due to a 
recording error. 
ects 
IA s PS NS E 
DI 3 0 + 1 
D3 a 2 + 1 
D5 3 0 + 
D6 1 0 + 
Total 15 02 2 2 2 
old Deaf(N-7) 63 7 26 0 3 46 
old Hear(N-8) 52 13 1 7 20 2 
Table 9.2 Method Scores for Slider Problem. Young Deaf (N=4) 
These data show that the young deaf behave more like the 
older hearing group than the older deaf group. The young deaf 
make fewer attempts in all (mean=3.75) than either the older 
deaf (mean=9) or the older hearing (mean=6.5). None of the 
young deaf try impetus as a solution compared to all of the 
older deaf group. Only one of the young deaf group failed to 
discover the throat immediately compared to 6 of the older 
deaf group. 2 of the young deaf group solved the problem 
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without suggestions from E and 2 offered partial solution. 
Both of these children used this information to discover the 
correct solution after only 1 further attempt. The older 
subjects (1 deaf and 5 hearing) who offered partial solutions 
needed 4 further attempts on average to discover the correct 
solution. 
Hence the younger deaf differ from the older group in requiring 
fewer attempts to solve the problem, and in being more able to 
use information discovered in the course of problem solving to 
arrive at a correct solution. Like the older hearing group, the 
young deaf do not try impetus as a solution, but actively 
search the apparatus and discover the throat. 
In some respects the data of the young deaf group are better 
than those of the -hearing group in that the younger deaf are 
more efficient when numbers of attempts are considered. 
However the small sample- makes such an assertion speculative, 
but the data would appear to warrant a larger scale study. 
Behavioural Analyses 
The preceding analyses suggested that the problem solving 
behaviour of the older and younger deaf groups differed. The 
behaviour of the two older groups was found to differ on a 
number of behavioural measures and that some of these could 
be systematically related to successful problem solving 
behaviours. Hence we might expect differences in the behaviour 
of the older and younger deaf groups to be reflected here 
also. Table 9-3 shows the mean number of behaviours 
transcribed for all three groups for the Cage and Slider 
problems. 
The number of behaviours elicited by the Cage problem from the 
young deaf is similar to the old deaf group, both of which 
differ from the old hearing group. For the Slider problem, 
however, the young deaf are similar to the old hearing group in 
the number of behaviours elicited, both of these groups 
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recording half as many behaviours as the old deaf group. This 
reduction in numbers of behaviours for the young group is due 
to the fact that they did not demonstrate the perseverance in 
the pursuit of ineffectual methods which were apparent in the 
older deaf group and the deaf S's of Chulliat & Oleron. 
cage Slider 
old Deaf 75.14 68.35 
old Hearing 30.48 33.13 
Young Deaf 62.12 28.0 
Table 9.3 Mean Number of Behaviours 
For the older deaf children, the frequency with which the 
children looked at E was noted, and comparisons made with the" 
older hearing children. Table 9.4 shows the percentage of total 
behaviours which were looks to E, for all three groups, for the 
Cage and Slider Problems. 
cage slider 
Old Deaf 23.76 16.15 
old Hearing 12.95 14.28 
Young Deaf 20.11 25.00 
Table 9.4 Percentage of Behaviours Which Were Looks 
to Experimenter 
The data for the young deaf are not strictly comparable as it 
was almost impossible to exclude looks to E which were not 
concerned with direct communication. This was due to E making 
use of looks directed towards her for communication i. e. waiting 
for the child to volunteer eye contact rather than attracting 
the child's attention when E wanted to communicate. 
The distribution of visual behaviour preceding a tool change 
was categorised according to the scheme described in Chapter 5. 
These data are shown in table 9.5 and graphically in Fig. 9.1 
where data for the two older groups is included for comparison. 
Inspection of the table shows that there is little change in 
the distribution of behaviour between categories for the young 
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deaf group. From Figure 9.1 it can be seen that there is little 
I 
difference in the distribution of behaviours preceding a tool 
change for the two deaf groups, with E being the predominant 
cage slider 
67 .5 60.0 
5.0 6.66 
T 17.5 26.6 
u 10.0 6.66 
Table 9.5 Distribution of Events Preceding a Tool Change 
(Young Deaf) 
category for both problems. Table 9.6 gives the distribution of 
behaviours preceding the choice of the final (successful) tool. 
This is shown graphically in Fig. 9.2, with data from the older 
deaf and older hearing group for comparison. 
Cage Slider 
E so 25 
A 0 0 
T 33.3 75 
u 16.7 0 
Table 9.6 Distribution of Events Preceding Choice of 
Successful Tool (Young Deaf) 
Inspection of table 9.6 shows that when only the final choice of 
tool is considered the young deaf group show a shift in 
behaviour between- problems; E being the most frequent preceding 
event for the cage problem, T the most frequent for the slider 
problem. Figure 9.2 shows that the behaviour of the young 
deaf group differs from both the older groups, but is more like 
that of the hearing group than the older deaf group with 
success being related to a category other than E (T) in 3/4 
subjects. As with the hearing group the younger deaf are able 
to make use of information gained during the course of problem 
solving. 
Matrix Analyses 
4 (preceding category) x4 (succeeding category) frequency 
matrices were constructed for each problem as described 
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Figure 9.1/2 Distribution of Visual Behaviours Preceding Tool 
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in Chapter 5. These can be found in appendix 9. 
Dominance 
Dominance matrices (appendix 9) were calculated for both 
problems (see Chapter 5). Table 9.7 gives the rank order 
dominance for each category, for each problem. Data for the 
two older groups is given for comparison. 
Old D 
cage 
Yoiý-iq D Old H Old D 
Slider 
Young D Old H 
E 1 1 1 1 
A 3 3 3 4 
T 2.5 2 1.5 3 3 2 
u 2.5 4 3 3 3 3 
Table 9.7 Rank Order Dominance of Events Preceding a Tool 
Change 
These data show little difference between any of the groups, 
with E being the dominant category for both problems, and for 
the Slider Problem the dominant category not being predictive 
of success. 
Markov Chain Analysis 
The young deaf group have shown similarities in behaviour with 
both thd' older groups. Like the hearing group they show the 
ability to make use of information gained in the course of 
problem solving, and less consistency in behaviour between 
problems. The hearing group required a different Markov model 
for each problem, the state of the process immediately 
preceding the problems being at chance. By contrast the 
behaviour of the older deaf group was predicted by a single 
model for all three problems, the state of the process 
immediately preceding the first problem being in a state other 
than chance. If the single Markov model is Purely a function of 
differential hearing status of E and S then we should expect 
the behaviour of the young deaf group to parallel that of the 
hearing group and find two Markov models necessary to predict 
their behaviour. 
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Transitional probability matrices were derived from the 
frequency matrices used for the dominance analysis as 
described in Chapter 5. The operations performed on these 
matrices are also as described in Chapter 5. The result of 
these operations show that a single Markov model is sufficient 
to predict the behaviour of the young deaf group for both 
slider Problem 
E A T U 
observed slider vector . 64 . 09 . 18 . 09 
observed cage vector x [C]2 . 625 . 084 . 179 . 136 
Equilibrium vector IS]32 . 61 . 084 . 169 . 084 
Chance vector x (S] . 857 . 035 . 07 . 035 
Cage Problem 
observed cage vector . 65 . 062 . 1a7 . 
130 
Slider equilibrium vector x [C] . 62 . 072 . 166 . 084 
Equilibrium vector JC]32 . 646 . 075 171 . 086 
Chance vector x (C] . 487 . 137 . 18S . 187 
K. B. [I denotes a matrix. S- Slider; C- cage 
Table 9.8 Predicted and Observed Probability Vectors for Cage 
and Slider Problems (Young Deaf) 
problems (see table 9.8). As for the older deaf group the 
state of the process immediately preceding the first 
observation is not at chance level. These data indicate that 
the Markov model which describes the visual behaviour of the 
young deaf is similar to that of the old deaf. 
Given that both deaf groups are similar and different from the 
hearing group, then the process described by the Markov model 
could be a function of deafness per se., and not a consequence 
of the relative hearing status of E. To test this possibility 
the Slider matrix of the young deaf group was premultiplied by 
the equilibrium vector for the Slider problem from the old deaf 
group. The following results were obtained: - 
EATu 
Predicted prob vector . 614 0 . 048 . 027 
observed prob vector . 65 . 062 . 187 . 130 
EATu 
f 6.7 0 .5 .3 
f 
17 
121 
Also given (to the right) are the predicted and observed 
ST COPY 
AVAILA L 
Variable print quality 
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frequencies for each category. As can be seen there is a 
close agreement between the predicted and observed data. 
Whilst the small samples involved urge caution, these data are 
certainly indicative of a commonality of process across the two 
deaf groupsl. 
DISCUSSION 
Summary of Results, 
Overall the resUlts indicate that týhtý: ý'pri6bl, em-is-cýl--vfnci. tý-., - 
behav7iour_1'-of Edeaý2'-chilldreiý-i'diýf-fiýýr-si-ýwheif-., EiEi_-d_ a-ý-d6af BSUý 
'6pp'6sed to--:: a, -h'e*a'r'i-ngi-, S'I'gner. '-L,, --ýF. ori,. -th'e--caqeý-, problerii 
theee, _of, theý- y-otifi4-Ideaf ý- children s'OlvedDthe-,, problemcunýaided-- 
aýnd7ltliree- dfter': a: sugg'6stioii- fr6mýiE-. illýAff. Ch'ýi, l"li-zýtý andj'_ý 
-de -'ihe*arIing (i: IfiIdrehI, of1 this- gi how d--a , 
01 onl'sidataofor 
decr`eiae'nt-, -d; n 1ýperf orffiTancel comparedoto, -. yeael'oldb-, jthen 
, thiterepresentsiýaý. b6tten-_'ý6rf orm-ance than (dither.; -. of-11the%two. 
old. erý'gtoilpstwh-ere,., 'onlý72/8. hea'rinq zindc]2/7 older-., ýdeaf childr. en 
solved-: the '-j#oblem.; umýaided. -_ý --This pattefncof c.. reaults was also 
f dund- ýor), Ithe. slider ptoblem-(_)', TK0 eoflftlje c-, ygung 7. deaf 
solved ý. the problem Am: - aided.; -and! twoltof fe red partialt'. solutions. n 
, These-ttwo-, children t discoveired, -, the f correct, solution-, aftentonly, z 
oner, further attempt- ýcompateFd -. -to ý--an; -ay-e rage (-,. 
df -. f olýr 'Lattempts 
nýee de d.,: by cthe, -'olde ri child renn 
bo th'Lde afn -and -hearing. ot-it-, is,,. also 
vorthýýnotingý -, tha. t- (tile ý- young' deaf e group'. 9:, -results -wjer-e, 
better; ),, 
-;: 
f ive 
-than 4,. thos e, ýcited, -by (-Chullia tr and--. Ole ron-, 
(19 5 5) - for 1 hearing 
y-ourig: e. af y. ear, olds. -. Trom theseE:. data, -, it is., -apparentiý, -, 
that the, 
are, -., better,: able ýnthan-- -the- older(-! deaf,,,,,, -toc,, make use ý, 2. ý. 
information gained in the course of problem solving. 
The behavioural analyses showed that the number of behaviours 
elicited by the Cage problem was comparable for the old and 
young deaf groups. For the Slider problem, however, the number 
of behaviours elicited from the young group was half that of 
the old deaf group, and comparable to the hearing group. The 
1. This observation can be tested further by varying the 
permutations of vectors and matrices which are multiplied. 
These can be found in appendix 9 
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percentage of behaviours which were looks to E were not 
strictly comparable, due to E using these as an opportunity to 
communicate. 
The distribution of visual behaviours preceding a tool change 
did not differ between the old and young deaf groups for either 
problem. When visual behaviour preceding successful choice of 
tool is considered, the distributions for the young deaf group 
differed from both the old deaf and old hearing groups for both 
problems. 
The matrix analyses showed that the rank order dominance of 
the events preceding a tool change did not differ between the 
three groups, for either problem, E being the dominant category. 
The Markov chain analysis showed that a single model was 
sufficient to predict the behaviour of the young deaf group for 
both problems, and that the state of the process immediately 
preceding the first problem was in state other than chance. In 
this respect the old and young deaf groups do not diffL-r from 
each other, but both differ from the hearing group. 
Interpretation of Results 
The main feature of these data is the better performance of 
the young deaf group than either of the two older groups, in 
terms of un-aided solutions. For the Slider problem Chulliat & 
Oleron do not record a spontaneous solution by a deaf child 
until age 9 and by a hearing child until age 5. Of the hearing 
5 year olds only 6/22 (27%) discovered a solution, either 
spontaneously or after a suggestion. Of the remaining children 
2 showed no understanding of the problem at all and 14 had to 
be told the solution but could generalise the response, i. e. use 
a combination of bars up to l2cms. In view of this the data 
reported here represent at least an IS month advantage for 
the young deaf group over the hearing 5 year olds. One reason 
the problems were chosen was that they were visual concrete 
problems and therefore should not disadvantage the deaf. If 
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the concrete visual nature of the problems alone, accounts for 
the enhanced performance observed here, then it should have 
also been evident in the data of the older group. The two 
factors which distinguish this study from that of Chulliat & 
Oleron with respect to deaf Ss are (i) that the experimenter 
was also deaf and (ii) that the children had sign language 
experience from an early age. 
Influence of Deaf Experimenter 
In Chapter 6 it was noted that changing the hearing status of 
the experimenter also changed the language which was being 
used, even though both experimenters used manual methods to 
communicate. Hence, the difference between the older and 
younger deaf groups was the presence of a deaf experimenter 
whose language was BSL, i. e. the total socio-linguistic 
environment of the groups differed. This means that the 
different pattern of results for the two groups could be due 
either to the presence of a deaf experimenter or to the 
different language. Chosinq between these two possibilities is 
impossible with the design used here. To decide between these 
possibilities would require a design in which language and 
hearing status were not confounded, for example, comparison of 
data from groups where the experimenters were a hearing BSL 
user (e. g. the hearing child of deaf parents) and a deaf BSL 
user. 
To decide on the effects of the language used is more 
problematic. If language and thought interact then it is 
entirely possible that the type of language and type of 
problem interact, in so far as their coding capabilities are 
more or less efficient for different kinds of information. 
Indeed, I will report data which indicates that the spatial 
nature of BSL makes it an efficient medium for coding spatial 
information, in the same way as it is argued that speech based 
codes are efficient at coding order information. 
Given that it is not possible to separate hearing and linguistic 
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status in the present study, the ensuing discussion will 
examine the differences in the way which the deaf and hearing 
E's used their "signed language" in communicating with the 
children. 
It was noted that classifying 'Looks to E' independent of a 
communicative act was difficult for the young group as the deaf 
E used volunteered eye contact to communicate with the 
children rather than attract their attention. In other words 
the deaf E's communicative acts were contingent on the child's 
behaviour to a greater extent than the hearing E. 
Another noticeable difference between the two Es was the use 
of the problem space in relation to sign. The hearing E made 
the vast majority her signs in the conventional signing space, 
i. e. a space extending from the waist to the top of the head. 
The deaf E signed within the problem space, i. e. in proximity, to 
or over the apparatus for problem relevant information and in 
problem neutral space for other information, such as praise or 
questions. There are two possible reasons why the deaf Es 
place of signing could have led to the observed results. The 
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first is that because the problems are visuo-spatial in nature 
and because sign is visuo-spatial, by signing over the problem 
space, the deaf E in some way 'told' S the solution. There are 
four arguments against this. Firstly, there was less 
difference in the signs used by the two Es than where they 
used. Therefore, any advantage from the signs themselves 
would apply to both groups. Secondly, Chulliat & Oleron mimed 
the instructions to their deaf S's. Presumably, mime would 
contain as many clues as sign language to the solution. 
Thirdly, even though the hearing E gave oral instructions to 
the hearing group, these were accompanied by gestures, which 
were mimetic of the actions required and in some cases (as the 
deaf E pointed out) signs. Finally, the behaviour of the 
subjects indicated that they were discovering a solution, 
rather than putting into practice an already known solution. 
The second reason place of signing may be important is that it 
clearly indicates to what the information being given relates, 
i. e. it overcomes the problem of divided attention. By signing 
over the problem space the deaf E made it possible for the 
child to both look at the signs and the referent. A related 
point is the synchronicity evident in the visual behaviour of 
the deaf dyads. If during face to face signing some aspect of 
the apparatus was referred to both E and S would look at the 
referent, S apparently following E's eyeline. They would then 
resume face to face signing apparently simultaneously. 
Stepping through the video frame by frame, a resolution of 
1/25th of a second, it was not possible to determine who 
initiated the return to communication. With the hearing E the 
hearing Ss spent little time looking at E while instructions or 
information was being given. Instead they looked at the 
apparatus, and when an intended referent was not clear to them 
they would seek clarification, for example, by pointing at 
something and querying its correctness. In other words for the 
hearing Ss attention was divided between the aural and visual 
channels. If this argument is correct then, the advantage which 
the young deaf group have over the old deaf group is a more 
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certain knowledge of what the nature of the problem is. 
However, this alone does not explain the enhanced performance 
of the young group over the hearing children. 
one analysis which did show equivalence between the two deaf 
groups was the Markov chain analysis. It was also indicated 
that a single model may be sufficient to describe the visual 
behaviour of both the old and young deaf. In other words the 
underlying process is a function of deafness per se. 
If we assume for the moment that this process is one which 
relates to communication (Meadow, 1980), then the implication is 
that in the presence of a deaf E this strategy is successful. 
Is this because the deaf E shares the same process? Is it 
this process which leads to the qualitatively different 
interactions observed between deaf mothers and their deaf 
infants? Is this process the observable consequence of 
'divided attention? If so the implication is that 2/3 of 
attention is given to social stimuli and 113 to non social 
stimuli. These are empirical questions which could be addressed 
by future work. The answers to these questions would seem to 
have important educational implications. 
Methodological Note 
The methods used here and in Chapter 5 have demonstrated that 
different process can lead to similar outcomes; deaf/hearing 
comparisons for spontaneous solutions, and that similar 
processes can lead to different outcomes, depending on context; 
deaf/deaf comparisons. 
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CHAPTER 10: A Comparison of Deaf and Hearing 6 Year Olds 
Solving the Tower-of -Hanoi Problem. 
INTRODUCTION 
In two previous studies (Chapters 5 and 9), problem solving was 
examined using concrete, visuo-spatial problems. The study 
reported here uses a visually presented, well defined, abstract 
problem which is a variant of the Tower-of-Hanoi problem 
described by Klahr & Robinson (1981). 
Abstract Functioning in the Deaf 
As with most areas of cognitive functioning in the deaf, 
abstract ability has been examined mainly as an aspect of a 
discrete function, such as concept formation, and as a means of 
examining the relationship between language and thought. The 
central issue in all reviews (Myklebust, 1964; -Furth, 1964; 1966; 
1971; Meadow, 1980; Rosenstein, 1961) is the role of language in 
abstract functioning, and whether a language deficiency impairs 
that functioning. In general, the cognitive processes of deaf 
children are characterised as being more concrete *and less 
abstract, especially where verbal symbolic skills are considered 
to be an aid to abstraction (e. g. Myklebust, 1964; Oleron, 1953; 
Furth, 1961). For example, on tasks-- involving classification, the 
deaf and hearing score at equivalent levels, but when more 
abstract processing is required, such as in a task requiring 
analogies (e. g. Templin, 1950) or a transfer task (e. g. Furth, 
1963), then the deaf score less well. Rosenstein (1961), 
commenting on Wright's study (1955) of the abstract reasoning 
of deaf college students writes; 
...... that the deaf students exhibited inferior 
performance. He concludes that the more abstract 
the task, the greater will be the discrepancy between 
the deaf and the hearing; and, (interestingly enough), 
that this discrepancy occurs irrespective of whether 
the stimuli are verbal or non-verbal in nature. " (p281). 
More complex abstract tasks, such as logical reasoning, have 
been examined by Furth (e. g. 1964) Suppes (1974) argues that 
most tasks of logical reasoning given to the deaf are extremely 
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elementary. He suggests that this is due to the efforts to 
make such tasks non-verbal and that more complex kinds of 
reasoning, such as can be give to 6/7 year olds, are difficult 
to test out-side a verbal context. He suggests that these more 
complex aspects of abstract functioning, such as inference 
should be tested within a sign language context. He goes on to 
say; 
"These more developed forms of inference are not 
primarily auditory in nature but visual; for example, 
there is very little development of mathematical 
proofs in purely auditory fashion. " (p159). 
This suggests the possibility of examining more complex 
abstract functioning than can be accessed by classification 
tasks, by the use of a problem which is amenable to visual 
inferencing. Such a task is the Tower-of-Hanoi. 
Task Characterist . ics 
The Tower-of-Hanoi (TOH) involves moving a stack of n disks, 
which decrease in size, from one of three pegs to another, 
subject to t wo rules; 1) that only one disk can be moved at a 
time and 2) that a large disk may never be placed on a small 
disk. For a stack of n disks the minimum number of moves in 
which this can be accomplished is given by the algorithm 2n-l. 
The problem is well defined, in that initial and goal states are 
fully given, as are operators and operator restrictions (i. e. 
rules). Despite the inherent definition of the problem, the path 
to the goal is not immediately obvious and for any problem 
requiring three or more moves, sub-goals are necessary, which 
may have a negative goal gradient. For example, the 
missionaries and cannibals problem, which has similar task 
characteristics, requires the movement of three missionaries 
and three cannibals across a river. Only two people can cross 
the river at any one time, and cannibals must never outnumber 
missionaries. The solution to the problem requires that 
people are taken back across the river to the starting point, 
in other words it requires sub-goals and associated moves 
which appear contrary to the end-goal. These are moves with a 
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negative goal gradient. Hence the solution of this kind of 
problem requires a means-end analysis, the identification of 
sub-goals and the operations necessary for transforming the 
problem from its initial state, to the goal state. This implies 
that the problem solver creates a mental representation of the 
problem which is used to enable the formulation of a plan for 
the execution of moves. 
The extent to which language is useful or necessary for this 
problem is a moot point. Piloting a three disc version with 
older children and adults, indicated that there were some who 
could solve the problem in the minimum number of moves and 
give a concurrent verbal protocol. Others, including the 
author, could not solve the problem and give a concurrent 
verbal protocol. Findings from cross modality interference 
studies suggests that those such as the author, are solving 
the problem verbally, hence a concurrent verbal task interferes 
with the solution of the TOH task, whereas those who can give 
a concurrent verbal protocol are solving the problem visually, 
hence there is no interference. 
Previous Work with Children and Tower-of-Hanoi 
There are very few studies which use the TOH with young 
children. Piaget (1976) used 2-, 3- and 4-disk versions with 
hearing children between the ages of 5 and 12 and concluded 
that most 5 to 6 year olds could only solve a 2-disk tower 
with difficulty and a 3-disk tower was impossible for them. He 
argued that the method used was trial and error and that the 
children were not conscious of the logical links involved. 
Klahr & Robinson (1981) point out that a 2-disk tower requires 
only three moves, and that children much younger than 5 or 
6 were capable of solving three step problems in everyday 
contexts. They used a modified 3-disk version of the TOH with 
hearing children between the ages of 4 and 6 years. The task 
uses three stacking cups, instead of the usual disks. To 
reduce memory load, the task has two sets of pegs on which 
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are represented the goal state and the initial state. The size 
rule is reversed, i. e. a small cup cannot be placed on a big 
cup. The apparatus is such that it is difficult to violate this 
rule, but if it is violated, the resultant stack falls off the 
peg. 
There are 27 possible configurations, or states, of the 3 cups. 
As every state can be reached from every other state it is 
possible to devise a set of problems in which the number of 
moves required for solution varies from I to 7. Normally, the 
initial and goal states of the TOH are stacks or towers. 
Producing the problems by the method just outlined gives some 
problems where the initial and goal states are flat, i. e. a cup 
on each peg. Klahr & Robinson, presented the children with 
blocks of problems half being tower-ending and half flat-ending, 
each successive block requiring one more move for completion. 
The children's set of cups represented the goal state and the 
Es cups the initial state- The childeen had to tell E how he 
would have to move his cups to make them look like the, child's, 
although the cups were never actually moved. This verbal 
protocol, in the absence of visual confirmation of the results 
of moves, was taken as evidence that the children were planning 
the solution, rather than discovering it by trial and error. 
The children were assigned a planning level, which corresponded 
to the maximum number of moves for which they could produce 
minimal path solutions for all tower-ending or flat-ending 
problems in a block. For tower-ending problems approximately 
half the 4 year olds could solve 3 move problems and over half 
the 6 year olds gave minimal path solutions for 6 move 
problems. Flat-ending problems were much more difficult, with 
planning levels being well below those for tower-ending 
problems. However, it remains that this modified version of 
the TOH demonstrates that 6 year olds can plan up to 6 moves 
ahead using mental representations of future states and the 
effects of transformations. 
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I have not been able to find any study which uses the TOH with 
deaf children. However, it appears to offer a way of 
investigating the problem solving capabilities of deaf children 
in an abstract domain- A second aspect of the task is that it 
requires a sequence of moves. Sequencing ability in the deaf 
is generally thought to be poor (see next Chapter). In view of 
this it was decided to examine the capability of manually 
educated deaf children for this task. Some procedural changes 
were deemed necessary which took account of the differential 
language status of E and S. The first of these was that the 
children would solve the problems by executing the moves 
themselves, rather than give a verbal protocol. Klahr & 
Robinson reported that in an earlier study (Klahr & Robinson, 
1976) using this procedure, the execution of the children's 
suggested moves by E, had provided feedback of the 
effectiveness of their strategies and some learning had taken 
place over the course of the experiment. The decision to use 
verbal protocols as data was to enable a more accurate 
assessment of baseline performance. Bearing this in mind, it 
was felt that verbal protocols on the part of deaf subjectý; 
were open to the possibility of E misinterpreting the signed 
utterances. It was also felt that verbal protocols were 
potentially more disruptive for the deaf Ss"as both task and 
language are visuo-spatial (see above). Providing deaf and 
hearing subjects were given the same set of problems in the 
same order, any potential learning will be equated between the 
groups. 
The Ss in Klahr and Robinson's study were given unlimited time, 
over more than one session, in which to complete the problems. 
For the reasons outlined in Chapter 6, i. e. minimal disruption to 
classroom time for the deaf group, a single session of 20 
minutes was decided upon. This is the lower limit given by 
Klahr & Robinson for solving a block of 20 problems. The pilot 
studies had indicated that executing moves took less time than 
giving verbal protocols, therefore, 20 minutes seemed 
reasonable. 
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Aims 
The aim of the study is to examine the problem solving ability 
of manually educated deaf children in a complex abstract domain. 
If, as previous work suggests, the deaf are poorer at abstract 
functioning, because of their language deficiency, then it would 
be expected that manually educated deaf children will perform 
as well as hearing children on the task. If inferior abstract 
functioning is a consequence of deafness then the deaf will 
perform less well than the hearing, on this task. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
7 hearing 5-6 year old infants, from a small J&I school and 5 
deaf children, also aged 5-6, attending a partial hearing unit 
attached to a mainstream infants school, acted as subjects. 
The P. H. U. had a total communication policy. These were the 
same children who had taken part in the study reported in 
Chapter 5. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus consisted of a modified version of the Tower-of- 
Hanoi as described by Klahr & Robinson (1981). Two sets of 
three pegs, each a different colour, were mounted onto a base 
board. Two identical sets of three different coloured cups, of 
diminishing size were used instead of the usual discs. The 
tops of the pegs were cut at an angle of 45 degrees, so that 
only legally stacked cups, Le a large cup on a small cup, would 
remain on the pegs. The arrangement of cups on the three pegs 
nearest E represented the goal state; the cups on the three 
pegs nearest S represented the initial state. See appendix 10 
for a drawing of the equipment. 
There are 702 possible problems requiring from one to seven 
moves to complete. The set of problems used here, given in 
appendix 10, comprises of seven sets of four problems, 28 in 
all- The first set require a minimum of one move to complete, 
the second a minimum of two moves and so on to set seven 
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which requires seven moves. All sets contain two tower ending 
and two flat ending problems. 
Design 
An independent measures design was used to test the effects 
of hearing status on problem solving (Tower- of -Hanoi). The 
same set of problems, and the same order of presentation was 
used for each child, in each group. Klahr & Robinson, found no 
order effects for tower-ending and flat-ending problems, 
therefore, it was not felt necessary to counterbalance, in this 
respect. Also it was necessary to equate potential learning in 
the two groups, therefore, the same order of presentation was 
required. 
Procedure 
All subjects were tested individually in a room, other than 
their normal classroom, at their school by the author. All 
sessions were recorded on video tape. The camera was visible 
to the children throughout the session. E showed each child 
the video equipment and explained that the video was to enable 
E remember how they played the game. The children were then 
shown themselves on the monitor, which was subsequently turned 
so that only E could see the picture. The children did not 
appear to be troubled by the presence of the camera during the 
session. 
The children were shown the apparatus and invited to play a 
game. The two sets of pegs and cups were pointed out and E 
explained that one set were Es and the other the child's . If 
the child appeared ill at ease with the situation some time was 
spent comparing the colours of the two sets of pegs and cups 
and in naming the animals which were painted on the cups. Once 
it was felt that the child was comfortable, they were asked if 
they could make their cups look the same as Es. 
At the end of each problem E positioned the cups for the next 
problem in view of the child, but in such a way so as not to 
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reveal the solution. Klahr & Robinson asked their Ss to close 
their eyes or turn their backs while the cups were being set. 
These procedures were felt to be inappropriate for the deaf 
children as both cut the deaf child off from their environment 
and regaining the child's attention is potentially frightening. 
At the beginning of each set of problems the child was told the 
minimum number of moves required to solve the problems in that 
set. The rules were introduced one at a time as they became 
necessary, i. e. as the number of moves required to solve the 
problem increased. At set two the "one at a time" rule was 
introduced and at set three the "stacking" rule was introduced. 
The rules were explained both verbally and by demonstration. 
The child was reminded about the rules if necessary, i. e. if the 
child made an illegal move. If an illegal move was made the 
cups were re-positioned to the state they had been in 
immediately prior to making the illegal move. If the child 
indicated, either verbally of behaviourally, that they had gone 
wrong, their cups were re-positioned to the initial state. 
The sessions were conducted in spoken English or Sign, 
according to the hearing status of the child. As with the 
previous study (Chapter 5) 1 attempted to keep my vocabulary 
as similar as possible with the two groups. However, I was 
aware that I found it very much easier to explain the rules to 
the hearing children and to explain why a move which produced 
the required result was illegal. Each session lasted for 
twenty minutes or until the child had completed all seven sets 
of problems, whichever was the sooner. The children were given 
a small packet of sweets at the end of the session. 
RESULTS 
Treatment of Data 
The video tapes of the sessions were transcribed as 
behavioural acts. All analyses were carried out using the 
transcripts. Appendix 10 contains an example of a transcript. 
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In the twenty minute session 1/5 deaf and 5/7 hearing children 
completed all seven problem sets. The remaining two hearing 
children reached set five as did one deaf child. The remaining 
three deaf children reached set four. It should be noted that 
these figures are only for problems completed and do not 
necessarily imply success. 
Problem set Number of children 
Deaf Hearin 
157 
527 
65 
75 
Table 10.1 Number of Subjects In Each Problem Set 
0 
There are a number of possible reasons why the hearing -should 
complete more problems in a given time, the most obvious being 
that they are the better problem solvers. However, it was 
noted earlier that it was very much easier to explain the rules 
of the game to the hearing children. This is reflected in the 
number of illegal moves made (see later) and also in the 
transcripts. The transcripts of the deaf children's sessions 
are much longer on average. This is almost entirely due to 
interactions between E and S* regarding rules. Hence it is 
possible that lower number of problems completed by the deaf 
group in the time given reflects an inability to understand E 
rather than lack of competence in problem solving. Subsequent 
analyses will address these possibilities. 
Number of Problems Solved 
A coding scheme was devised which took account only of the 
moves the child made to complete the problems. Moves were 
Problem Number -+- 13 14 15 16 
Ending T F T F 
Direction r/I r/l r/I b 
2+1 4 3+1 2+1 
8 a 8+1 
12 
Table 10.2 Example of Scoring 
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scored as legal, i. e. within the rules, or illegal, i. e. 
contravened the rules in some way; for example trying to stack 
a small cup on a large cup. The number of moves a child took 
to solve a problem were then counted. If all the moves for a 
given problem were legal then the entry on a the score sheet 
was a single number. Where a sequence of moves included an 
illegal move this was indicated by an I with the number of legal 
moves pre and postceding it. As the cups were re-positioned 
to the state immediately preceding the illegal move the final 
number in the column is the total number of legal moves taken. 
Where the cups were re-positioned to the original start 
position is indicated by a line across the column. An example of 
a hearing child's score sheet for set four is shown in table 
10.2. Complete score sheets for both groups are given in 
appendix 10. There is 'some missing data in some of the sets. 
In set two problem 8 was omitted for two hearing Ss due to E 
error. Where data is missing from the last set a child 
attempted this is due to time running out. 
The number of problems which were solved in the minimum number 
of moves without illegal moves, or re-positioning of the cups is 
given in table 10.3. 
Problem Set 
2345 
Deaf 75 70 45 62.5 42.86 
Hearing 
1 
82.14 84.62 57.14 46.43 46.15 
1-5 67 
61.44 25 0 
63.24 
1 
10 6.25 
Table 10.3 . Percentage of 
Problems Attempted and Solved in 
Minimum Moves with no Illegal Moves 
These data show little difference between the groups for 
problem sets 1-5 as is reflected in the overall percentage for 
those sets (X2=0.068; df 1; n. s). Although the hearing group 
completed more problems in the time given they were not 
especially successful on sets 6 and 7, giving minimal path 
solutions to only 3 of the 40 problems completed. All 
subsequent analyses will be on problem sets 1-5. 
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The above criterion does not exhaustively score the data. 
Moves can be legal or illegal and solutions can be in minimum 
moves or non minimum moves. This gives four possible solution 
types viz: - 
Legal(L) Illegal(I) 
minimum (M) H/L M/I 
Non-14inimum (NM) NM/L NMII 
Table 10.4 Possible Solution Types 
This scheme exhaustively codes the data. The distribution of 
solutions amongst types is given in table 10.5. 
Deaf 
LI total 
K 61.44 27.72 89.16 
KH 4.82 6.02 10.84 
total 66.26 33.73 
Hearing 
LI total 
M 63.24 5.88 69.12 
RK 19.85 11.03 30.88 
total 83.09 16.91 
Table 10.5 Distribution of Solutions Amongst Types 
These*data show that while the groups are similar with respect 
to minimal path solutions (M/L), the distribution of the 
remaining three cells is quite different. The deaf give twice 
as many solutions which contain an illegal move than the 
hearing. However, of those solutions involving an illegal move 
the deaf complete four times as many as theý- hearing in the 
minimum number of moves. Considering non-minimum solutions; the 
hearing have three times as many as the deaf. Whereas the 
deaf have approximately equal number of NM/L and NM/I 
solutioris, the hearing have nearly twice as many NM/L as NMII 
solutions. 
Klahr & Robinson (1981) define a perfect solution as one in 
which the problem is solved in the minimum number of moves. 
Illegal and non minimal path moves are allowed "... as long as 
they are recognized by the child and self-corrected, ultimately 
producing the correct solution path. " (p123). Applying these 
criteria to the data gives the results in table 10.6. By these 
criteria the deaf perform better than the hearing on all sets, 
with the relative difference increasing as the problems become 
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more difficult. Overall (sets 1-5), this difference is significant 
(X2=1-1.58; df 1; p<. 001) between groups. These criteria are less 
stringent than those used for deriving the results in table 
10.3, in absolute terms. 
In Chapter 4 it was argued that analyses should take account 
of process as well as outcome. The criteria of Klahr & 
Robinson do reflect an essential part of problem solving; the 
recognition and correction of errors. As the major differences 
between the groups lies in their relative performances with 
respect to errors, all subsequent analyses will be reported in 
detail for the scores derived from the Klahr and Robinson 
criteria. Only the results of the parallel analyses on table 
10.3 scores will be given where applicable. 
Problem Set 
I od i 4b DI L- D 
Deaf 95.0 90.0 80.0 87.5 71.42 
1 89.16 
Hearingi 89.28 88.46 64.28 50.0 53.84 69.12 
Table 10.6 Perfect Solution (Sets 1-5) as a Percentage of 
those Attempted. 
Flat-ending and Tower-ending Problems 
It was no-ýed that Flat-ending problems were more difficult than 
Tower-ending problems. The percentage of perfect solutions for 
tower and flat ending problems was calculated for each problem 
set for each group. These data are given in table 10.7. 
These data show that for the hearing group Tower-ending 
problems are significantly easier than Flat-ending problems when 
considered across all problems (set 1-5, X2=4.421; df 1; p<. 05). 
For the deaf group, the type of ending makes no significant 
difference, when all problems are considered. These differences 
are reflected in the between groups comparisons. The deaf and 
hearing do not differ significantly with respect to Tower-ending 
problems, but for Flat-ending problems, the deaf are 
significantly more successful across all problems (X2=5.228; df 
1; p<0.5). Table 10.3 data shows no significant differences 
189 
within or between groups. 
Tower 1 2 3 4 5 I-S 
Deaf 100 90 so so 100 79.54 
Hearing 85.71 92.85 85.71 64.29 71.43 78.57 
Flat 
Deaf 90 90 100 100 33.3 82.05 
Hearing 92o86 83.3 so so 41.67 62.12 
Table 10-7 Percent of Perfect Solutions in each Problem Set by 
Type of Ending 
Comparison With Klahr & Robinson Data 
Klahr Robinson's Ss were assigned planning levels for 
Tower-ending and Flat-ending problems, which was the maximum 
number of moves for which the children could produce perfect 
plans for all problems of a type in a set. Table 10.8 shows 
the results for the deaf and hearing groups with Klahr and 
Robinson's data for comparison. These data are also shown 
graphically in figure 10.1. 
Tower Flat 
2 3A 2 3 4 5 
x rc R 100 92.3 92.3 76.9 100 76.9 69.2 46.1 
Deaf so 60 60 40 80 100 so 0 
Hearing 05.7 71.4 42.8 57.1 71.4 14.3 14.3 28.6 
Table 10.8 Percentage of Subjects in Each Group at Each 
Planning Level 
These data show that overall, both groups in the present study 
have lower planning levels than Klahr & Robinson's Ss. For 
Tower-ending problems the scores for all groups are in the 
same direction. For Flat-ending problems the deaf groups 
scores are in a different direction from both hearing groups. 
It will be recalled that the procedure used here differed in a 
number of ways from that used by Klahr and Robinson, the major 
difference being that the children in this study moved the cups 
themselves. This suggests, somewhat counter intuitively, that 
moving the cups makes the task harder than giving a verbal 
protocol. A first move analysis (see table 1.1. below) shows 
that both groups in the present study are more likely to 
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Figure 10.1 Planning Levels for Tower- and Flat-Ending Problems. 
Tower-ending Problems 
100 
go 
80 
OD 
so 
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Fig 10.1 a Percentage of Subjects at 
Each Planning Level 
Flat-Ending Problems 
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Fig. 10.1 b Pomentage of Subjects at 
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select an optimum first move than Klahr & Robinson's Ss. 
Therefore, the differences in performance occurred during the 
course of solving the problem. The implication is that 
verbalisation aids this kind of problem solving in this age 
group. There is some evidence of this in the transcripts. 
When a child found a problem difficult they would verbalise or 
engage E in dialogue. The following is the transcript of a 
hearing child solving problem 5. This is a Flat ending 2 move 
problem, where the 'one cup at a time' rule is introduced. 
1. looks at cups 
2. lifts yellow cup off peg and looks at cups 
3. S says "put this one (yellow) in my hand" 
4. E says " before you move another one you've got 
to put it on a peg or on another cup 
5. S puts yellow cup on orange peg and says "put it 
on there and then the bear (red cup)" moving the 
red cup onto the yellow cup and looks at E. 
6. E says "do yours look like mine now? " 
7. S says "no" then moves the red cup to the black 
peg whilst saying "that goes there after". 
This was scored as three moves, 1) yellow cup to orange peg, 2) 
red cup to yellow cup, 3) red cup to black peg. The first move 
in this transcript was optimum. The child's error was to make 
the second required move - red cup to black peg - in two 
steps. This transcript also indicates the possibility that 
scoring between this study and Klahr & Robinson's differed. It 
is possible to argue that the child corrected the move made in 
line 5 at line 7. My decision to score the moves in lines 5 
and 7 as separate moves was based on the fact that the child 
stopped between the two moves and had to be prompted to 
continue. . 
Had the child made the two moves consecutively and 
without a prolonged pause, I would have deemed the second move 
a correction of the first and scored the whole processes as 
one move. All such instances were dealt with in the same way. 
First Move Analysis 
If the children are solving the problems strategically then this 
will be reflected in the first move. The first move in any 
problem can be optimum (0), non optimum (NO) or illegal (I). 
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obviously, a minimal path solution can never be arrived at from 
a non optimum first move. For any first move there are three 
possible illegal moves and three possible legal moves. Of the 
legal moves, only one is optimum. Hence, if the children are 
choosing moves at random then the optimum move has a 1/6 
chance of being chosen, non optimum moves a 2/6 chance and an 
illegal move a 3/6 chance. Table 10.9 shows the percentage of 
first moves in each category for each group. Also included are 
Klahr & Robinson's data for comparison. These data are also 
shown graphically in figure 10.2 
Chance 
0 16.67 
0. C) 0 
NO 33.33 
I10.00 
rsooo 
Tower 
Deaf K Ec R Hearin 
63.63 51 68.57 58.97 42 57.57 
11.36 40 24.29 28.21 46 39.39 
25.00 9 7.14 
1 
12.92 12 3.03 
Flat 
Deaf K&R Hearin 
Table 10.9 Percentage of First Moves in Each Category for 
Tower- and Flat-ending Problems 
These data show that both groups in the present study chose 
optimum first moves at well above chance level for both Tower- 
and Flat-ending problems, with both groups in the present study 
being more likely than Klahr and Robinson's Ss to choose an 
optimum first move. The graphs of the two hearing groups 
follow thý same pattern, both being different from that of the 
deaf group, for Tower-ending problems, but not for Flat-ending 
problems. For Tower-ending problems the deaf differ from the 
other two groups, in that the probabilities of choosing a non 
optimum and an illegal move are reversed, the deaf being more 
likely to choose an illegal move, rather than a non optimum 
move. 
Direction of Movement 
Whilst watching the children solve the problems it appeared 
that the direction in which the cups had to be moved affected 
the relative difficulty of the problems. In table 10.2, the third 
row is labelled direction. This is an indication of the extent 
to which the moves required to solve the problem are left to 
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Figure 10.2 First Move Analysis 
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Fig 10-2c Percentage of First Moves in 
Each Category 
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right (L-R) or right to left (R-L). The label indicates that the 
majority of moves are in that direction. For some Flat-ending 
problems with an even number of moves no one direction 
predominates and these are labelled B. Table 10.10 shows the 
percentage of each type of problem (e. g. Tower L-R) for which a 
perfect solution wa-s recorded. 
Deaf Hearing 
L-R R-L B L-R R-L B 
Tower 94.12 70.37 82-14 71.42 
F 88.33 90.48 91.67 
1 
38.46 64.71 63.15 
Table 10.10 Perfect Solutions by Direction and Ending 
These data indicate that for both groups L-R Tower ending 
problems are slightly easier than R-L Tower-ending problems. 
For Flat-ending problems direction makes little difference to 
the deaf group, but for the hearing group nearly twice as many 
R-L Flat-ending problems are solved as L-R Flat-ending 
problems. Table 10.3 data shows no differ'ences between groups. 
Illegal Moves 
Two children, 1 deaf and 1 hearing, completed sets 1-5 without 
any illegal moves. only the deaf child completed all seven sets 
with no illegal moves. Overall the deaf made nearly twice as 
many illegal moves as the hearing (59 v 35). There are three 
possible types of illegal move 1) Moving the Es cups (E); 2) 
Moving more than one cup at a time (M); 3) Stacking a small cup 
on a large cup (S). Classifying illegal moves according to this 
scheme gave the following results (table 10.11). 
Ems 
Deaf 13.56 72.88 13.56 
Hearing 
1 
8.57 88.57 8.57 
Table 10.1.1 Percentage of Illegal Moves in each Type 
The most common type of illegal move was M for both groups, 
but with E and S occurring nearly twice as often in the deaf 
group. 
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If the frequency of illegal moves is a function of the 
understanding and application of the rules then this should be 
reflected in the relative frequencies of illegal moves as the 
session progresses. It may also be the case that as the 
number of moves required to solve the problem increases the 
probability of making an illegal move increases. Table 10.12 
gives the number of illegal and legal*moves in each problem set 
for each group. Legal moves are expressed as a percentage of 
minimum moves required. This table shows that apart from set 
3 illegal moves are evenly distributed amongst sets. There is 
2 
1L 1L 1L 1L 1L IL 
Deaf 
Hearing 
7 105 
7 125" 
8 105 
5 109 
29 105 
12 113 
8 105 
.6 
135 
7 128 
5 127 
59 120 
35 124 
Table. 10.12 Distribution of Illegal Moves Amongst Sets 
a sharp increase in illegal moves at set 3 for both groups, 
although-the rise is much. greater for the deaf group. This set 
saw the introduction of -the stacking rule and was also the set 
where subgoals became necessary. 
Considering illegal moves in relation to legal moves it can be 
seen that the increased frequency of illegal moves in the deaf 
is not a function of an increased number of moves per se. 
This reflects the data presented in table 10.5, which showed 
that the deaf were more likely to give minimal path solutions 
which involved an illegal move than the hearing. Type of ending 
does not affect the relative distribution of illegal moves, 
either within or between groups (table 10.13). 
All Tower Flat 
Deaf 
Hearing 
33.73 
17.64 
34.1 33.3 
21.43 13.54 
Table 10.13 Percentage oE Problems with Illegal Moves 
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DISCUSSION 
Summary of Results 
In a twenty minute session the hearing group completed more 
problems than the deaf group. This was almost certainly due to 
difficulties encountered by E in communicating the rules of the 
task to the deaf Ss. Although the hearing group completed 
more problems in the time given, they were not especially 
successful on the last eight problems, the group solving only 
three of forty attempted in minimum moves. Hence analyses 
were confined to the first five sets of problems (1-20). 
Although the deaf made more illegal moves than the hearing, the 
relative distribution across sets and problem type did not 
differ between groups. Using strict criteria, a minimal path 
solution with no illegal moves or re-starts, to assess outcome, 
no significant differences were found between the groups in 
number of problems solved overall and number of Tower- or 
Flat-ending problems. Therefore, on the most conservative 
measure used there is no basis to support the view that 
deafness adversely affects the ability to solve this kind of 
abstract problem. 
Classifying ou. tcomes by a scheme which also took account of 
non-minimal path solutions and illegal moves, the behaviour of 
the two groups was found to differ. The hearing were more 
likely to produce non-minimal path solutions, either with or 
without illegal moves, than the deaf. Conversely the deaf were 
more likely to produce minimal path solutions with an illegal 
move than the hearing. 
A less severe measure of outcome, used by Klahr & Robinson 
(1981) allows illegal moves and restarts provided that the child 
recognises their own error and self corrects. Using this 
measure, the deaf were significantly more successful than the 
hearing overall. This was due to the enhanced performance of 
the deaf on the more difficult Flat-ending problems. When 
direction of movement of the cups is considered, the deaf are 
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unaffected by direction, whilst the hearing groups are less 
successful with Flat-ending problems in which the predominant 
movement is left to right. 
Comparing data from the present study with that of Klahr & 
Robinson (1981) indicated that moving the cups made the task 
more, rather than less, difficult. Comparison of first move 
analyses indicated that the Ss in the present study made as 
many optimum first moves as Klahr and Robinson's Ss, 
confirming that problem solving, initially at least, was 
strategic- 
Interpretation of Results 
Previous work indicates that where a task requires information 
n ot perceptually given, the deaf do less well than the hearing. 
The main finding of this study, is thýt even with a severe 
outcome criterion, the deaf perform as well as the hearing on 
this task. The task is more difficult than those normally used 
to investigate abstract ability in the deaf, and indeed was 
considered too difficult for any child of this age by Piaget 
(1976). It is also the case that when less severe outcome 
criteria are applied the deaf children show enhanced 
performance, especially for Flat-ending problems. This then 
raises the question of why this particular group of deaf 
children can accomplish a relatively difficult task, when older 
deaf children have failed simpler tasks? 
Language and Visuo-spatial Processing 
The most obvious reason is that these deaf children use Sign 
language and cannot, therefore, be considered alinguistic. If 
language is a necessary part of abstract functioning then 
these data merely reflect that. The extent to which language 
aids the solution of these particular problems was discussed in 
the introduction, as was the sensitivity of the task to 
cross-modal interference. The relatively lower level of 
performance by both groups in this study compared to Klahr & 
Robinson's Ss is certainly suggestive that the procedure used 
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is a determinant of outcome. Their Ss, in both the 1976 and 
1981 studies, did not move the cups themselves, but gave verbal 
instructions which were executed by E (1976) or plans (1981). 
The Ss here made as many, if not more, optimum first moves. 
Therefore, the effects of the procedural changes operated on 
subsequent moves, where maintenance ofthe mental 
representation of the task is crucial, if a minimal path 
solution is to be achieved. Oakhill & Johnson-Laird (1984) found 
that both verbal and visuo-spatial working memory were used to 
maintain spatial descriptions. The use of verbal memory was 
especially evident if these descriptions were difficult. If we 
assume that for the present task representation is 
visuo-spatial in nature then the act of moving the cups has 
the potential to interfere with that representation. 
Verbalising the solution offers an alternative 'means of 
representing the problem i. e. as a set of propositions, which is 
not susceptible to visuo-spatial interference. That the 
children did sometimes verbalise solutions supports this view. 
Whilst this may reasonably account for the hearing groups 
performance, the fact that the language of the deaf group is 
visuo-spatial poses a special problem. For any task, which 
involves a visuo-spatial component and a language component, 
the deaf person, whose primary language is Sign, is always in 
the position of a hearing person in a cross-modal interference 
task. The full implications of this point will be discussed in 
Chapter 12. For the moment the discussion will be restricted to 
points relevant to this task. Presumably, the deaf person and 
Sign have developed strategies and linguistic devises for 
overcoming the potential problem of interference. Placement 
(see Chapter 9) is one such device, in that it removes the 
necessity to maintain a visuo-spatial representation which is 
distinct from a linguistic representation. 
Consider a signed utterance which is the solution to a three 
move problem. Placement dictates that there is a one to one 
correspondence between the spatial layout of the problem, the 
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moves required to solve it and the location and direction of 
the signs which constitute the uttered solution. In other 
words, in Sign, the surface structure of the linguistic 
representation is identical to the operations necessary to 
effect a solution, and, therefore, identical to a visuo-spatial 
representation. Assuming that the deep structure linguistic 
representation is propositional, the transformations to 
produce the surface string will produce the solution directly. 
Put simply, moving the cups is verbalising the solution for the 
deaf child. 
Language, Direction and Mirrors 
Klahr & Robinson argued that Flat-ending problems are more 
difficult than Tower-ending problems. In a Tower-ending problem 
the order in which the cups must reach the 'goal peg is 
immediately apparent, hence, subgoals are implicit in the -final 
configuration, whereas this is not the case for Flat-ending 
problems. They also noted that when cups were in the form 
(xy/-/z) and moving x to the empty peg is not the optimum move, 
this error was four times more likely to be made during 
Flat-ending problems than Tower-ending problems. This move 
produces a configuration which approximates to the goal state, 
and, therefore, has a strong perceptual pull. By this 
reasoning, it would be expected that the deaf would find these 
Flat ending problems more difficult than the hearing. That they 
did not argues against those who characterise the deaf as 
being perceptually bound (e. g. Oleron, 1953). 
There is some evidence that the deaf were less affected by the 
Flat-ending problems than the hearing- This was because the 
direction of movement of the cups did not affect the deaf 
group's ability to solve the problems, whereas the hearing 
group were adversely affected by predominantly left to right 
movements. This is counter intuitive, in that reading and 
writing give practice in dealing with left to right information 
processing. Also English sentences are right branching. 
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The following is a state description of two Flat-ending problems 
which require three moves: 
Problem 9 R-L Problem 11 L-R 
Initial state G/-/RY RY/-/G 
lst move RG/-/Y Y/-/RG 
2nd move RG/Y/- -/Y/RG 
Goal state G/Y/R G/Y/R 
It will be noticed that these problems are mirror images of one 
another, for all configurations. This is also the case with the 
two Flat-ending problems in set 5 and some pairs of 
Tower-ending problems. In all pairs of problems which are 
mirror images, a right to left problem precedes a left to right 
problem. We have already seen (Chapter 8) that placement in 
Sign requires a facility for dealing with mirror images, and 
that deaf children spend time exploring and uEiing mirror images. 
It was suggested that placement requires that the treatment of 
space is isotonic. In other words the coding of spatial 
relations must be such that a reference to an aspect of that 
space, by any participant in a conversation is unambiguous. 
Assuming that this process underlies the coding of spatial 
relations in these problems, then there is a sense in which 
mirror image problems are in fact identical problems for the 
deaf. It is also necessary to assume that coding is different 
in the hearing. 
If this is the case then we would expect to see a practice 
effect in the deaf, but not in the hearing. Table 10-14, shows 
the percentage of L-R problems for which the solutions were 
better than, worse than, or the 'same as for the preceding R-L 
problem. Due to the small numbers involved, the values are for 
both Tower-ending and Flat-ending problems. 
Deaf Hearing 
Better 47.6 15.6 
Worse 14.28 31.3 
Same 38.09 53.1 
X2-6.679; df 2; p<. 05 
Table 10.14 Percentage of L-R Problems With the Same, Better 
or Worse Solutions than a Preceding R-L Problem 
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This shows that the deat are three times as likely to improve 
their performance on a L-R problem which is a mirror image of 
a preceding R-L, with decrements in performance being half that 
of the hearing. The distribution for the hearing group, 
indicates not only the lack of a practice effect, but also 
interference. This suggests that some commonality is observed 
between the mirror image problems, but that this cannot be 
separated from, or accessed independently of chirality. If the 
decrement in performance on L-R Flat-ending problems in the 
hearing is due to this kind of interference, then repeating the 
study with L-R problems first would lead to a decrement in R-L 
problems. 
This observed practice effect suggests a second reason why, 
the deaf evidence an enhanced performance, on the less severe 
criteria, namely that the problem is, in some aspects at least, 
a visuo-spatial one. The cogntive-linguistic skills of the deaf 
are, on this occasion, more efficient at dealing with the 
information and abstracting common principles. Whilst, this may 
seem a bold statement, it is no more so that saying oral 
language is more efficient at preserving order information (see 
next Chapter). The two statements are in fact saying the same 
thing; that where the structure of information and language are 
coterminous, then language is an efficient means of preserving 
it. 
Illegal Moves 
The foregoing has concentrated on those aspects of the task 
on which the deaf performed better than the hearing. it still 
remains that the deaf made consistently more illegal moves than 
the hearing. Chulliat & Oleron (1955) and others have commented 
on the perseverance of the deaf, in pursuit of inefficient 
strategies. The frequency of illegal moves can be viewed as 
another example of that kind of behaviour. However, having 
looked beyond the perseverance, we find that the deaf are not 
inef f icient. This is not to say that such behaviour should be 
ignored, or treated as noise in the experimental situation. It 
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is a part of what deaf children do and, therefore, to 
understand deaf children, requires that we understand this 
aspect of their behaviour. It is difficult to understand why 
the deaf children persisted in making illegal moves. Their 
behaviour, such as making the illegal move when they thought E 
was not looking, indicates that they knew the move was wrong. 
once, dissuaded from making illegal moves, the probability was 
that they would produce a minimal path solution. 
Methodological Note 
On strict quantitative comparisons we find no difference 
between deaf and hearing in numbers of problems solved, but a 
difference in the number of illegal moves made, the deaf making 
twice as many illegal moves as the hearing. - By using less 
stringent criteria, and a more detailed specification of 
individual problems, it was possible to make a more qualitative 
analysis of the. data. This allowed relationships between task 
characteristics, language structures, and outcome measures to 
emerge. This method gave quantitative results which can viewed 
as confirming previous findings, (e. g. abstract ability, Furth, 
1971; perseverance, oleron, 1953) or refuting previous findings 
(e. g. abstract ability, Wright, 1955). The method also 
demonstrated that going beyond the quantitative produced 
qualitative data which indicated that different processes, which 
. are related 
to the experience of deafness, underlie essentially 
similar results. 
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CHAPTER 11: Visual Memory for Non-Linear Sequential and Spatial 
Patterns in Deaf and Hearing Preschoolers 
INTRODUCTION 
Memory is a fundamental aspect of cognitive abilities, which is 
reflected in a large literature on the subject for hearing 
populations. Surprisingly, therefore, reviews up to 1980 
covered only 16 studies of memory in the deaf. 
Memory is concerned with the recording, organisation, retention 
and recall of information from the en vironment. As such it 
might be expected that preferred mnemonic strategies and 
organisation have a far reaching influence on those cognitive 
skills which memory subserves. Equally the potential methods of 
encoding information available might be expected to have an- 
influence on the performance of memory. In the case of the 
prelingually profoundly deaf, the channels available for the 
recepti. on of information differ in that the auditory channel is 
not available. An obvious consequence of this is that encoding 
based on the auditory features of information is greatly 
reduced if not excluded. If this is the case then we might 
expect to find greater reliance on visual aspects of 
information. If this is the case then what ar: e the 
consequences for memory in the deaf and how is this 
reflected in memory tests? 
Memory Research with the Deaf 
Reviews by Furth (1964,1971), Meadow (1980), Myklebust (1964) and 
O'ttem (1980) of studies of various aspects of short term 
memory (STM) in the deaf show that the pattern of results 
obtained differs from that found in the hearing, with the deaf 
showing superior, equivalent and inferior performances depending 
on the type of stimulus material, the method of presentation 
and recall requirements. In general, for material which is 
non-verbal and items simultaneously presented the deaf show 
enhanced or equivalent performances to the hearing (e. g. Blair, 
1957); for material which is linguistic and sequentially 
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presented the deaf show inferior performance (e. g. Olsson & 
Furth, 1.966). For non-verbal sequential material and verbal 
simultaneous material the pattern of results is more irregular, 
but indicate that for ordered recall sequentially presented 
items are more problematic than simultaneously presented items, 
irrespective of type of material. For example, Withrow (1968) 
reports that in deaf adults memory span for successively 
presented forms is below that for hearing adults, although 
equivalent for simultaneously presented forms. This is 
confirmed by Olsson & Furth (1966), who also demonstrate that 
for digit spans, the performance of deaf adults is inferior 
irrespective of method of presentation. 
The results are also taken to indicate that for the deaf, 
absolute memory span, the number of items which can be held in 
STM, is below that of the hearing. This is because the 
non-verbal span of the deaf -is taken to represent their 
ceiling. In the hearing, digit or other verbal spans, are always 
longer than non7verbal spans, hence the hearing have a greater 
STM capacity than the deaf. This advantage is taken to stem 
from the availability of a speech based code to the hearing 
(see below). Data from Klima & Bellugi (1979) on serial recall of 
signs suppQ. rts this view, in that deaf adults recalled 
significantly fewer signs than hearing adults recalled words. 
on average the deaf recalled one item less, than the hearing 
group, but other aspects of performance are similar. For 
example, the deaf have the same type of serial position curve, 
and show intrusion errors based on formational aspects of sign 
analogous to intrusion errors based on phonetic similarity. 
Visual Coding 
The above was more concerned with the performance of memory 
than the type of encoding which was being used. An obvious 
code for the deaf is one which makes use of visual aspects of 
the stimuli, and is indicated by the presence of the intrusion 
errors noted above. Frumkin and Anisfeld (1977) investigated 
the codes used by deaf children in memory using false 
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recognition errors as an index of coding. They presented 6- 
15 year old deaf Ss with list of words which contained 
semantically related and orthographically related words. They 
found a false recognition effect for both semantically related 
words and orthographically similar words. A second experiment 
using a series of manual signs on video tape found false 
recognition effects for signs which were semantically related 
and for signs which were cherologicallyl similar. On the basis 
of their results they argue that the visual codes of 
orthography and cherology are effective for deaf children. 
They also note the consistently strong semantic effect in the 
young deaf children which is not found in young hearing 
children. The generality of this semantic effect was further 
tested by using lists of concrete and abstract signs. Given 
the role of imagery in memory, which has been found to be 
analogous in deaf and hearing subjects (Conlin & Paivio, 1975) 
the authors argued that if the semantic effect were only to be 
found for the concrete list then this would suggest imagery 
based coding rather than semantic coding per se. The results 
again showed a strong semantic effect which was equivalent for 
both the abstract and concrete lists. They suggest that the 
young deaf child has no effective speech based code leading to 
greater reliance on semantic codes than is the case with young 
hearing children. They suggest that this semantic effect 
indicates that cherological coding (Le. visual) does not have 
the same coding capacity for the deaf child as the analogous 
phonetic coding of the hearing child. 
MacDougall (1979) also demonstrated the importance of visual 
coding in the deaf. Groups of 5 letters, were presented 
visually to deaf and hearing Ss. Their task was to write down 
the letters in the same order as they were presented on the 
slide, immediately after presentation. There were two 
conditions using different typescript for the letters. Evidence 
of visual coding was examined by comparing the pattern of 
1. Cheremes are the Sign analogues of Phonemes 
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errors for the two typescripts. A similar pattern for both 
typescripts would be taken to indicate the use of a code not 
based on visual features of the stimulus. The results showed 
that the deaf relied predominantly on visual coding, with the 
young deaf group being more 'visual' than the older deaf. In 
the case of the hearing groups this trend was reversed with 
the older hearing group being more 'visual' than the younger. 
However in this study all the letters of the alphabet were 
used, rather than subsets chosen specifically for their 
orthographic or phonetic confusibility. Hence, a second 
analysis was carried out which determined the number of visual, 
acoustic or overlap (items which were confuseable in either 
modality) errors for each typescript. This analysis showed 
little difference in the pattern of errors-for the young and 
old deaf groups, visual errors out numbering acoustic errors 
c5: 1. In the hearing groups the younger Ss made approximately 
equal numbers of acoustic and visual errors, while the older 
group made approximately twice as many visual as acoustic 
errors. Therefore, this second analysis confirms the 
developmental trend advanced for the hearing group, but not 
the deaf S's, and further confirms the predominance of visual 
coding in the deaf. The author argues that this reliance on 
visual coding may be an important factor in the deaf child's 
difficulties in learning to read, given that hearing children 
apparently develop from auditory to visual-auditory coding. 
"An important point to keep in mind in this 
connection is that independent of the modality of 
processing in this study, and indeed all other studies 
on this topic, deaf S's make substantially more errors 
than hearing S's when presentation is visual (Conrad, 
1970; Wallis & Corballis, 1973). As hearing S's become 
older and use visual coding, they seem to be more 
efficient than deaf Ss as far as absolute memory is 
concerned. This raises the possibility that the type 
of visual processing that is being used by deaf and 
hearing S's is in fact different. " (p2l) 
He suggests that his data support this notion of differential 
visual processing by the fact that the deaf and hearing Ss in 
his study show a different pattern of visual errors across the 
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two conditions. He then goes on to suggest that the deaf may 
be impaired in their ability to use visual memory per se, which 
is contrary to the data reported by Blair (1957) which shows a 
su perior ability in visual memory for designs. Whilst the 
argument of differential visual processing may be supported by 
the reported data, it is not clear on what basis he makes the 
assertion of impairment, nor the statement that the deaf 
always make more errors when presentation is visual. The 
overall number of errors for the deaf and hearing, collapsed 
across ages and conditions are 633 for the deaf and 715 for 
the hearing, with the old-hearing group i. e. the most visual of 
the hearing groups making more errors than the young deaf 
group (361 v 281) On these data the use of visual coding 
reduces -the efficiency of the hearing group in this study. 
In both the above studies, it has been asserted that visual 
coding is inferior to speech based coding for the tasks in 
que. stions. This conclusion is also reached by Wallis & 
Corballis (1973) using visually presented 4- and 5-letter 
sequences. However, with the exception of the sign condi. tion in 
Frumkin & Ainsfield, all three used material which was oral 
linguistic in nature and the two latter required retention of 
order information. 
Sequencing and Language 
Of the research results, it is the poor ability shown for 
dealing with sequentially presented material and reduced memory 
span, which has received most attention. The prelingually 
profoundly deaf, with a few exceptions, fail to acquire a 
competence in oral language. This is equally true for either 
spoken or written forms of language. It has also been noted 
that other language disabled groups (e. g. Aphasics) show similar 
deficits in these kinds of sequential span tests. From this it 
is argued that a common process underlies language and 
sequencing abilities. For example, syntax is concerned with the 
order in which words and information are given. Lake (1980) 
points out that deaf children do not pay attention to word 
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order when learning English and there is widespread agreement 
that the greatest difficulty the deaf have with oral language 
is aspects of syntax (e. g. Quigley & Paul, 1984). 
Auditory perception requires the discrimination and integration 
of series of temporal events, with spatial aspects of the 
signal being less important. By contrast visual perception is 
concerned with the processing of simultaneous (i. e. spatial) 
information, with temporal aspects of the signal being less 
important. Oral language is a linear distribution of events in 
time and the perception of language requires rapid temporal 
discrimination and integration of these events. It is argued 
that it this experience which accounts for the enhanced 
performance of hearing populations in sequential or memory span 
tasks where recall of temporal order is the central 
requirement. 
A second explanation of the superior performance of hearing 
groups is tfie availability of a speech based code. It is 
argued that speech codes not only enhance STM capacity per se, 
but are also ideally suited for coding or'der information, such 
as sequences (e. g. Healy, 1975; 1977). Evidence for a speech 
based &ode comes from studies of confusion errors in recall 
(e. g. acoustic Conrad, 1962; articulatory Hintzman, 1967). Given 
that most previous work perceives the deaf as being alinguistic 
it can be argued that they have no speech based code, thus 
necessitating the adoption of alternative, visually based 
strategies. 
Accepting sign language as linguistic still precludes a speech 
based code although not, as Klima & Bellugi (1979) point out, a 
linguistic code. However, it has already been noted that this 
code still does not lead to similar results in the deaf and 
hearing, when order information is important. This is confirmed 
by Hanson (1982), who found that deaf adults recalled fewer 
items from a list when ordered recall was required. 
Irrespective of mode of presentation, i. e. sign or written word, 
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Ss showed evidence of using a speech based code. However, for 
the sign presentation condition there was also evidence of the 
use of a sign based code. Despite this accuracy of ordered 
recall was correlated with the use of a speech based code. 
Hanson argues that the data support the view that a speech 
based code facilitates the retention of order information. In a 
second experiment, which required only item recall, the 
performance of deaf and hearing adults was comparable. Whilst 
there was no evidence of a speech based code being used by 
the deaf Ss, neither was there evidence of the use of a sign 
based code. The authors suggest the Ss are using a visual 
code, but from Frumkin & Ainsfield it is possible that they were 
using a semantic code. However, the implication from these two 
studies is that a sign based code can be used to-retain order 
information, but that a speech based code better preserves 
order information. 
The discussion of sequences and the retention of order 
information has thus far centred on the idea of temporal 
order, i. e. the distribution of events in time and the 
relationship this has with speech based codes. It is also true 
that a one dimensional sequence can be presented visually as a 
sequence of spatial locations, e. g. from left to right. A 
simultaneously presented group of letters such as used by 
Macdougall (1979) could also be. viewed as a spatial sequence. 
In this case it is difficult to see why a visual based code 
should be at a disadvantage for preserving order information. 
In fact the deaf Ss in the MacDougal study made less errors 
than the hearing Ss. This suggests that one dimension along 
which encoding strategies can vary is spatial - temporal, 
dependant on the type of information to be encoded and also 
that visuo-spatial codes can preserve order information. The 
use of such codes by hearing Ss has been demonstrated by 
Healy (1977), where Ss used a spatial-temporal code to preserve 
item and order information, when use of a speech based code 
was prevented. However, the serial position curves produced 
by these spa tial- temporal codes differs from the 'U' shaped 
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curves reported for serial recall of linguistic items, in being 
flatter and inverted. 
Order Information and Spatial and Temporal Coding. 
The above arguments suggest that the adoption of a coding 
strategy may be a function of a) modality of input, b) type of 
information c) task requirements or d) some combination of 
these. O'Connor & Hermelin (1972) investigated the influence of 
modality of input on coding strategy. They used a three item 
array, presented sequentially, such that the spatially central 
item was never the temporally central item. Items were 
presented visually in one of three linear display panels, or in 
the auditory modality in one of three linearly arranged 
loudspeakers. 
_ 
These ambiguous sequences were presented in 
the auditory modality to blind and sighted Ss and a control 
group of sighted Ss wearing blindfolds and in the visual 
modality to deaf and hearing Ss with a control group of hearing 
Ss wearing earmuffs. 
The results showed that modality of presentation predicted the 
strategy adopted, i. e. when the arrays were presented visually 
S's chose the spatially central digit, irrespective of hearing 
status, but when the arrays were presented in the auditory 
modality the Ss chose the temporally central digit, irrespective 
of seeing status. In a second experiment they examined the 
effects of simultaneous auditory and visual presentation with 
hearing Ss and found that responses were predominantly spatial 
(317 out of a possible 320 responses). However when Ss were 
first exposed to auditory and then simultaneous presentation 
the responses were predominantly temporal (no figures given). 
The authors attributed this to 'set' induction by the 
preliminary auditory presentation. On the basis of these 
results they concluded that modality of input induces either a 
spatial or temporal set. Therefore, deaf children, with no 
access to auditory input will behave as if they had a visually 
induced set and organise events spatially. 
In a later study (O'Connor & Hermelin, 1973) deaf, hearing, and 
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autistic children were presented with ambiguous three digit 
visual arrays. In this task Ss had to recall all three digits. 
The results showed that deaf and autistic Ss. recalled the 
spatial order of the digits, whilst the hearing group recalled 
the temporal order. As measured by number of errors neither 
strategy was more efficient than the other. A recognition task 
was used to test the hypothesis that recall forced the 
adoption of a particular strategy. These results followed the 
same pattern as for the recall task. 
These data apparently contradict the findings of the 1971 
study, which, given the modality of input, would have predicted 
all groups to organise the materially spatially. However, taken 
together, they suggest a possible interaction of modality of 
input and task requirements (a & c" above). in the 1971 study 
the Ss had to report only one item i. e. the middle digit, 
whereas in the 1973 study all three items had to be retained. 
The te. rm middle is relative and induces a set to look for a 
specific item. Tn the visual condition it is not unreasonable to 
expect that S's would fixate on the middle of the three display 
windows and wait for a digit to appear. Similarly for the 
auditory condition an efficient strategy would be to wait for 
the second digit and retain only that. The s* ighted controls 
could have waited for the digit presented in the spatially 
central loudspeaker. That they obviously did not suggests that 
'middle' in an auditory context refers to a position in a 
temporal sequence rather than a position in space. Thus a 
combination of the task requirements and modality of 
presentation interact to determine the encoding strategy 
adopted. 
The retention of three items in a given order is more demanding 
than retention of a single item and therefore it can be 
assumed that Ss will adopt the most efficient strategy 
irrespective of modality of presentation. In terms of numbers 
of errors temporal and spatial coding were equally efficient in 
the above study. If the two strategies are equally efficient 
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why are the two types of organisation not found equally 
amongst all the groups? The autistic children were included 
because of their "marked auditory unresponsiveness and verbal 
disability" (p336). As their results were statistically identical 
to the deaf group auditory experience and/or oral language 
experience are implicated. 
Whilst the deaf may show a preference for spatial coding in 
certain tasks, it is not to say that they cannot deal with 
temporal information or temporal processing. Whilst sign 
language may be described as a spatial language it is also true 
that signs follow one another in temporal sequence. Poizner 
and Tallal (1987) used deaf adult signers as Ss in four 
experiments, two concerned with the sensory processing of 
rapidly varying temporal information and two with memory for 
the temporal order of rapidly varying nonlinguistic stimuli. 
They found no differenc es between deaf and hearing Ss on any 
of the four measures and conclude; 
...... that deaf signers have no deficit in temporal 
processing, when temporal processing and processing 
English are not confounded" (p60). 
Kyle (1983) showed deaf native signers, hearing bilinguals and 
hearing non sýgners a silent movie. The Ss task was to recall 
the story in either sign or English. The story was recalled 
immediately after presentation and again after a delay of one 
hour. The deaf and hearing Ss recalled the events to the same 
extent but an analysis of the recall of the order of events 
showed that the deaf recalled fewer events out of order than 
did the hearing and that the delay in recall increased this 
dif f erence. Of particular interest are the results of the 
bilinguals. These fell midway between those of the deaf and 
hearing. This suggests that there is some effect due to 
deafness and some due to the language code used. 
These data could be interpreted as suggesting a rigidity, or 
lack of flexibility in dealing with temporal order in the deaf. 
The fact that the hearing bilinguals fell midway between deaf 
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signers and hearing speakers indicates that the grammar of sign 
does not contain those structures which allow reference to 
past and future out of temporal context. However the greater 
tendency by the deaf to recall the events as seen implies some 
difference in the way the story is coded. 
Rational for Present Study 
The particular subset of memory studies considered here are 
especially concerned with spatial and temporal processing as 
evidenced by memory tasks. The evidence reviewed seems to 
suggest that- dealing with sequences per se is not problematic 
for the deaf (e. g O'Connor & Hermelin, 1972; 1973), nor the 
processing of temporal information per se, (e. g. Poizner 
Tallal, 1987). When the material and task requirements allow 
visual and/or spatial coding to be employed and order 
information is to be preserved then the deaf are as efficient 
as the hearing (O'Conner & Hermalin, (1975). There is evidence 
that the number of items of which can be held in STM using 
visual based codes and sign based codes is lower, by one item, 
than the number that can be held using a speech based code. 
The deaf have difficulty where temporal order is not 
observabley related to spatial order or oral linguistic 
processing is a task requirement. 
The memory studies reviewed typify the methodology of 
comparing deaf and hearing on the basis of what the hearing 
can do and what oral language enables,. and focusing on the 
inferior performances of the deaf. Myklebust's (1964) review 
notes three areas of memory where the deaf show superior 
performance; memory for design, movement and tactual memory. 
For memory for object location deaf and hearing performances 
are equivalent. In line with the arguments advanced in Chapter 
4 what would a memory task look like if it were devised on the 
basis of what the deaf can do and how would the hearing fare 
if they are compared to the deaf on these terms?. The present 
study uses a task designed to allow just such a question to be 
asked. 
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The work reviewed indicates that the deaf prefer to use a 
visuo-spatial coding strategy. Ellenberger & Steyaert (1978) 
note the relationship between sign language and spatial skills, 
suggesting; 
"What appears to be simple gesturing may actually 
require a fairly advanced mastery of cognitive skills 
involving spatial relationships. " (p 268). 
A sign can be construed as a pattern in three dimensional 
space. Signs are not only static patterns but can also include 
movement. The place in space where a sign is made is not 
arbitrary, location being a necessary part of the sign. In 
discourse movement and location play grammatical roles. These 
aspects of signing can be seen to be related to those aspects 
of memory for which the deaf show enhanced or equivalent 
performance. In the past these have been examined individually. 
Effective use of sign requires that these individual aspects of 
memory be used together. The deaf child who has experience of 
sign from an early age might be expected to show well 
developed memory skills for these aspects of memory acýing 
together, compared to a hearing child who has not. To 
demonstrate this would require a task which involved patterns 
and movement and location. So as not to confound memory 
processing with language processing, the task would need to be 
as alinguistic as possible. A further linguistically derived 
requirement is that the task should include more than one 
dimension. In the past order information recall studies with 
the deaf have used a linear or one dimensional array. Sign 
language is three-dimensional, whereas oral language is 
linearly constrained in time (Winograd, 1977). 
The task used here is based on one reported by Gazzaniga 
(1988) to test memory in Ss with a callosul section. In that 
study patterns of dots were displayed in a two dimensional 4x 
4 matrix. Recall was immediate and demonstrated by pointing to 
the locations where the dots had appeared- A similar task was 
used by Ichikawa (1982) to examine visual memory span in adults. 
Again recall was immediate, and demonstrated by marking the 
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position of the dots in a blank grid. He reported that visual 
memory span measured by this test has a very low correlation 
(r=. 23) with verbal spans measured by digit sequences. The 
visual memory span of adults was defined by Ichikawa as the 
number of dots in a pattern in a5x5 or 6x6 matrix which 
could be perfectly recalled 509. ' of the time. This gives a span 
of approximately five. 
The adult data for these dot-in-matrix tasks indicates that the 
task is not an easy one. Pilot studies with hearing children 
aged 9 to 11 years showed that a3x3 matrix containing 3 dot 
patterns produced a ceiling effect but 4 dot patterns did not. 
Therefore, it was considered that these tasks would be a 
difficullt but practical task to use with preschoolers. In the 
present study an additional task has been included. In this 
task the pattern is formed by a single dot appearing in a 
sequence of locations in the grid, hence the pattern is an 
abstract . ion of the stimulus. Piloting with hearing children and 
adults indicated that this was a difficult task. In *view of this 
the tasks were piloted with one deaf child aged 57 months, wit .h 
a deaf adult acting as experimenter. This confirmed that 
although the tasks were difficult they were within the child's 
capabilities. 
Aims 
The aim of the study is to examine the effects of differential 
hearing and linguistic status on memory for static and 
sequential 2-dimensional patterns and to determine the coding 
strategies used by deaf and hearing subjects for these tasks. 
METHOD 
Subjects & Experimenters 
Four profoundly deaf children ages 48 to 56 months (mean age 
51-75 months) attending the departmental playgroup for the deaf 
and six hearing children ages 47 to 57 months (mean 51.5 months) 
attending an L. E. A. nursery school acted as subjects. Hearing 
children were tested by the author; deaf children were tested 
216 
by a profoundly deaf adult, using BSL. for communication. 
Materials & Apparatus 
Static and moving patterns were generated using a B. B. C. model 
B computer, with double disk drive, programmed by the author. 
Details of the programmes are in appendix 111. Responses were 
made on an A. B. Electronics p1c. concept keyboard (A4 size), 
overlaid with a replica of the matrix which appeared on the 
screen, and recorded on disk by the programme. The programme 
recorded the type of pattern, which square had been pressed, 
and in what order. 
Patterns were generated in a3x3 matrix and contained 3 or 4 
discs. Patterns could be static i. e. all discs appearing 
simultaneously, or moving, i. e. one disc occupying consecutive 
positions in the matrix. Static patterns remained on the 
screen for the same number of seconds as there were discs in 
the pattern (i. e. 3 secs for 3-disc patterns; 4 secs for 4-disc 
patterns). For moving patterns the disc remained in each 
position for 1 second, hence, am oving pattern was displayed 
for the same length of time in total as the corresponding 
static pattern. For both types of pattern the child's response 
was a sequentiallý constructed static pattern i. e. for each 
square pressed a disc appeared in the corresponding square on 
the screen and remained there until all the responses had been 
made. The number of responses was limited by the programme to 
the number of discs in the pattern. 
Design 
A2 (hearing status) x2 (pattern type) x2 (number of pattern 
elements) factorial design was used, with repeated measures on 
the factors of pattern type and pattern elements. 10 different 
patterns were generated for each number of elements. 5 were 
presented as static and 5 as moving patterns, hence static and 
moving patterns were different. order of presentation of 
1. Program listings and/or disk are available from the author. 
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patterns was counterbalanced across subjects. The same order 
of testing static, moving, 3-disc, 4-disc patterns was used for 
each child. 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually, in their normal playrooms. 
The children were not taken to a separate room for testing at 
the request of parents. The child was asked if s/he would like 
to play a game on the computer. The practice programme was 
loaded and the experimenter pointed out the correspondence 
between the matrix on the screen and the matrix on the concept 
keyboard. It was explained to the child that the computer 
would produce a pattern and they had to make it reappear by 
pressing the correct squares on the their keyboard. No 
specific instructions were given concerning the order in whi ch 
the pattern elements were to be recalled leaving the child free 
to adopt their preferred strategy. Practice trials with both 
static and moving patterns were continued until the 
experimenter felt confident that the child understood the task 
requirements. The main programme was loaded and the child was 
given 5 trials of each pattern type for each number of 
elements (20 trials in all). After each block of 5 trials the 
child was told that pattern type would change and what that 
change would be. Recall was immediate for all trials. The 
child was praised after the completion of each trial, but no 
feedback was given regarding the correctness of the child's 
attempt to reproduce the pattern. 
RESULTS 
Scoring Method 
The raw data was printed out from the data collection files and 
scored. For static patterns a score of 1 was given for each 
element which appeared in the correct position in the matrix. 
For moving patterns each element was scored on two variables; 
spatial and temporal. A score of 1 was given for each element 
in the correct spatial position (S), and a score of 1 given for 
each correct position in the correct temporal order (T). 
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Therefore, the maximum possible score for each child is number 
of elements x number of trials. There are two sets of scores 
for moving patterns. The data are summarised in table 11.1. 
Pattern type 
The Static scores are directly comparable with the moving 
spatial scores. These data show that for the static condition 
more elements of 3-disc patterns were correctly recalled than 
elements of 4-disc patterns. A Wilcoxon test shows that this 
difference is significant for the hearing group (T=O; N=6; p<. 05 
tt) but not for the deaf group. This pattern of results is 
repeated in the moving condition, the hearing group recalling 
significantly fewer elements of the 4-disc moving patterns (T=l; 
N=6; p<. 05 tt). 
Static Hoving 
3-disc 4-disc 3-disc 4-disc 
-STT deaf 68.3 . 58.75 
52.0 19.96 47.9 9.58 
hearing 76.66 67.5 56.63 32.18 27.08 3.75 
Table 11.1 Mean Percentage of Pattern Elements Correct for each 
Condition. 
Comparing between groups the data show that the deaf recall 
fewer elements of 3- and 4-disc static patterns than the 
hearing. However, this difference is not significant for either 
condition. For Moving patterns there is little difference 
between the groups for the 3-disc condition, but for the 4-disc 
patterns, the most difficult task, the deaf recall nearly twice 
as many elements as the hearing. A Mann-Whitney U test shows 
this difference to be significant at the 1% level of confidence 
(U=O; p<. 01). The differences between the spatial and temporal 
scores for both conditions for both groups indicate that coding 
is predominantly spatial. The next section examines this 
further. 
Spatial v Temporal Coding 
The moving patterns may' be coded as a pattern i. e. spatially, 
as a sequence i. e. temporally or by using some combination of 
these. To assess the relative contributions of temporal and 
219 
spatial coding in serially presented patterns three serial 
position curves were constructed. Temporal recall curve is the 
number of times a position was recalled in the correct temporal 
order. The Mixed recall curve is the number of times a 
position was correctly recalled irrespective of temporal order. 
The Spatial recall curve is the number of times a position is 
correctly recalled, but not in the correct temporal order. The 
data are summarised in tables 11.2 and 1.1.3 and shown 
graphically in figure 11.1 
serial position 
2 3 
H D H D HD 
temporal recall 40.5 25.0 31.2 20.0 22.8 15.0 
mixed recall 60.5 50.0 60.5 40.0 49.4 60 
spatial recall 20.00 25.0 26.8 20.0 26.6 45.0 
Table 11.2 Mean Percent of Elements Recalled for each Serial 
Position: 3-disc Patterns 
serial position 
2 3 
H D H D H D H D 
temporal recall 13.3 23.33 13ý3 10.00 3.3 0.00 13.3- 5.0 
mixed recall 43.3 46.66 53.3 30.0 60.00 S8.33 63.3 56.65 
spatial recall 30.00 23.33 40.00 20.00 56.6 58.33 50.0 51.65 
Table 11.3 Mean Percent of Elements Recalled for each Serial 
Position: 4-disc Patterns 
The mixed recall curve indicates the overall success in 
recalling the pattern. The spatial and temporal curves indicate 
the relative contribution of these strategies to overall 
success. 
The classic serial position curve is U shaped. This can be 
seen in the mixed curve for the deaf 3-disc patterns and in 
the temporal curves of the 4-disc patterns for both groups. A 
number of findings (e. g. Healy 1975) have suggested that serial 
position curves for visually presented material or for tasks 
requiring retention of spatial order, are bow shaped i. e. an 
inverted, flattened U. This type of curve can be seen for the 
mixed and spatial curves of the hearing 3-disc patterns and the 
deaf and hearing 4-disc patterns. 
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Figure 11.1 Serial Position Curves for 3- and 4-disk Moving 
Patterns 
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Hearing Children 
For the 3-disc patterns temporal recall is the major 
contributory factor for the first serial position, in that if 
this element is correctly recalled it is twice as likely to be 
recalled in the correct temporal order than in some other 
temporal position. In the second and third serial positions 
spatial and temporal recall contribute about equally. Elements 
in the third serial position are recalled less well overall (i. e. 
depressed recency). 
For the 4-disc patterns spatial recall is the major 
contributory factor for all serial positions. This seems to 
indicate a change in coding strategy from that used in the 
3-disc patterns. Here spatial recall accounts for 80% of the 
mixed recall curve compared to c44% of the 3-disc mixed recall 
curve. 
Deaf Children 
For the 3-disc patterns spatial and temporal recall contribute 
equally to overall success for the first two serial positions. 
Primacy on the spatial curve is suppressed. For the third 
serial position the spatial curve shows a marked recency 
effect, with the temporal curve showing a corresponding 
suppression of recency- The overall effect is a classic U 
shaped serial position curve, with spatial-temporal recall 
accounting for primacy and spatial recall for recency. 
For the 4-disc patterns again spatial and temporal recall 
contribute equally to success for the first two serial 
positions. Temporal coding shows a primacy effect with 
depressed primacy on the spatial curve. For the third serial 
position spatial recall accounts for all the data, and most for 
the fourth serial position. These data tend to suggest that 
the children initially adopted a spa tial- temporal strategy, 
changing to a spatial strategy after the second serial position. 
The net effect is to produce a bow shaped mixed curve, as has 
been reported previously for spatial memory tasks. The data 
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do not suggest such a clear change in strategy for the deaf 
children as was the case with the hearing children. Rather, the 
data suggest an extension of that used for the 3-disc 
patterns. 
Comparison Deaf & Hearing 
Two features of the data clearly differentiate the deaf and 
hearing. The first is the shape of the shape of the mixed 
recall curve for 3-disc patterns, this being in opposite 
directions for the two groups. This is in part due to the 
second feature, which is the suppressed recency of the spatial 
curve of the hearing compared to that of the deaf. This 
spatial recency effect is also apparent in the 4-disc curve of 
the deaf. These data for the 'deaf group are in line with 
findings by Dodd et al (1983) who found enhanced recency 
effects for both deaf and hearing Ss for moving manual signs, 
comp ared to static signs. 
Previous studies predict that where there is a choice between 
temporal or spatial strategies, as in this study, hearing S's 
will opt for a temporal strategy and deaf S's a spatial 
strategy. These data do not support such a clear cut 
distinction, however, Healy (1975,1977) has suggested that under 
certain conditions hearing Ss use a spatial-temporal code, of 
an unspecified nature. The data here are indicative of such a 
code, with temporal aspects playing a greater role in the 
coding of the deaf than has previously been allowed. 
Error Analysis 
The stimuli used here differ from those normally used to 
investigate coding in short term memory in that they consist of 
a 2-dimensional array rather than a linear array. With a 
linear array both spatial and temporal coding require only 
unidimensional representation i. e. need one piece of information 
to uniquely identify its position, and that would be identical to 
its temporal or spatial position. If 2-dimensional stimuli are 
coded using either a verbal, or a more abstract propositional 
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type code, each element of the pattern must have two pieces of 
information attached to it for accurate recall of the pattern. 
Verbal coding would require something like "top left" or "middle 
right" to uniquely identify an element position- A more 
abstract (e. g. propositional) code would require equivalent 
information in say terms of cartesian co-ordinates. This 
information is always identical with an elements spatial 
position, but never with its temporal position. Information 
regarding temporal position would require additional coding 
resulting in three pieces of information for each element. 
Visual 'coding of a 2-dimensional array could reduce the amount 
of information by coding only the relations between elements of 
the pattern, i. e. only the overall shape-is retained, information 
locating the elements in unique positions being lost. If this is 
this case then an error analysis would be expected to show 
evidence of correct pattern shapes, but wrongly located in the 
matrix. This same analysis would also indicate the extent to 
which the moving patterns are coded as a pattern rather than a 
sequence of positions. 
Table 11.4 summarises the number of patterns which were 
recalled correctly. Maximum possible score for each pcittern 
type is ten. For moving patterns only position of elements are 
scored. 
Pattern Type 
Static moving All 
Heazing 50 16.67 33.33 
Deaf 20 10.52 15.38 
Table 11.4 Percentage of Patterns Correctly Recalled. 
The data show that the hearing were more successful than the 
deaf, in recalling complete static and moving patterns. The 
data confirm that even the static task was not an easy one 
for the children. No child achieved a maximum score, the range 
(deaf and hearing) being 0 to 9. The deaf's low score for 
moving patterns stands in contrast to their relatively enhanced 
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performance when only pattern elements are considered. The 
error analysis may indicate possible reasons for this. 
The raw data were transcribed into 3x3 matrices and the 
resultant patterns compared with those generated by the 
computer. Errors were classified according to the following 
scheme: - 
1. orientation (0) The pattern shape is correct but is 
reoriented within the grid. This could be by rotation through 
90,180, or 270 degrees; a mirror image or an inversion 
2 Displacement of Whole Pattern (D) - the overall shape and 
orientation of the pattern are correct, but the pattern is 
displaced in the grid. 
3 Displacement of Part of Pat tern (DP)- The orientation of the 
pattern is correct but one element of the pattern is displaced 
by one square. 
5. Apparent Motion (moving patterns only) (A) - The responses of 
the child include those squares through which the moving disc 
apparently passed. (NB as the number of possible responses the 
child could make was limited to the number of discs in the 
pattern a child following this strategy could never complete a 
pattern) 
6. Sequencing (moving patterns only) (S) - pattern elements were 
correctly located but.. the child's responses were not in the 
same temporal order as the stimuli. 
7. other (0t) - errors which could not be classified reliabley in 
the above categories. 
Table 11.5 gives the percentage of errors in each category for 
the four types of pattern. The data are shown graphically in 
figure 11.2 
In the 3-disc static condition the majority of classifiable 
errors are Partial Displacement for both groups. This suggests 
that the coding took the form of relations between elements 
e. g. two together and one underneath. This would give aI in 3 
chance of the underneath element being located correctly. 
There are few errors in the displacement category, none for 
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Figure 11.2 Percentage of Patterns in Each Error Category for 
Each Condition, for Each Group. 
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the deaf and 9.1% for the hearing. This suggests that some 
information regarding exact location is coded. Taken together 
with the serial position data it could be suggested that those 
elements occupying the first serial position are coded in full 
and hence act as an 'anchor' for the rest of the pattern, which 
is then coded as relations. The deaf group have by far the 
highest percentage of errors which are not classifiable. As 
this category (0t) includes patterns which are wrong, this again 
suggests that the deaf perform less well than the hearing on 
this task. 
3-disc patterns 
static moving 
0D DP Ot 
I 
0ý D DP As Ot 
D: af 
1 
15.4 0,46.1 36.5 
1 '10.0 1.5.0 15.0 0 20.0 40.0 
H ar 18.2 9.1 63.6 9.1 11.53 0 23.1 11.5 11.5 42.3 
A-disc patterns 
Deaf 12.50 31.2 2S. 0 31.2 0 16.6 22.2 00 61.1 
Reaz 
1 
16.6 5.5 61.1 16.6 3.4 10.3 20.7 6.9 6.9 51.7 
Table 11.5 Percentage of Errors in each Category 
For the 3-disc moving patterns, the percentage of errors which 
are not classifiable differs little between the two groups. Of 
the classifiable errors Partial Displacement again accounts for 
the highest percentage of the hearing groups errors, whereas 
Displacement and Partial Displacement are equally frequent for 
the deaf group. There are no errors in the Apparent Motion 
category for the deaf group and relatively few for the hearing 
group, suggesting that the pattern is perceived and coded as a 
whole. The deaf group have the highest percentage of 
sequencing errors, which further strengthens the view that the 
deaf attend more to the temporal characteristics of a stimulus 
than is indicated by previous work. 
For the 4-disk patterns, Partial Displacement accounts for the 
largest percentage of classifiable errors for the hearing group 
and Displacement for the deaf group. The deaf have the 
highest percentage of unclassifiable errors, although the 
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difference between the deaf and hearing groups is not so great 
as was the case for the 3-disc static patterns. 
The 4-disc moving patterns have the highest percentage of 
unclassifiable errors of all conditions, for both groups, 
reflecting the difficulty of this task for this age group. Also 
this condition shows least between groups difference in the 
distribution of classifiable errors, the majority being in the 
Displacement and Partial Displacement categories. 
Considering errors overall, inspeetiori! -shows: that Ahe deaf have 
the, highest -, percentage: - of 'unclassifiable errors, - 
the 
diff erence _'occutrinq 
for the- easier. static patterns. L For-- the 
static patterns the hearing group.. are ýmore likely-, to-. make, 
errors. of -Partial ý 
Displacement -_zhd the: -deaf errors--of 
Displacement. -., t, For..,. the.; moving patterns the-'deaf are more:. likely 
to-. make- 7 errors. of Displacement! ýthah the. hearing-. but -have ., equall 
numbers, of, -PartiaL Displacement errors. 
DISCUSSION 
Summary of Results 
In terms of number of elements correctly recalled, the hearing 
recall significantly more elements from 3-disc than from 4-disk 
patterns, and significantly more elements from Static than 
Moving Patterns. For the deaf there are no significant 
differences in the recall of elements for any condition. 
Between groups there is no significant difference in the recall 
of 3- or 4-disc Static Patterns. For Moving patterns, there is 
no significant difference between the groups for 3-disc 
patterns, but for 4-disc patterns the deaf recall significantly 
more elements. These results are not reflected in the in the 
numbers of complete patterns correctly recalled by the groups. 
The hearing recall over twice as many complete Static patterns 
as the deaf. For Moving patterns, there is little difference 
between the groups. 
The element data for Moving patterns was used to construct 
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serial position curves, to examine the influence of spatial and 
temporal strategies on recall. For 3-disc patterns the overall 
(mixed) recall curves of the two groups were in opposite 
directions; the deaf group having a typical V shaped SPC, 
usually associated with temporal recall. By contrast, the 
curve of the hearing group was typical of those reported for 
spatial order recall curves, i. e. a flat bow shape. For the 
deaf group, spatial and temporal coding contributed equally to 
recall of the first two serial positions, with a marked spatial 
recency for the third serial position. For the hearing group, 
temporal primacy, contributed most to the recall of the first 
serial position, with spatial and temporal coding contributing 
equally to the recall of the second and third serial positions. 
For 4-disc patterns the curves of the two groups were more 
similar, both being characteristic of spatial order recall 
curves. However, some differences were apparent. For the 
deaf group, spatial and temporal coding contribute equally to 
the recall of the first serial position. For the third and 
fourth serial positions, spatial recall accounts for nearly all 
the data. For the hearing group, spatial recall is predominant 
for all positions. The data indicate that the deaf pay more 
attention to temporal aspeýcts of stimuli, than has been 
suggested previously. 
Interpretation of Results 
It was suggested that experience of BSL as a primary means of 
communication, along with a greater reliance on vision, 
necessitated by deafness, might give the deaf children an 
advantage in these tasks, over their hearing peers. In general, 
this does not appear to have been the case, with the deaf 
showing a poorer performance than the hearing according to a 
number of measures, and an equivalent performance on others. 
The exception to this, was in the case of the 4-disc moving 
patterns, the most difficult task given to the children, where, 
in terms of number of elements correctly recalled, the 
performance of the deaf was superior to that of the hearing. 
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However, within groups the deaf were more consistent across 
the four conditions. In other words, the deaf tended to 
maintain a level of performance, whilst the performance of the 
hearing group, declined relatively. This is indicated most 
clearly, by the comparison of number of complete Static and 
Moving Patterns recalled. 
The relative difficulty of the task, is some justification for 
using elements recalled as an index of success. Had recall of 
complete patterns on the easier tasks been equivalent between 
the two groups, then the difference in performance on the 
4-disc Moving patterns could be taken to support the 
hypothesis with some confidence. However, with the deaf 
scoring at only half the level of the hearing on the easier 
Static task, the significance of the element data for the 
4-disc Moving patterns must be viewed with some caution, 
unless some viable reason can be advanced to account for the 
reduced-performance of the deaf on the easier task. 
Visual 'Attention 
In general, sensory systems respond maximally to change; 
changes in intensity of a stimulus serving to orient attention 
towards the stimulus. Habituation occurs when stimulus 
intensity remains invariant and there are no other factors 
causing attention to be directed towards it. Essentially, 
habituation serves to free attention. In the hearing person 
both sight and hearing perform the function of environmental 
monitoring, sounds often serving to orient sight (e. g. a noise 
behind), or one functioning as sentinel while attention is 
concentrated on the other,. In the absence of hearing, the 
deaf must rely almost exclusively on vision for environmental 
monitoring. When visual attention is occupied, say in the 
performance of a task or during communication, the deaf person 
is essentially cut off from his/her environment and any changes 
which may occur in it. Under certain conditions some 
information is available to them, from vibration etc, but for 
the most part they are dependant on vision for information. 
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In view of this, it would not be unreasonable to expect the 
deaf to develop strategies for maximising the amount of 
information they can collect from the environment. 
Observations in the nursery have suggested that peripheral 
vision is enhanced, particularly in the adults, and the children 
scan the environment frequently, and are highly distractable by 
visual stimuli, especially movement. 
It was stated earlier that habituation serves to free 
attention. -If the demands on the sensory system are high, and 
there is no other system which can effectively reduce the load 
by sharing functions, then an increased rate of habituation, 
would seem to be both logically plausible and ecologically valid. 
In the case of the deaf this would lead to a rapid habituation 
to visual stimuli, unless there is some other factor to cause 
attention to remain directed toward it. There is some evidence 
to support. this view in Chapter 8, where an age related 
decrease in time spent watching a non-task related *event was 
reported. 
The stimuli used in the tasks reported here were of two kinds; 
Static and Moving. It could be argued that attentional demands 
of the two types of stimuli differed, with Moving patterns being 
more demanding of attention than Static patterns. The Static 
patterns remained on the screen for three or four seconds, 
depending on the number of discs in the pattern. If static 
patterns are indeed less attentionally demanding, this would 
result in rapid habituation, leaving an amount of time in which 
attention could be redirected, leading to possible interference. 
The effect of this would be to reduce recall. The increased 
attentional demands of the Moving patterns would not result in 
habituation, and hence recall would not be impaired. Taken 
together this would lead to the pattern of results observed 
here. 
Observations of the children during the task, are in line with 
this argument. The deaf children looked away from the screen 
231 
very quickly after presentation of a static pattern, and were 
impatient to begin responding. Whil e waiting for the response 
screen to appear, they would look around the room and comment 
to E on the activities of the other children. Very often their 
attention would have to be redirected to the response screen, 
once it appeared. 
Whilst this explanation is admittedly post hoc, it does give 
rise to a testable hypothesis; "Increasing the attentional 
demands of the static pattern stimuli, will lead to increased 
recall in the deaf. " This could be tested by either reducing 
the amount of time the pattern remains on the screen and 
thereby reduce the possibility of interference, or increase the 
attentional demands of the pattern itself, by for example, 
causing the discs to flash or change colour. The program' is 
easily modifiable in both these respects (see appendix 11). 
Other Explanations. 
MacDougal (1979) suggested that the deaf may be impaired with, 
respect to visual memory, or less efficient. The data 
reported here could be taken as supporting that position. In 
particular, the high proportion of unclassifiable errors and the 
low number of correctly recalled complete Static patternp '. 
With 
respect to the unclassifiable errors, the only counter argument 
is that for the more difficult Moving patterns the two groups 
did not differ. 
Any subject can only demonstrate what they have remembered by 
giving a response. The responses here, were made on a concept 
keyboard, overlaid with a replica of the matrix which appeared 
on the screen. To make a response, the child had to look at 
the keyboard and determine which square corresponded to the 
one on the screen s/he wanted the disc to appear in. Hence, 
the very act of responding was a visual task, which might 
itself, result in impaired recall. 
This argument would apply equally to the hearing, assuming that 
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the task was entirely visual, i. e. there was no verbal aspect. 
However, it was noted in the last chapter that Sign appeared 
efficient at coding the kind of information necessary to solve 
the TOH. Again the signed solution to the moving condition of 
this task, is identical to the sequence of moves necessary to 
effect the solution on the keyboard. In other words, Sign can 
give an effective verbal coding, as opposed to a visual coding, 
for this task, which oral language cannot, thereby reducing the 
possibility of interference. Coding the pattern as a Sign 
sequence, would also preserve temporal order, in the sequential 
order of the signs. The effect of Sign coding would give the 
pattern of results observed here. 
One further point with regard to responses. It was noticed 
that some of the children would point*to the screen, at the 
squares where the discs had been. These responses tended to 
be more accurate than the subsequent responses on the concept 
keyboard. The obvious implication here is that a different 
mode of response would give. a different result. The program is 
easily modifiable to allow a touch sensitive screen to be used 
for responding, and hence, test this suggestion (see appendix 
11). 
Spatial v Temporal Coding 
Given the child's task was to reproduce the pattern, and that 
recreating the pattern in the order in which it was presented 
was not specifically asked for, the child was free to adopt 
either a spatial or a temporal strategy. Extant data predicts 
that the deaf child would choose a spatial rather than a 
temporal strategy and vice versa for the hearing child. The 
data reported here do not support such a clear cut distinction. 
However, Healy (1975; 1977) presents data which suggests where 
verbal coding is not possible, hearing Ss use a spa tial- temporal 
code. The nature of such a code remains unspecified, as does 
its status as either derivative of or independent of other 
memory codes/strategies. 
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The data treatment here implies a derivative code, but it is 
not intended to exclude the possibility of a unique. code. The 
interesting fact to emerge from this analysis is the greater 
use, by the deaf, of temporal aspects of the stimuli, than one 
might expect from previous studies. The data suggest that the 
deaf make greater use of an integrated spa tial- temporal code, 
than do the hearing, who appear to maintain more of a 
distinction between spatial and temporal aspects of the stimuli. 
This distinction of course is just that which applies between 
the two language codes. In Chapter 4, the example of Sign 
required the dimensions of both space and time to indicate the 
properties of the utterance. 
Methodological Comments 
The SPC'data is indicative that the mnemonic strategies used 
by the two groups differ, in a way which can be related to 
their differing language experience. These differing processes 
give rise to quantitative outcomes which show both similarities 
and differences between the groups. The small number of 
subjects makes any of the arguments here somewhat speculative. 
However, there is a sufficient consistency of individual data 
within groups to warrant a larger scale study, incorporating 
the modifications suggested above. 
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CHAPTER 12: Conclusions 
Introduction 
The aim of this project was to demonstrat'e the theoretical and 
practical utility of the conceptual and methodological approach 
outlined in Chapters 1 to 4. To demonstrate the extent to 
which this aim has been achieved, this chapter examines the 
theoretical and practical implications of the reported data. 
Control of Attention - Data 
Control of attention is control of visual attention for the 
deaf child. The vast majority of information 'must be received 
visually, be it linguistic or otherwise. To reduce information 
overload, the deaf develop strategies which increase the 
efficiency of information collection from the environment. As 
the child becomes older, the amount of time spent watching an 
environmental distractor decreases (Chapter 8. )- 
A corollary of this is that less complex visual stimuli are 
undemanding on the deaf child's attention (Chapter 11). 
Therefore, in visually undemanding environments deaf children 
show sustained attention for on going activity, i. e. they are 
not so distracted by environmental stimuli (Chapter 7). 
Deaf adults serve to reduce dis tractability, or increase 
attention in the deaf child in a number of ways. The changes 
they effected in the playroom were to reduce the visual 
complexity (Chapter 7). They also appear to serve as an 
external prompt, by redirecting the child's attention to the on 
going activity after they had been distracted, a function which 
the child can perform him/herself in some circumstances, e. g. 
when playing by the mirror (Chapter 8). Here it appears that 
the mirror gives a visual prompt to attention, by allowing the 
child to view both the environmental distractor and him/herself 
at the same time. 
Deaf children divide their attention between social and non 
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social stimuli, 2/3 to social stimuli and 1/3 to non social 
stimuli, for problem solving situations at least. This 
distribution is invariant with respect to the hearing status of 
the experimenter. However, the presence of a deaf 
experimenter results in an improvement in problem solving 
performance by the deaf child (Chapters 5& 9). 
Control of Attention - Implications 
In Chapter 3 it was noted that deaf children of deaf parents 
evidenced better performances on a range of scholastic and 
other tests. The data reported here (Chapters 5& 9) indicate 
that this advantage can also be conferred on deaf children by 
deaf adults other than parents. It will also be recalled that 
in the presence of the deaf" experimenter, the 'impulsive 
behaviour' of the children, decreased. To what extent are 
previous reports of 'more impulsive' the observed consequence 
of the deaf child's effort to understand a non-contingent 
environment? 
Mogford et al (1980) suggested that deaf parents may be more 
sensitive to the ebb and flow of their deaf child's attention 
than a hearing parent. The Markov model data indicates, but by 
no means proves, that the deaf child is consistent in his/her 
distribution of attention to aspects of the environment. 
If this is the case then, what the deaf adult brings to an 
interaction is a knowledge of that distribution, perhaps because 
the deaf adult shares it? A related point is the observation 
by Vernon (1967) that more experienced researchers are less 
likely to find differences between deaf and hearing in 
scores. It could be that as researchers become more 
experienced at working with the deaf they come to share this 
aspect of the deaf world. This is an obvious candidate for 
further work. Educationally, the implications are far reaching. 
They point to a need for the active participation of deaf 
adults in the educational process, both for the deaf child and 
hearing teachers of the deaf (see also Elf 1988/9). 
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The attentional demands of stimuli do not appear to have been 
considered in previous work. one of the most widely quoted 
findings in deafness research is that by Furth (1961), that deaf 
children have difficulty in mastering the concept of 'opposite'. 
To what extent does this finding reflect the fact the stimuli 
used in this study were extremely simple? In two studies 
reported here (Chapters 10 & 11) more complex stimuli have shown 
a relatively enhanced performance by the deaf. It is also the 
case that heavy reliance on the visual channel for information 
can result in overload (e. g. Draw-a-Man, Chapter 7). The 
obvious implication here is that the design of experiments and 
curricula should include a consideration of the attentional 
demands of the materials and the deaf child's ability to deal 
with them. 
The attentional demands of the environment is also a factor 
which influences the attentional control of the deaf child. 
Some experienced teachers of the deaf tell me that they pften 
arrange their classrooms so that all visual materials are 
behind the children when they are sat at'their desks. One 
teacher said "I wondered why I did that, because its not what 
we are taught. " What the observations reported here imply, is 
that we need to know much more about what level of visual 
stimulation is stimulating for the deaf child and what is over 
stimulating or distracting. It is only with this knowledge that 
teachers can design effective teaching materials for deaf 
children. 
Visuo-spatial Processing - Data 
Sign language is a visuo-spatial language, and all the tasks 
given to the children in the work reported here contained 
visuo-spatial aspects. This was a deliberate device to 
examine the relationship between Sign and cognitive functioning. 
Competence in Sign requires a mastery of spatial skills and 
deaf children actively seek to learn these 'skills (Chapter 8). A 
unique aspect of Sign is the need to treat space and spatial 
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locations as being absolute, i. e. left and right have no meaning 
in this use of spatial locations. The children show an ability 
to ignore, or otherwise deal with, the inverted laterallity of 
actual mirror images (Chapter 8) and mental representations of 
mirror image problems (Chapter 10). 
Although language was not logically necessary for the tasks 
used here, the use of Sign or sign structures/processes was 
suggested as an explanatory factor for the data of the deaf 
(Chapters 8,10 & 11). Interference has also been appealed to 
as an explanatory factor, for both inferior (Chapter 5) and 
superior performances by the deaf (Chapters 10 & 11), in the two 
latter cases as a function of Sign. 
The visuo-spatial processing ability of the deaf has been shown 
to vary as a function of attentional control (Chapters 5& 9), 
attentional demands of the stimuli (Chapter 11) and task and 
information characteristics (Chapters 10 & 11). Tasks which are 
considered difficult for'hearing subjects are not necessarily 
difficult for deaf subjects (e. g. Flat- versus Tower-ending 
problems, Chapter 10) and vice versa. The difficulty of a 
problem is related to the information processing strategies in 
which the subject is well rehearsed. 
Visuo-spatial Processing - Implications 
As with attentional control, there is a sense in which 
information processing in the deaf is visuo-spatial processing, 
even for linguistic information. If this statement is true then 
the implications extend to the whole of cognitive functioning in 
the deaf. This project has focused on the relationship 
between Sign language and thought, in problem solving and 
memory. Even within this limited domain it is necessary to 
consider the theoretical problems of representation and the 
structure of information. 
Any theory of deaf cognitive functioning has to be able to 
account for the ability of the deaf to process visuo-spatial 
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and linguistic information at the same time. Such a theory 
would have to postulate a model, in which the form of the 
representation of information is such, that it could generate 
linguistic and behavioural output which is identical. 
This last statement sounds silly, except that it is a 
description of the signed solution of the Tower-of-Hanoi and 
the movement of the cups needed to solve the problem. McNeill 
(e. g. 1985) has argued that language and gesture, in the hearing, 
share a common computational stage; a stage where action and 
language are coterminous. This is a contentious point of view, 
although the empirical evidence, including that from deaf 
populations, tends to. support this position (e. g. Sheehy, 1987). 
The data reported here, is also best explained by McNeill's 
argument, with representation being analogue, as opposed to 
imagistic or propositional (cf Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 1977). 
Analogue representation is suggested by the need to treat 
space as absolute; propositional coding (assumed in Chapter 10) 
r'equires coding specific to each modality. Imýtgistic coding 
would require the use of visual processing space, which would 
be prone to disruption during the reception of linguistic 
information. Analogue representation, logically necessary to a 
point of view such as Fodor's (1972; 1978), is non specific with 
respect to modality. Such consideration's bring into question 
the extent to which the deaf are 'concrete and perceptually 
bound' or "tied to the level of imagery" (Myklebust, 1964). 
One of the most radical implications is that the deaf offer the 
opportunity to view linguistic, cognitive and epistimological 
processes at a deep level, because their language and its 
structures is such, that the surface string more directly 
represents the underlying structures. This is related to the 
point I raised in Chapter 10. 
A related point is the efficiency of language to code 
information. Sign and oral language appear to be equally 
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efficient at coding information, providing the form of 
information is similar to the form of the language. 
Interference, in cross modality tasks is usually negative. 
However, interference can also be additive (positive). It is 
this kind of interference which gives rise to the un-scored 
notes referred to in Chapter 4. The ability of the hearing to 
deal with order information and the deaf to deal with spatial 
information can both be seen as instances of additive 
interference. This has obvious implications for what is taken 
to be the relationship between language and thought. 
In Chapter 10 (and Chapter 11 to some" extent) it was evident 
that the deaf child could generate and use sequential 
information in a spatial -context, yet in many simpler sequencing 
tasks, deaf children perform poorly. Hearing children are 
taught to sequence from early age, for example counting. For 
the hearing child, learning to use language is learning to 
translate nonlinear information into linear form (cf for example 
Winograd, 1977 or Pask, 1980). For example, a (oral) verbal 
description of a tree is a sequence of parts. A tree has a 
trunk on which there are branches. On the branches are twigs 
and on the twigs are leaves, etc. 
Now imagine miming the description of a tree. You will, in 
effect, be drawing a picture of a tree in space (cf McNeill). 
True, there will be a sequential aspect to your actions, but it 
will be a sequence in 3-dimensional space. The deaf child's 
knowledge of the world is in this form, and his/her language 
does not necessitate the same kind of sequential analysis that 
the use of oral language entails. However, his/her language 
does entail a sophisticated spatial analysis, and where tasks 
require just such an analysis we see the deaf child perform 
well. 
The ability of the deaf child to deal with mirror images 
suggests another possible explanation of the deaf child's 
perceived failure to sequence, and one which has implications 
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for the description of 'more egocentric'. Imagine a deaf child 
and a tester sat opposite one another. The child is given 
three cards depicting an orange being peeled, and asked to. 
arrange them in order. The child arranges the cards 1) peeled 
orange, 2) half peeled orange, 3) un-peeled orange. Looking at 
the cards from the child's position the sequence is wrong, and 
would be scored as such, but viewed from the testers position 
the sequence is correct. Whenever possible, the deaf 
instructors in the nursery sat at right angles or next to the 
children. 
From the foregoing, it might be expected that the deaf child 
finds activities such as drawing easy, yet paradoxically, this is 
not the case (Chapter 7). Clearly, we need to more about the 
visuo-spatial processing abilities of the deaf. Educationally, 
this has implications for the way information is presented to 
the deaf child. 
Conclusion 
I would argue that the data reported here, point to the need 
to re-examine the cognitive functioning and abilities of the 
deaf child, from a point of view which allows all their 
adaptations to emerge. The methods used here have given rise 
to observations, in line with those previously reported, (e. g 
perseverance, Chapters 5& 10), but it have also demonstrated 
that deaf children can successfully complete tasks, such as the 
Tower-of-Hanoi, which, previous conceptions of deaf functioning 
would predict they could not. 
I am aware that the brief interpretation given in this Chapter 
is only one of many possible, and reflects the assumptions, and 
beliefs which I originally set out. However, my stated aim was 
to test the utility of an approach based on these ideas. I 
suggested that the critical outcome, would be the potential of 
the data to offer a richer description of deaf cognition than 
"more concrete, more rigid, more impulsive, and more egocentric". 
My conclusion is that these four terms are inadequate to 
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summarise the cognitive abilities of the deaf children which the 
data reported here describes. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 5 
1. Drawings of Cage, Bottle and Slider Problems, used in 
Chapters 5 and 9. 
2. Timing schedule used by Chulliat & Oleron 
3. Example of transcript 
4. Raw data for distribution of visual behaviours preceding 
a tool change. 
5. Dominance matrices 
6. Transitional probability matrices 
7. Data for Markov Model proofs 
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CRGE PROBLEM 
BOTTLE ' PROELEM 
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Time Schedule for Lure Retrieval Problems from Chulliat L 
Oleron (1955) 
Cage Problem 
1. Si 1'6nfant echoue, faute d'utiliser un baton, aprýs trois 
minutes environ, il lui pre-sente la petite baguette. 
2. S. i Penfant ne parvient pas ý r6soudre convenablemnt le 
probleme, il montre avec insistance l'ouverture. 
Bottle Problem 
Dans un premiere temps, Pexperimentateur observe le 
comportment spontan& du sujet aprZis administration de la 
consigne (trois minutes). 
2 En cas d'inaction, il montre les fils metalliques et en 
place un devant le bocal. 
3. En cas dinaction ou d'6chec, aprýs deux minutes, il plie 
plusieurs fois un fil par le milieu pour mettre sa 
mall6abilit6 en evidence. - 
4. Si le sujet echoue encore, apres deux minutes, il met 
sa disposition deux instruments qu'il fabrique sous ses 
yeux: un chrochet frop grand et inefficace et un crochet 
adapte au diam6tre du bocal; il y joint un fil droit et 
invite Penfant a utiliser l'instrument qu'il juge convenable. 
Slider 
1. AprZis trois"minutes, si 1'enfant reste inactif ou si son 
action est 6trang6re au probleme, 1'experimentatuer repZte 
la consigne. 
2. S'il ny pas de progres aprZs deux minutes, il presente 
la r6gle de 12 centimetres (Premiere suggestion) 
3. Deux minutes plus tard, la rZgle est placee sur le c6t6 
paralMement 'ýi la lacune pour former un suggestion optique 
( Deuxsieme suggestion) 
4. Enfin, si le sujet resiste encore ýi toutes ces 
suggestions, la riigle est placee dans -la lacune entre A 
(slider) et B (sweet shelf). 
Chulliat & Oleron (1955) pages 289,291 & 295. 
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IS looks in box picks up grey rod and looks at E 
2 replaces grey rod and looks in box 
3S picks up wire and looks at E 
4E signs try 
5S inserts wire in cage and touches sweet box. 
6 looks at E 
7 pushes an turntable with wire and glances in mirror 
8 withdraws wire and looks at E then round room 
9 points to covered window and looks at E 
10 E nods signs stop the nosey people watching out there 
11 S reinserts wire in side of cage 
12 Looks at EE signs that's not working 
13 s continues then points to padlock and signs orange 
14 E signs what? sweet you sweet you 
15 S continues with wire in side of cage 
16 Looks at EE signs don't know try something different and 
points to box 
17 S looks in box 
18 picks up yellow rod and looks at E 
19 E signs you try 
20 S inserts yellow rod in side of cage and manipulates 
turntable 
21 slides box off turntable 
22 lloks at E 
23 pokes at sweet box with finger 
24 E points to perspex door S continues poking at box with 
finger 
25 E signs not with finger with stick 
26 S uses yellow rod to push box 
27 pushes box to perspex door and looks at E and mouths 
yeah 
28 inserts rod through far end of cage appears frustrated 
and looks at F 
29 E shakes head S looks at E and offers her yellow rod 
30 E signs no you do it 
31 E turns cage round 
32 S inserts rod in side of cage and pushes turntable 
33 Looks at e 
34 E guides childs hand so rod is above turntable 
35 S looks at E and signs box goes through door 
36 E points to slots in bars and signs which 
37 S gets rod behind box and moves it looks at E and signs 
sweet 
38 E signs try to get the sweet smiles and nods yes go on 
39 S moves box looks in mirror looks at E looks in mirror 
wipes mouth and looks at E sings there 
40 E nods and points to sweet box 
41 E shows perspex wall and signs how 
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Percentage of Visual Behaviours in Each category 
Dl D2 D3 I D4 I D5 I D6 I D7 
CAGE PROBLEM 
1 ý 
E 100.0100. C lOO. 0 14.3 100.0 100.0 00.0 
A 
T 14.3 
u 71.4 
BOTT LE PROBLEM 
E 52.9 66.7 14.3 80.0 
A 5.9 16.7 57.1 11.1 20.0 
T 16.6 28.6 33.3 
U 41.2 55.6 
SLID ER PROBLEM 
E 100.060.0 25.0 100. 66.6 100.0 
A 12.5 
T 20.0 37.5 75.0 33.3 
u 20.0 50.0 
Hl I H2 I H3 I H4 I H5 I H6 I H7 I H8 
CAGE PROBLEM 
E 16.7 12.5 
A 50.0 12.5 
T 33.3 50.0 
u 25.0 
BOTTLE PROBLEM 
E 30.0 25.0 
A 10.0 12.5 
T 25.0 
U 60.0 37.5 
SLIDER PROBLEM 
E 120.0 
A 28.5 25.0 
T 28.6 1 
U 42.9 125.0 
0.0 66.7 50.0 16.7 
100.0 10O. C16.7 
0.0 33.3 50.0 66.6 
00.0.28.6 33.3 33.31 25.0 
1 33.3 1 12.5 
57.1133.3 25.0 
t14 .3 
133 
.3 
133.3 137.5 
00.0.33.3 
166.7 120.0 12.5 
50.0175.0 70.0 75.0 
50.0 ; 25.0 10.0 12.5 
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Dominance Matrices - Chapter 5 
First Order Deaf 
Caqe Bottle Slider 
A 
Second Order 
EA TU 
E l 0 0 2 
A 0 0 0 0 
T O O 0 1 
U 0. 0 0 1 
Third Order 
EATU 
E1003 
A0000 
T0001 
u0001 
E l 0 0 3 
A 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 
U 0 0 0 1 
Sumary Matrices 
£ATU 
£ 1 1 1 0 
A 0 0 0 0 
T O 0 1 0 
U 1 0 0 1 
EA TU . 
1120 
A 0000 
TOO 10 
U 2111 
- EAT U 
£1130 
A 0000 
TOO 10 
U 3231 
EAT U 
E l 0 1 0 
A 0 0 1 0 
T 0 0 1 0 
U 0 0 0 1 
E A T U 
E l 0 2 0 
A 0 0 1 0 
f 0 0 1 0 
U 0 0 0 1 
E A T U 
E l 0 3 0 
A 0 0 1 0 
T O O 1 0 
U 0 0 0 1 
EATVEATUEATU 
E 1.83 0.00 0.00 3.00 E 1.83 1.83 2.33 0.00 E 1.83 0.00 3.00 0.00 
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 A 0.00 0.00 1.83 0.00 
T 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.83 T 0.00 0.00 1.83 1.00 T 0.00 0.00 1.83 0.00 
u 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.83 U 3.00 2.17 1.50 1.83 U 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.83 
E 1.83 0.00 0.00 3.00 
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 
T 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.83 
U 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.83 
E 1.83 1.83 2.33 0.00 I 
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
T 0.00 0.00 1.83 1.00 
U 3.00 2.17 1.50 1.83 
E 1.83 0.00 3.00 0.00 
A 0.00 0.00 1.83 0.00 
1 
T 0.00 0.00 1.83 0.00 
U 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.83 
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Dominance Matrices - Chapter 5 
First Order Raring 
Cage Bottle Slider 
EAT U 
£ 1 0 1 0 
A 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 
U 0 1 0 1 
Second Order 
£A TU - 
£ 1 1 2 1 
A 0 0 0 0 
T o 2 1 2 
U 0 1 1 1 
Third Order 
EATu 
1333 
A0000 
T0313 
u0212 
£ 1 3 3 3 
A 0 0 0 0 
T 0 3 1 3 
0 0 2 1 2 
sumary Matrices 
EATU 
E l l i 0 
A 0 0 0 0 
1' 0 0 1 1 
U 1 1 0 1 
- E A 1' U 
E l 1 2 1 
A 0 0 0 0 
T 1 1 1 2 
U 2 2 1 1 
E A T U 
1 2 2 3 3 
A 0 0 0 0 
? 3 3 2 3 
U 3 3 3 2 
- EAIU 
E l 0 1 1 
A 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 
U 0 1 0 1 
J E A I U 
E l 2 2 3 
A 0 0 0 0 
I 0 2 1 2 
U 0 1 0 1 
J E A I U 
£ 1 5 3 6 
A 0 0 0 0 
1 0 3 1 3 
U 0 1 0 1 
EATuEATuEATU 
T 1.83 1.50 3.00 1.50 E 2.17 2.17 3.00 1.50 E 1.83 2.67 3.00 4.50 
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00. A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
T 0.00 3.00 1.83 3.00 T 1.50 1.50 2.17 3.00 T 0.00 3.00 1.83 3.00 
U 0.00 2.17 0.83 2.17 U 3.00 3.00 1.50 2.17 U 0.00 2.17 0.83 2.17 
E 1.83 1.50 3.00 1.50 
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
T 0.00 3.00 1.83 3.00 
U 0.00 2.17 0.83 2.17 
E 2.17 2.17 3.00 1.50 
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00. 
T 1.50 1.50 2.17 3.00 
U 3.00 3.00 1.50 2.17 
E 11.83 2.67 3.00 4.50 
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
T 0.00 3.00 1.83 3.00 
U 0.00 2.17 0.83 2.17 
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Matrix Analyses Chapter 5 
PROBABILITY MATRICES 
EATu 
E 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
A 0.00 (1) 0.00 0.00 
T 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
u 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.80 
EATu 
E 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
A 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 
T 0.43 0.00 0.43 0.14 
u 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.25 
CAGE - DEAF 
EATu 
E 0.65 0.00 0.05 0.30 
A 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.33 
T 0.25 0.00 0.38 0.38 
u 0.33 0.08 0.25 0.33 
BOTTLE - DEAF 
EATu 
E 0.86 0.00 0.07 0.07 
A 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
T 0.29 0.00 0.57 0.14 
u 0.16 0.00 0.17 0.67 
SLIDER -DEAF 
Observed Probabilitv Vectors 
Deaf 
Cage [. 62 0.00 0.00 . 
38] 
Bottle [. 49 0.02 0.16 . 
32] 
Slider [. 54 0.00 0.25 . 
21] 
CAGE - HEARING 
EATu 
E 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.58 
A 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.75 
T 0.44 0.00 0.44 0.11 
u 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.40 
BOTTLE - HEARING 
EATu 
E 1-. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
A 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 
T 0.05 0.05 0.68 0.21 
u 0.14 0.00 0.71 0.14 
SLIDER - HEARING 
Hearinq 
[. 33 0.00 0.48 
. 
19] 
(. 37 0.00 0.20 
. 
43] 
[. 15 0.03 0.59 
. 
23] 
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Markov Model 
Notes. 1. The Markov model requires that all the rows in 
the matrix add up to 1. For the deaf cage matrix the A, A, 
cell has been given an entry of 1 in the probability matrix, 
even though there are no entries for the A row in the 
frequency matrices. This was a device to allow the matrix 
to be used in calculations. The justification, is that the 
value of 1 represents the probability of remaining in the 
state A, which is in this instances negative. This is 
admittedly arbitary, and could be argued to weaken the 
model. However, the remainder of the data is sufficient 
without the cage matrix. 
2. There are two kinds of Markov model; simple Markov 
chains, which are the type described here and Absorbing 
Markov chains. It wil be noticed that some of the matrices 
can be rearranged to give a matrix of the form; 
0pp 
10pp 
pppp 
Pppp 
where p=a probability. 
This is the form of matrix associated with absorbing Markov 
chains. Although it was recognised that an absorbing model 
might be relevant, especialy for the hearing data, it was 
felt that a) the small numbers involved and b) the 
prelimanary nature of this investigation did not warrent 
the more complex model. Obviously this should be 
considered in future investigations. 
Further Proofs, 
Deaf Model - Slider 
Bottle observed vector x Slider matrix 
[. 5 240 . 29 . 12) f [14.7 0 8.12 3.3 6] 
obs[15 07 6) n. s. 
Cage observed vector x Bottle matrix squared 
[. 496 00 . 318) f [13.9 008.9) 
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observed frequency vector and predicted frequency vector 
from bottle eqilibrium vector for cage. 
observed [8 00 5] 
predicted [6.9 004.5] n. s 
observed and predicted frquency vectors for Bottle problem 
observed [21 17 14] 
predicted [23.1 1.1 4.9 13.2] cage vector x Bottle Matrix 
equilibrium (20.1 1.1 7.1 13.4) 
Hearing Model 
Observed and predicted frequency vectors for Slider 
observed [5 1 20 8] 
chance vector x Slider matrix [10 .8 15.23 8.1] 
Cage matrix3 x Cage v ector (23.4 0 8 2.6] 
Bottle vector x Slider matrix [15.1 . 34 15.1 3.5] 
observed and predicted frequncy vectors for Bottle problem 
Observed [13 07 15] 
Cage *vector x Bottle matrix [14 0 9.2 15.8] 
Chance vector x Bottle matrix [12.3 0 6.5 * 15.8 ] 
equilibrium vector [12.9 0 7.5 13.9) 
BLANK IN ORIGINAL 
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Appendix 6 
Floor plans of equipment layout in nursery for first three 
raonths 
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Appendix 
-7 
1. Score sheet for interaction observations 
2. Stylistic half complete man. 
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INTERACTIONS 
__ - 
coder: 
L 
child method from child to 
-- 
to child No. turns 
from 
VT SX A C S AC 
VT SN A C S AC 
VT SX A C S AC 
VT Sx A C S AC 
vT Sx A C S AC 
VT SN A C S AC 
VT SM A C S AC 
VT SM A C S AC 
VT SM A C S AC 
VT SM A C S AC 
VT SX A C S AC 
VT SM A C S AC 
VT SM A C S AC 
VT SX A C S AC 
VT SX A C S AC 
VT SX A C S AC 
VT SM A C S AC 
VT Sx A C S AC 
VT SM A C S AC 
VT -S X A C S AC 
VT SM A C S AC 
VT SM A C S AC 
VT SX A C S AC 
VT SX A C S AC 
V'T SM A C S AC 
VT SN A C S AC 
VT SN A C S AC 
VT SX A C S AC 
VT SX A C S AC 
VT SX A C S AC 
VT SM A C S AC 
VT Sx A C S AC 
VT SM A C S AC 
vT Sx A C S AC 
VT SX 
f 
A C S AC 
Comments 
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Appendix 8 
1. Raw data for mirror interactions 
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Event Analysis Old Deaf Group 
present chi cildren children children adult group 
type play syzb parallel parallel parallel f/play symbolic 
location Y/house table table table w/house W/house 
time 13: 33: 42 13: 52: 19 13: 52: 23 13: 45: 19 13: 08: 29 13: 09: 
unit 04 19 24 23 19 25 26 129 
31 32 33 36 
Event Triger 
intention Incidental II 
Deliberate 21 
Not known 31 
Continuation 4 
focus Sees self 511 
Sees other' 611111 
sees event 7 
location front 8 
behind 9 
left 10 
right 11 
Event Content 
type watch 12 11111 
converse 13 
monitor 14 
explore 15 
comment 16 111 
dialogue 17 
initiate 18 
number turns 19 
focus self 20 11111 
self as other 21 
child 22 1111 
adult 23 
environment 24 
imaginary 25 
direction Beccessary 26 
peripheral 27 11 
optional 28 1 
Terminate 
duration 29 3151341121115 
End type fistracted 30 11 
natural end 31 
switch to real 32 1 
another mirror 33 
return to activ 34 1 
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alone alone group group alone group group 
syxbo 1ic symbolic sysbo Iic syxbo Iic symbolic symbolic motor 
w/house w/house W/house Y/house V/house V/bouse vlhouse 
13: 15: 34 13: 17: 47 13: 19: 51 13: 19: 59 13: 30: 38 13: 32: 15 13: 34: 30 
34 1 1 47 t S1 t I SQ It IR f I Is 11 41 -S7 t 10 42 58 34 
36 2 
-4- 
20 2 7 1 6 14 
112 
11 3 1 2 
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group alone group 
syabolic messy restart 
w/house S/Pit previous 
13: 39: 17 13: 19: 20 13: 22: 52 
17 49 36 20 24 27 39 7 14 15 17 21 35 51 4 27 35 38 50 58 5 22 56 20 40 57 51 4 17 
4 12 4 2 2 3 3 
712 1 11 1 113 21111271621411322361223 
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group adult 
liessy messy 
S/Pit S/pi 
13: 25: 52 13: 28: 29 
5 : 52 2 17 28 32 42 53 0 45 54 3 9 24 31 38 56 57 21 22 : 29 36 56 57 10 20 32 33 34 56 57. 
3 2 2 2 3 3 2 
2 11 44 1 2 3 1 3 2 1 1 4 1 6 6 1 1 1 2 ! 
ý2 21 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
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group child child 
watch messy messy 
bike S/pit S/Pi 
13: 31: 02 13: 31: 37 13: 32: 21 
2 11 53 t23 . 37 39 1 3 6 15 27 35 42 44 46 48 52 1 19 31 12 21 23 24 25 jaean 
17 
1 72 
I1 1 24 
0 
1 29 
I 
0 
I I1 1 67 
1 19 
1 26 
11 43 
15 
7 
5 
34 
10 
I 
4 2 2 2 9 17 2 106 3.926 
I 11 63 
1 14 
1 17 
1 1 22 
1 
4 
I 1 21 
1 1 9 1 1. 21 2 3 7 1 8 1 2 1 2 1 4 18 3 38 1 211 3 412 3.614 
1 6 
28 
1 24 
41 
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intention 
focus 
location 
type 
ocus 
direction 
End type 
Event Analysis Young Deaf Grou 
type play 
location t/table do 
present group 
tille 14: 45: 02 14: 45: 45 
-4 41* IC 10 CA CI) C1 
do do 
14: 45: 50 14: 52: 47 53 54 55 56 14: 53: 
CA Cl * 11 JO CA CI In IC CA AC In t Cl 17 
do 
Event Triger 
Incidental 1 
Deliberate 
Rot known 
Continuation 
Sees self I 
Sees other 
sees event 
front 
behind 
left- 
right I 
Event Content 
watch I 
converse 
explore 
comment 
dialogue 
initiate 
number turns 3 5 
self I I 1 1 1 1 
self as other 
self as actor 
child 
adult I I 
environment 
imaginary 
neccessary 
peripheral 
optional I I 
Terminate 
duration 14 2 2 2 1 3 1 8 1 1 2 2 5 9 1. 3 4 2 2 
Distracted 
interrupted 
natural end 
switch to real I I 
another mirror 
return to activ I 
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syjabo I ic 2es 
do w/house t1table S/P 
alone group chi 
52 54 14: 54: 55 14: 21: 43 14: 30: 55 37 40 42 43 44 45 13: 
34 36 47 52 155 4 A3 45 46 56 55 13 22 30 43 55 32 35 37 58 1 28 36 42 45 56 58 60 
5 5 3 6 2 1 2 1 6 7 113 6 5 3 2 4 3 1 8 6 2 6 2 8 2 
I 
I I I 
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sy Ressy sysbolic 
it S/Pit t/table t/table Y/house 
Id sib alone children children alone 
45: 00 13: 47: 08 48 14: 31: 49 14: 46: 41 13: 42: 
I IU Ii IV 0 Li J3 1 14 49 40 44 J1 qu qj 46 )z 31 M ýo qI 
32 33 2 4 37 39 21 19 25 20 22 29 28 44 
964 7 4 2 4 2 
1 1 1 5 1 2 1 1 1 19 10 6 2 13 2 7 54 5 63 3 43 8 3 17 
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r/t symbolic 
w/house 
child group 
33 47 49 51 52 13: 45: 35 50 51 52 53 54 
.. 11 v I 4ý . 11 it I ji J7 IV 11 li IV it IV if iv lj il J2 7V Ij L. 7 IV iv ji 
45 46 
3 5 
5 8 3 6 2 3 4 3 4 2.1 2 1 5 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 4 8 1 1 21 4 1 
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r/t 
Y/house 
child 
56 13: 50: 40 
32 15 16 17 40 man S. d. Mal min 
20 
59 
0 
33 
0 
77 
32 
3 
53 
17 
27 
35 
0 
72 
11 
2 
23 
4 
0 
6 65 4.333 2.024 92 
26 
1 16 
37 
14 
18 
2 
o 
73 
12 
1 1 1 26 
0 
13 1 1 4 11 420 3.750 3.362 19 
9 
5 
0 
28 
33 
1 37 
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Appendix 9 
1. Frequency matrices 
2. Dominance matrices 
3. Transitional probability matrices 
4. Data for Markov Model proof 
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Chapter 9 Data for Matrix Analyses 
Frequency Matrices 
Cage 
E 
E 
Slider 
E 
Doxinance Matrices 
First Order 
-EATu E I I 1 0 
u 0 0 1 1 
Second Order 
EATU 
E1221 
A0011 
T0111 
u0171 
A 
EAT U 
£ 1 1 1 1 
A 1 0 0 0 
T 1 0 0 0 
U 1 0 0 0 
E A T U 
E 4 1 1 1 
A 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
U 1 1 1 1 
Third Order 
- EAT U 
E l ) 4 3 
A 0 1 2 1 
T O 1 2 2 
U 0 2 3 2 
E 
E 
A 
Sumiary Matrices 
EATU-EATU 
E 1.80 3.00 3.30 1.06 E 5.30 2.80 2.80 2.80 
A 0.00 0.30 0.80 1.00 A 2.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
T 0.00 1.80 2.06 0.80 T 2.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
U 0.00 0.80 1.80 0.30 U 2.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
E 1.80 3.00 3.30 1.06 
A 0.00 0.30 0.80 1.00 
T 0.00 1.80 2.06 0.80 
U 0.00 0.80 1.80 0.30 
E 5.30 2.80 2.80 2.80 I 
A 2.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
T 2.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
u 2.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Transitional Probability Matrice 
EATUEATU 
E 0.79 0.05 0.16 0.00 E 0.43 0.14 0.28 1.40 
A 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.00 A 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
T 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.25 T 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
u 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 u 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observed Probability Vectors 
Cage [. 66 . 06 . 19 . 091 Slider [. 61 . 09 . 18 . 091 
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Further Proofs 
Observed and predicted frequency vectors for Cage problem 
observed (21 2 6 3) 
Equilibrium vector (19.8 2.3 5.3 2.7] 
Slider equilib. vector x Cage matrix [20.6 2.4 5.5 2.7) 
Chance vector x Cage Matrix [15.5 4.4 5.9 5.9) 
Observed and predicted frequency vectors for Slider 
Problem 
observed (7 1- 2 1] 
Cage vector x Cage matrix2 [6-9 .9 2 1.5) 
Equilibrium vector [6.7 .9 1.9 . 91 
Chance vector x Slider Matrix [9.4 .4 . 77 . 38] 
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Appendix 10 
1. Drawing of Tower-of-Hanoi 
2. Problem sets 
3. Example of transcript 
4. Score sheets 
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7'- "5- T rfU tul 0FHP. H0 13- 
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Problem Sets - Tower-of-Hanoi 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
1 MOVE 
Intial state Goal state 
Jý y R/G R y G 
G y R G R/Y X 
x x R/Y/G R x Y/G 
R Y/G X x R/Y/G X 
2 MOVE 
R/G X y G y R 
G y R R/Y/G X x 
y R G x x R/Y/G 
y x R/G R y G 
3 MOVE 
G x R/Y G y R 
G x R/Y R/Y/G X x 
R/Y X G R y G 
x R/Y G x x R/Y/G 
4 MOVE 
x R/Y G R/Y/G X x 
x G R/Y G y R 
x G R/Y R/Y/G X x 
R x Y/G G y R 
5 MOVE 
x y R/G R/Y/G X x 
x x R/Y/G G y R- 
R/Y/G X x R y G 
G y R x x R/Y/G 
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Problem 12 xX3X Y/R G Tower 
I moves S red to S blue peg and S yellow to S green and S 
red to S yellow 
Problem 13 3XXX Y/R G Tower(4) 
I moves S green to S blue peg and S red to S black peg and 
S yellow to S green and S red to S yellow 
Problem 14 GYRXG Y/R Flat 
1 Moves S green to S blue peg and S red to S orange peg 
2 Looks at cups and moves S yellow to to S green and S red 
to S black peg and S yellow to S orange peg 
Problem 15 3XXXG Y/R Tower 
1 moves S green to S blue peg and S red to S orange peg 
and S yellow to S green and S red to S yellow 
Problem 16 GYRRX Y/G 
1 Moves S yellow to S orange peg 
2 Looks at cups 
3 Moves S red to S green and then S yellow 
4 Moves S green to S blue peg and S red to S black peg 
Problem 17 3XXXY G/R Tower (5) 
1 Moves S red to S blue peg 
2 Looks at cups 
3 Moves S yellow to S green 
4 Looks at cups 
5 Moves S red to S orange peg then back to S blue peg 
6 Moves S yellow to S orange peg 
7 Looks at cups 
8 Moves S red to S yellow and S green to S blue peg and S 
red to S black peg and S yellow to S green and S red to S 
yellow 
Problem 18 XX3GYR Tower 
1 looks at cups 
2 moves S rd to S yellow and S green to S black peg and S 
red to S blue peg and S yellow to S green and S red to S 
yellow 
Problem 19 GYRxx3 Flat 
1 Moves S red to S blue peg and S yellow to S orange peg 
and S red to S yellow and S green to S blue peg and S red 
to S black peg 
Problen 20 RYG3xx Flat 
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Tower-of-Hanoi - Score sheets 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
F T F T F T T F F T 
R/L R/L R/L L/R B R/L L/R B R/L R/L 
Hl 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1+1 3 
4 
H2 Ec Ec 1 2 1 1+1 2 3 1+1 
3 1 1 1 5 
IL 2 1 
1 4 
H3 1 1 1 2 2 2 1+1 3 
4 
H4 1 Ec 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 
1 
H5 I 1 1 1 4. 2 2 3 
.3 
H6 1 1 1 5 3 2 2 2 4. 3 
I 
2 
H7 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1+1 1 
. 1+1 3 
4 
Dl 1 Ec 1 2 1+1 1 2 1 3 
1 2 2 3 
D2 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 
D3 1 Ec 1 1 2 2 2 1+1 1 1+1 
Ec 3 1 1 
1 3 1+1 
2+1 
4 
D4 1 Ec 2 1 1+1 Ec Ec 2 1+1 1 
1 2 2 1 1+1 1+1 
I I 1+I 
3 3 5 
D5 1 Ec 1 1 2 2 2 21 1 
Ec 1+1 3 
I I 
1 1 
I 
3 
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Tower-of-Hanoi Score sheets cont 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
F T T F T 
I 
F T T F F 
L/R L/R R/L R/L R/ L B R/L L/R R/L L/R 
Hi 4 3 4 5 4 4 8 5 5 5 
H2 I 1+1 2+1 4 3+1 2+1 1+1 3+1 
I+I 1 8 8 8+1 1 5 
4 3 12 6 
113 3 3 4 5 6 6 5 5 8 8 
H4 4 3 6 4 4 7 5 10 6 7 
H5 3 3 4 4 4 6 5 5 5 8 
4 
H6 1+I 1+1 4 6 4 4 5 5 3+1 5 
4 4 5 
H7 3 3 3+1 6 2+1 4 3 5 6 2+1 
4 5 5 7 
Dl 3 3 4 4 4 1+1 1+1 5 2+1 
4 5 1+1 
4+41 
6 
D2 3 3 6 4 4 4 5 5 5 8 
6 
D3 1 3 4 2+1 4 
1 2+1 
1+1 4 
3 
D4 3+1 3 2+1 41 4 
3 4+1 4 
5 
D5 I I 1 4 
3 1+1 1 
1+1 4 
I 
3 
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Appendix 11 
1. Programme documentation 
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PROGRAMME NOTES 
1. Introduction 
The materials consist of a suit of seven programmes. 
Static or moving dot patterns are generated in a3x3 
grid. Patterns may consist of 3,4 or 5 dots. 
Response input, which is via a concept keyboard, is recorded 
on disc along with an identifying pattern number and 
pattern type (i. e. static or moving). 
2. Programmes 
"HEADI" and "HEAD2" produce introduction screens. 11PRACSS11, 
"PRACMM", "STATIC3" and "PATERN4" are the main programmes, 
which generate the memory tests and collect the responses. 
"READ" allows the data files made in the test programmes to 
be printed out. 
2.1 Running the programmes 
Vhen the disc is BOOTed, HEAD1 is run. This initiates a 
practice session, in which the rules of the 'game' can be 
explained to the child. A menu allows selection of either 
static or moving patterns. These are generated by PRACSS 
<static) or PRACMM (moving) which are CHAINed from within 
the programme. From within these programmes the user has 
the option to change the type of pattern or to move to 
experimental trials. 
If the user opts to begin the experimental trials HEAD2 is 
CHAINed. The user is asked to input the name of the child. 
This opens a file on DRIVE 1 with the name of the child. A 
menu allows selection of pattern type and CHAIN's either 
STATIC3 or FATERN4. These generate the experimental trials 
and record responses in the opened file in DRIVE 1. Within 
these programmes the user has the option to change pattern 
type or to end the session. 
Ending the session causes a prompt to "CHECK DATA FILE" to 
appear an the screen. Once this point is reached the file is 
closed and the programmes must be reBOOTed. 
The READ programme is on the DATA disc and can be BOOTed. 
3. Variables 
Z$, Y$ - graphics for grid 
291 
AS - Array for grid 
DS - Dot 
CS - erases dot 
IM - name for data f ile 
G$ - get variable 
D= number of dots in pattern 
P= pattern number 
S= response square number 
N= cell number of concept keyboard 
CK value from user port 
H=1 sec, per dot in pattern 
FIX = time lapse of Isec 
A= numeric array holding TRUE/FALSE values for grid 
squares 
T nost recent value of S 
F% channel number for file operations 
X, Y control variables 
4. PRDCeedures 
PROCinit - initialises variables, defines characters, text 
window and colours, dimensions arrays. 
PROCdraw draws 3x3 grid and writes pattern type 
PROCreset removes pattern dots after childs responses 
PROCtime sets time dot(s) will remain in square(s) 
PROCselect - gets pattern number from keyboard input. 
FROCone to PRDCnine - draws dot in square I to 9. In 
PRACMX and PATERN4 also erases dot after 1 sec 
PROCtrue resets all elements of array A to TRUi 
PROCagain gets childs response and sets options for next 
trialýor end 
PROCCK - gets value of concept keyboard cell from userport 
PROCCKS - claculates value of S from concept keyboard cell 
number 
5. Nodifications suggested in Chapter 11 
PROCck contains the code for handling information from the 
input device. If a tough sensitive screen is used then the 
code in this PROCedure would need to be chnaged to that 
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relevant to the new device. All associted variables will be 
the same. 
To make the dots flash the arguments to the COLOUR command 
in PROCinit need to be changed e. g. 
COLOUR I 
VDU 19,1,19,0,0,0 
will cause COLOUR 1 to be written as flashing red-cyan. 
